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A bstract
This thesis studies the interactions between financial markets, monetary policy, and the real economy. 
It analyses the role of financial markets in business cycle fluctuations and explores issues concerning 
systemic financial stability.
Chapter One develops a dynamic general equilibrium model in which firms and banks face fi­
nancial frictions in obtaining external funds. The model exhibits an unconventional bank capital 
channel as monetary policy affects the economy partly via its effect on bank capital. We show that 
the dynamic interactions between bank capital, firm net worth and asset price amplify and propagate 
the effect of a monetary shock in the macroeconomy.
Chapter Two empirically investigates the importance of financial markets in the monetary trans­
mission. The analysis is based on the argument that the real money stock serves as a proxy for 
the relative yields of various non-money assets that m atter for aggregate demand. Using Thailand 
data, we find that the two-asset assumption is biased and that this problem can be ameliorated by 
introducing an explicit role for money into standard macroeconomic models.
Chapter Three develops a numerically-solvable version of our general model [Goodhart, Suni- 
rand, and Tsomocos (2003)] to analyse financial fragility. The model incorporates heterogeneous 
agents and therefore leads to different simulation results from those obtained when using standard 
representative agent models; the effect of a shock depends on the part of the economy on which it 
falls and can generally shift the distribution of income and welfare between agents.
Chapter Four proposes a general equilibrium model incorporating three heterogeneous banks. 
This allows us to study not only the interactions between any two individual banks, but also their 
inter-relationship with the rest of the banking sector. The model is calibrated against real UK 
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Introduction
This thesis studies the interactions between financial markets, monetary policy, and the real economy. 
It consists of two main parts. The first part (Chapters One and Two) explores such interactions 
over time. It analyses the role of financial markets in real business cycle fluctuations, focusing 
on its implications for the monetary policy transmission mechanism. The second part (Chapters 
Three and Four) addresses issues concerning systemic financial stability. Its main emphasis is on 
the interactions between heterogeneous banks in the financial sector and their inter-relationship with 
heterogeneous private agents which in turn could produce real contagion effects in the real economy.
The idea that financial markets are not just a ‘veil’, and therefore play an important role in 
business cycle fluctuations, has long been the key standpoint of the credit view of the monetary 
transmission mechanism. Instead of assuming that all non-money financial assets are perfect substi­
tutes and that they can be aggregated into a single composite asset called ‘bond’, the credit view 
argues that macroeconomic models for monetary policy need to depart from this so-called ‘two as­
set world’ assumption by introducing certain forms of market imperfections in financial markets. 
This, in turn, would break the ‘perfect substitutability’ property across different non-money assets, 
thereby generating a non-trivial role for financial factors in the monetary transmission process.
There are three broad forms of imperfect substitutability between non-money assets proposed 
in the literature, each of which represents a distinct credit channel. The first, the so-called bank 
lending channel, assumes that loans and securities are imperfect substitutes, both for borrowers and 
banks. Put differently, at the heart of the bank lending channel is the lack of perfect substitutes 
for bank loans on the part of borrowers and the lack of perfect substitutes for (reservable) deposit 
liabilities on the liability side of the banking sector’s balance sheet. The second form, the so-called 
balance sheet channel, emphasises the imperfect substitutability between firms’ internal and external 
sources of finance, i.e. firms’ debt and equity. In the past decade, this balance sheet channel has been 
formalised in the context of dynamic general equilibrium models to study the interactions between
10
firm net worth, monetary policy, and business cycle fluctuations. 1
The third channel, the most recently identified one thus far, is the bank capital channel. In 
this case it is argued that a monetary policy shock can affect bank lending and aggregate economic 
activities through its direct impact on bank capital.2 One key assumption underpinning this channel 
is that banks’ debt and equity are imperfect substitutes. In the literature, this usually arises from 
the presence of an exogenously given regulatory capital requirement, e.g. Van den Heuvel (2001) 
and Bolton and Freixas (2000). In Chapter One, we show that a form of imperfect substitutability 
between banks’ debt and equity can also emerge from an agency problem between banks and their 
depositors. Since this implies that these banks face market-based, as opposed to regulatory-based, 
capital requirements, we are able to identify an unconventional bank capital channel.3 Moreover, 
the standard bank capital channel of monetary transmission has only been studied in the context of 
partial equilibrium models of banks’ asset and liability management.4 This implies that the dynamic 
interactions between bank capital, monetary policy, and aggregate macro variables such as aggregate 
output, investment and prices have not been formally analysed.
In Chapter One, we embed a ‘double’ costly state verification (CSV) problem into the otherwise 
standard dynamic general equilibrium model with price stickiness. It is ‘double’ because both firms 
and banks face endogenous financial frictions in obtaining external finance. This, in turn, implies 
that a wedge between the internal and external costs of funds exists for both firms and banks, thereby 
motivating an endogenous role for firms’ and banks’ inside capital in the model. The novel feature of 
this double CSV approach is that, while retaining rigorous microfoundations developed in the theory
d e c e n t  contribution on this front includes Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999), Carlstrom and Fuerst (2001), 
and Kiyotaki and Moore (1997). For a comprehensive survey on this issue, see Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999). 
A survey and overview of the bank lending and balance sheet channels in general can be found in Kashyap and Stein  
(1994), Freixas and Rochet (1997), among others.
2In the literature, several papers argue that bank capital also plays a distinct role in the m onetary policy trans­
mission by affecting the strength of the ‘bank lending’ channel (see, for exam ple, Van den Heuvel (2002), Jayaratne 
and Morgan (2000), Kishan and Opiela (2000), and Gambacorta and M istrulli (2004)). According to the bank lending  
channel, a contractionary m onetary policy affects bank lending because the decrease in reservable  deposits cannot 
be com pletely offset by issuing non-reservable  liabilities, i.e. lack of perfect substitutes for reservable deposits. Since 
the market for bank debt is not frictionless and non-reservable liabilities are typically not insured, investors would  
demand a ‘lem on’s prem ium ’. In this case, banks with less capital are more exposed to agency problems and have to  
face a higher cost of non-reservable funding. Thus, the bank lending channel is stronger for banks with lower levels 
of capital. This role for bank capital, however, differs from that played in the bank capital channel in that, while the  
former treats bank capital as given in response to monetary policy shocks, the latter explicitly takes into account the  
direct effect of such shocks on bank capital. For exam ple, as argued by Van den Heuvel (2001), given that banks’ 
assets have a longer m aturity than their liabilities, they are exposed to interest rate risk. Thus, their profitability and  
capital decline in response to a m onetary policy tightening. A drop in bank capital then feeds back to constrain bank  
lending and economic activities.
3The standard bank capital channel, as defined by Van den Heuvel (2001), relies on the following three hypotheses. 
First, there is an imperfect market for bank capital, i.e. banks cannot costlessly issue new equity. Second, banks are 
subject to  interest rate risk since their assets typically have longer m aturity than their liabilities. Third, banks have to  
meet regulatory capital requirements set by financial regulators. The bank capital channel identified in Chapter One 
differs from the standard one in that the third hypothesis is replaced by the assum ption that banks face an agency  
problem in obtaining external funds from depositors.
4 Chapter One provides a detailed literature review on the issue.
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of banking literature, it is simple and analytically tractable enough to be readily embedded into the 
standard Dynamic New Keynesian (DNK) model for monetary policy. This enables us to study, both 
qualitatively and quantitatively, how the dynamic evolution of bank capital operates to enrich the 
transmission mechanism of monetary policy by augmenting the dynamics of other aggregate macro 
variables, including aggregate investment, output and asset price.
We conduct a simulation analysis, where the steady state equilibrium is calibrated to match U.S. 
data, in order to study the quantitative importance of bank capital in business cycle fluctuations 
in response to a monetary policy shock. The results highlight a ‘financial accelerator’ effect in that 
the endogenous evolution of bank capital, and its dynamic interplay with that of firm net worth and 
asset prices, operates to amplify and propagate the effect of a monetary shock in the macroeconomy. 
Banks’ and firms’ inside capital plays a principal role here because lower bank capital and firm net 
worth means that both firms and banks have less inside capital to contribute to the firms’ investment 
projects. This implies that the agency problem faced by depositors, who are the ultimate lenders, is 
intensified. As compensation, they therefore require a higher external finance premium in the form 
of higher deposit rates. Since this directly imposes a greater cost of borrowing on banks, lending 
rates rise. Given a higher external cost of funds for firms, aggregate investment and output have to 
decrease compared with their corresponding levels as implied by conventional frictionless models. 
To the extent that bank capital and firm net worth are procyclical, an external finance premium 
will be countercyclical and thus operates as a propagation mechanism to the model’s dynamics.
As mentioned, the way that financial markets are usually entered in the monetary transmission 
process relies on the validity of the two-asset world assumption. If such assumption is invalid, as 
the proponents of the credit view would argue, the effect of monetary policy from its initial impulse 
to the ultimate responses on real aggregate macro variables involves changes in relative yields of 
various non-money financial assets. One way of taking macroeconomic models away from the two- 
asset assumption is by explicitly introducing some forms of imperfect substitutability among different 
financial assets in the models. This is the approach pursued in Chapter One. Though analytically 
insightful, the extent of complexity of such an approach can become overwhelmingly high when 
multiple financial assets are simultaneously introduced. Another approach, proposed by Meltzer 
(2001), is to incorporate an explicit role of the real money stock in the models as an auxiliary proxy 
for unidentified monetary transmission channels which arise from changes in relative yields of a 
wide array of non-money assets. The real money stock is, arguably, a reasonable proxy in this case 
because the demand for money is generally a function of these yields.
Chapter Two presents an empirical investigation of the validity of the two-asset assumption
12
based on Meltzer’s theoretical argument. Using Thailand data, we tested for the significance of the 
role for the real money stock as an explicit determinant of aggregate demand under a number of 
different specifications of IS equations. We found that lagged real money growth enters all of these 
IS equations positively, sizably, and significantly, even when the short-term risk free rate is explicitly 
controlled for. This implies that the real money stock has information content concerning aggregate 
demand fluctuations over and above that captured by the short-term interest rate. This finding is 
consistent with those found for developed countries such as the U.K. and U.S.5
Methodologically this chapter also has something new to offer. In particular, the analysis is 
also based on hybrid IS equations which essentially allow for both forward looking and backward 
looking behaviour of rational agents. We argue that this enables us to identify separately the two 
distinct forms of changes in relative yields of financial assets that money is conventionally found to 
proxy; one being the changes along the term structure of interest rate (the term structure effect) 
and the other being the changes in relative risk premia among different kinds and classes of assets 
(the risk premium effect). Given that the risk premium effect is found to be strong and statistically 
significant, we argue that the two-asset world assumption, which has long underpinned conventional 
macroeconomic models, including the class of models with microfoundations, becomes inherently 
distorting. This problem can be ameliorated by introducing an explicit role for money into the 
model. This is because the real money stock may serve as a reasonable stand-in for the relative 
yields of various risky assets which are important for aggregate demand fluctuations.
The underlying assumption of the models used in Chapters One and Two is that each sector in the 
economy has agents which behave identically. This ‘representative agent’ assumption greatly reduces 
the technical complexity of the models to the extent that they can be presented in an infinite-horizon 
format. This, in turn, enables us to analyse the dynamic interactions between financial markets, 
monetary policy and the real economy over time. However, the representative agent assumption is 
no longer justifiable when applying to a model whose aim is to address issues concerning systemic 
financial stability such as bank inter-linkages, financial contagion and crises. This is because such an 
assumption obscures many of the economic and behavioural inter-relationships among agents within 
each sector, particularly in the banking sector. By assuming homogeneity in the banking sector, 
either all banks fail or they all survive in face of some assumed common shock. In such a case, 
financial contagion among banks and their inter-linkages cannot, almost by definition, occur.
So, in order to study systemic financial stability we need a model which incorporates heteroge­
neous banks. There must also be active markets wherein banks interact with each other and the
5 A literature review on the issue is provided in Chapter Two.
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household sector, e.g. via the interbank and credit markets. The existence of these markets, in 
turn, allows a process of contagion to take place in response to some assumed shock. We also need 
default to exist, since if there were no default, there would be no crises. Moreover, financial markets 
cannot be complete. Otherwise banks can always hedge themselves against all kinds of eventualities, 
in which case, there would, again, be no crises. In addition, equilibria in incomplete markets are 
constrained inefficient, implying that policy matters and can be welfare improving. We also need 
a Central Bank and a regulator who respectively conduct monetary and regulatory policies so that 
the dynamic interactive effects of such policies on the banking sector and the real economy can be 
analysed. Since the focus here is not to study the interactions of agents over time, we can simplify 
the analysis, without loss of generality, by assuming a finite (two period) horizon model. In Good­
hart, Sunirand and Tsomocos (2003), we developed a general equilibrium model with an endowment 
economy incorporating all these features.
In Goodhart, Sunirand and Tsomocos (2003), we have shown that an equilibrium exists and that 
financial fragility, characterised by reduced aggregate bank profitability and increased aggregate 
default, occurs as an equilibrium phenomenon. However, owing to the scale of the model which 
contains B  heterogeneous banks, H  households, S  possible states in the second period, a variety 
of financial assets, and default, it is impossible to find a numerical solution to this general model. 
This implies that the model cannot be readily applied to study the behavioural responses of each 
economic agent and their possible inter-linkages through various interactive contagion channels in 
face of some assumed shocks.
So Chapter Three of this thesis presents simplified, and thus numerically solvable, versions of the 
general model. The economy consists of two heterogeneous banks, each of which is distinguished by 
a unique risk/return preference, and different initial capital endowments, and three heterogeneous 
households who either borrow from or deposit with the banks. Moreover, a Central Bank conducts 
monetary policy through open market operations, and a regulator fixes the bankruptcy codes for 
households and banks as well as sets the capital adequacy requirements for banks. We assume that 
there are five types of competitive markets wherein agents actively interact; commodity, consumer 
loan, deposit, interbank and asset (Arrow security) markets. For asymmetric information standard 
reasons, we assume a limited participation in the consumer loan markets.6 We also allow agents to 
default in some of the financial markets subject to the penalty set by the regulator. This setting was 
chosen as our base-line specification because it is the simplest possible given that we need at least two
6In Bhattacharya, G oodhart, Sunirand, and Tsom ocos (2003) we show that restricted participation in the loan 
market can also emerge as an equilibrium outcom e if we incorporate a relative performance criterion in banks’ objective  
functions, i.e. banks have a preference to outperform their com petitors.
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heterogeneous banks in order to analyse the intra-sector contagion effect within the banking sector 
via their interaction in the interbank and asset markets, and the possible inter-sector contagion 
effect involving the real sector via the credit, deposit, asset and commodity markets. Moreover, such 
a setting allows default in one market, e.g. a consumer loan market, to produce additional source 
of contagion to the others and the rest of the economy.
Given the arbitrarily chosen values of the exogenous variables/parameters in the model, e.g. the 
Central Bank’s and the regulator’s policy choices, we solve numerically for an initial equilibrium. 
We then conduct a series of comparative statics analysis by perturbing the values of the exogenous 
variables one at a time and tracing the new equilibria of the simulations. This allows us to study how 
the multiple markets and the agents’ choice variables interact, and how the many system-wide effects 
determine prices, interest rates and real allocations. In general, the simulation results highlight the 
importance of the main innovative feature of the model that the real world is heterogeneous; agents 
and banks are not all alike. We found that the effect of a shock may depend on the particular agent, 
and part of the economy, on which it falls and can generally shift the distribution of income, and 
welfare, between agents in a complex way. For example, a positive shock which is concentrated in 
one part of the economy may produce adverse negative contagion effects onto others and therefore 
does not necessarily improve the welfare and overall payoff of everyone in the economy. We found 
that monetary policy also has a distributional effect on the economy, implying that a trade-off 
between economic efficiency and financial stability exists not only for regulatory policies but also 
for monetary policy. Moreover, we found that regulatory policy can be seen as a mirror image of 
monetary policy since it affects banks’ credit extension via their portfolio decisions. Finally, agents 
who have more investment opportunities can deal with negative shocks more effectively since they 
are able to transfer negative externalities to others.
Although we show that the model presented in Chapter Three can be solved numerically, its 
major disadvantage is that the solutions obtained are based on an arbitrarily chosen initial condition. 
The outcome, therefore, is a somewhat artificial construct of our own assumed inputs and may not 
correspond to the particular economic regime of the economy whose systemic risk and financial 
fragility we want to study. In Chapter Four, we take a step further by attempting to calibrate an 
alternative version of the general model against real UK banking data. Its primary objective is to 
construct a model which can be implemented by central banks and financial regulators as a tool 
to assess risk for banks. The main innovation of the model is that, unlike existing models for this 
purpose which focus almost entirely on individual institutions7, it allows endogenous interaction
7 See, for example, Hoggarth, Logan, and Zicchino (2004).
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between banks, recognising that the actual risk to which an individual bank is exposed also depends 
on its interaction with other banks and other private sector agents.
A banking system in reality generally comprises more than two banks. In order to study in­
teractions between these multiple banks, we need at least a setting of three heterogeneous banks 
so that we can study dynamic inter-relationships between any two specific banks as well as their 
interactions with the rest of the banking sector, which is represented by the third bank. Moreover, 
given the lack of disaggregated household and private investors’ portfolio data8, we model household 
behaviour via reduced-form equations which relate their actions to a variety of economic variables 
such as GDP, interest rates, and aggregate credit supply.9 In this sense, the model presented in 
Chapter Three is a partially-microfounded general equilibrium model. However, the main aspects of 
equilibrium analysis such as market clearing, rational expectation, and agent optimisation are main­
tained. Moreover, contagion effects between the banking sector and the real economy still operate 
actively in equilibrium via the reduced-form equations. Thus, we adhere to the general equilibrium 
spirit of our general model presented in Goodhart et al. (2003) and the model presented in Chapter 
Three.
We show that the model can be used as a stress-testing tool for the UK banking sector. In 
particular, we address the impact of monetary policy and regulatory policy as well as GDP and 
capital shocks in the UK banking sector and the real economy. The focus of our stress-testing 
exercises is on adjustments in the interbank market wherein banks have mutual exposures, and in 
the relative interest rates on deposits and loans. Hence, in part via changes in bank margins, this 
feeds back into changes in bank profitability, capital and capital adequacy requirements. Moreover, 
changes in aggregate credit supply in the banking sector via each bank’s portfolio adjustment decision 
affect aggregate output and household default probability in the economy.
Our simulation results identify at least two key channels of contagion which operate actively in 
our model. The first is the interbank rate channel whereby the effect of a shock, which is initially 
concentrated in a particular group of banks, produces contagion effects to the rest of the banks in the 
banking sector via the adjustment in the interbank rate. This is because such adjustment directly 
affects the cost of interbank borrowing for every bank which has net exposure in the interbank 
market. The second is the consumer loan default channel. The main idea of this channel is that a 
higher default probability of a particular group of households in the loan markets increases the default 
risk to which banks are exposed. Since the loan markets are perfectly competitive, these banks are
8For example, the m onetary and good endowment of each bank’s borrowers and depositors.
9 As will be shown in Chapter Three, household and investor optim isation can be introduced. However, because 
one of the objectives of this chapter is to take our m odel to real data, we chose not to follow that route.
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forced to cut back their loan supply not only to the group of agents whose default probability is 
higher but also to the others. Put differently, this latter channel operates by aggravating the severity 
of ‘credit crunch’ in the economic system. Our simulation results also highlight the importance of 
central banks’ monetary policy instrument choices in achieving financial stability. In particular, 
whether monetary authorities target base money or the interbank interest rate in response to shocks 
has different implications with respect to financial stability.
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Chapter 1
The R ole o f Bank C apital and th e  
Transm ission M echanism  of 
M onetary Policy
Abstract
This chapter studies the transmission mechanism of monetary policy in the presence of an en­
dogenous role of bank capital. The basic framework is a standard Dynamic New Keynesian model 
modified so that firms and banks face endogenous financial frictions in obtaining external funds. 
The model exhibits an unconventional lbank capital’ channel in which monetary policy affects ag­
gregate economic activities partly via its effect on bank capital. The simulation results highlight a 
financial accelerator effect in that endogenous evolution of bank capital, and its dynamic interplay 
with that of entrepreneurial net worth and asset price, operates to amplify and propagate the effect 
of a monetary shock in the macroeconomy.
1.1 Introduction
The goal of this chapter is to study the transmission mechanism of monetary policy in the presence
of an endogenous role of bank capital. This is motivated by the observation that conventional macro
models for monetary policy, both with and without the explicit role of entrepreneurial net worth,
abstract completely from the role of bank capital.1 This consensus practice would be a justifiable
] For macroeconomic m odels in which the transmission mechanism of m onetary policy works only through the 
conventional interest rate channel, see, am ongst others, Clarida, Gali and Gertler (1999). For those with an explicit 
role of entrepreneurial net worth, thus incorporating the balance sheet channel, see, am ongst others, Bernanke, Gertler 
and Gilchrist (1999) and Carlstrom and Fuerst (2001).
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simplifying assumption only if one of the following conditions holds: 1) an unexpected monetary 
shock does not affect bank capital, or 2) if it does, changes in the dynamics of bank capital must 
have no major effect on that of other important aggregate macroeconomic variables.
One of the main functions that banks perform is the transformation of securities with short 
maturities, offered to depositors, into securities with long maturities that borrowers desire (Freixas 
and Rochet, 1997). This maturity mismatch on banks’ balance sheets implies that lending rates 
are relatively stickier compared to deposit rates in response to unanticipated aggregate shocks. 
Consequently, in response to an unanticipated increase in the risk free (policy) rate, banks’ interest 
rate cost rises faster than their interest rate revenue, thereby depleting their inside capital. This 
invalidates the prior first condition; an unexpected monetary shock can theoretically affect bank 
capital.
Turning to the second condition, there are many empirical findings which lend support to the 
importance of the role of bank capital in constraining bank lending and aggregate economic activities. 
Amongst others, Bernanke and Lown (1991), Furlong (1992) and more recently, Peek and Rosengren 
(1997) and Ito and Sasaki (1998) find that the capital position of banks has had positive and 
statistically significant effects on bank lending. Moreover, Hubbard, Kuttner, and Palia (2002) 
find that higher bank capital lowers the rate charged on loans, even after controlling for borrower 
characteristics, other bank characteristics and loan contract terms. Given these findings, the second 
condition is also violated. Thus excluding bank capital from a model’s dynamics can distort our 
understanding of the monetary policy transmission.
The basic framework employed in this chapter is an extension of the financial accelerator model 
of Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999). Here we propose the ‘double’ costly state verification 
(Double CSV) approach as the principal modification.2 It is ‘double ’ because, in addition to firms, 
banks also face endogenous financial frictions in obtaining external funds. This implies that a wedge 
between internal and external costs of funds exists, thereby motivating an endogenous role of firms’ 
and banks’ inside capital in the model. The novel feature of the approach is that, while retain­
ing rigorous microfoundations found in the theory of banking literature, the approach is simple 
and tractable enough to be readily embedded into the otherwise standard Dynamic New Keynesian 
(DNK) model with price stickiness. This allows us to study, both qualitatively and quantitatively, 
how the dynamic evolution of bank capital operates to enrich the transmission mechanism of mon­
etary policy by augmenting the dynamics of other aggregate macro variables, including aggregate 
investment, output and asset prices.
2 The one-sided CSV problem was first introduced by Townsend (1979).
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The organisation of the chapter is as follows. Section 1.2 discusses some related literature. 
Section 1.3 presents the partial equilibrium model of financial contract, the double CSV approach. 
Section 1.4 embeds the key equations derived in section 1.3 into the otherwise standard DNK model 
with price stickiness. Section 1.5 gives the definition of the equilibrium and describes the model in 
a completely log-linearised form. Section 1.6 discusses the calibration and presents the simulation 
results. Section 1.7 concludes the chapter.
1.2 R elated  Literature
Bernanke et al. (1999) and Carlstrom and Fuerst (2001) examine the role of credit market frictions 
in business cycle fluctuations. Firms in these models face financial frictions in borrowing from banks, 
which causes their net worth to become the key element in determining their debt capacity. This 
allows monetary policy to have an independent effect on entrepreneurial net worth, the so-called 
balance sheet channel. However, banks do not need to hold any inside capital in equilibrium as they 
are assumed to have a perfectly diversified portfolio of bank loans. This implies that any idiosyncratic 
risk associated with firms’ investment return is completely diversified at the bank level and therefore 
is not passed on to ultimate depositors. Given that depositors are risk averse, they can therefore be 
guaranteed an equivalently riskless rate of return.
Another set of literature focuses on an explicit role of bank capital in the model of bank’s 
asset and liability management. Van den Heuvel (2001) examines the role of bank capital in the 
transmission mechanism of monetary policy. Banks in his model hold their inside capital to satisfy 
exogenous capital adequacy regulations. This, together with a maturity mismatch on banks’ balance 
sheets, gives rise to a ‘bank capital’ channel in which monetary policy affects bank lending through 
its impact on bank capital.3 Schneider (1999) studies the relationship between bank’s borrowing 
constraint and the observed heterogeneity in borrowing and lending behaviours across banks. The 
holding of bank capital in his model is endogenous as it can alleviate the moral hazard problem 
associated with strategic defaults by entrepreneurial bankers. However, these models do not consider 
an independent role of entrepreneurial net worth and therefore do not exhibit its dynamic interplay 
with bank capital. Moreover, they are not fully general equilibrium models in the sense that they 
abstract from consumption, investment and aggregate demand effects relating to price stickiness.
3According to Van den Heuvel (2001), the bank capital channel relies on the following three hypotheses. First, 
there is an imperfect market for bank capital, i.e. banks cannot costlessly issue new equity. Second, banks are subject 
to interest rate risk since their assets typically have longer m aturity than their liabilities. Third, banks have to meet 
regulatory capital requirements set by financial regulators. As will be illustrated, the bank capital channel identified 
in this chapter differs from Van den H euvel’s primarily in that the third hypothesis is replaced by the assumption  
that banks face the CSV problem in obtaining external funds from depositors.
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The last set of papers endogenises both entrepreneurial net worth and bank capital. Bolton and 
Freixas (2000) analyse the transmission mechanism of monetary policy in the context where direct 
and indirect finance coexist. Given the presence of an exogenous capital requirement, asymmetric 
information on the value of bank capital implies the existence of an endogenous cost in raising outside 
equity capital. The monetary policy transmission implied by their model exhibits an amplification 
effect on bank lending through its effect on bank capital. Cantillo (1997) adopted the CSV approach 
to study coexistence between direct and indirect finance. In his model, both firms and banks 
face financial frictions in obtaining external funds. They, therefore, hold limited inside capital in 
equilibrium. However, as these models have only two periods, the issue of dynamics cannot be 
disentangled. Moreover, similar to Van den Heuvel (2001) and Schneider (1999), they are not fully 
general equilibrium models.
Chen (2001) studies dynamic interaction between entrepreneurial net worth, bank capital and 
real economic activities by extending Holmstrom and Tirole’s (1997) model into a dynamic general 
equilibrium setting. The moral hazard problem both at the firm and bank levels is assumed in order 
to motivate an endogenous role for firms’ and banks’ inside capital. However, since the model has 
no role for monetary authorities and price stickiness, it cannot be used to study the transmission 
mechanism of monetary policy.4
1.3 The Partial Equilibrium  M odel o f  Financial Contract: 
D ouble C ostly  S tate V erification (D ouble CSV)
1.3.1 Basic A ssum ptions and the Structure o f th e M odel
There are five types of agents in the economy: entrepreneurs, banks, households (depositors), re­
tailers and the Central Bank.5 As this section discusses the financial contracting problem among 
entrepreneurs, banks and depositors, only the basic structure of these sectors which are relevant to 
the contracting problem will be addressed in the following subsections. The rest will be discussed 
in section 1.4.
4 Moreover, as argued by Cantillo (1997), the role o f banks in resolving the moral hazard problem as assumed  
in C hen’s (2001) and Holstrom and Tirole’s (2001) m odels is a less appealing description of what banks in reality  
do. In particular, since banks in these m odels perform a monitoring  role to ensure that firms do not choose a ‘bad’ 
project in pursuit for higher ‘private’ benefit, they are more suitably described as equity intermediaries such as venture 
capitalists who are quite involved in the day-to-day activities of the com panies that they fund. In contrast, banks 
or other debt intermediaries in reality do not actively involve with non-bankrupt firms. Since, as will be explained, 
banks under the CSV approach only monitor bankrupt firms (by paying a verification cost), using the CSV framework 
may be more realistic.
5 As the main focus of this chapter is on the transmission of m onetary policy, we shall abstract from the role of 
government and therefore fiscal policy in the model.
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1.3.1.1 Entrepreneurial Sector
Entrepreneurs are assumed to be risk neutral and are the only type of agent in the economy with 
access to investment technology which involves the transformation of capital together with hired 
labour (from the household sector) into wholesale goods. A representative entrepreneur, say entre­
preneur i, operates firm i.6 At the end of period t, firm i purchases capital, K \. The unit price 
of capital is given by Qt . All capital is homogeneous. In addition, capital purchased at the end of 
period t cannot be used in production until the end of period t + 1. The gross rate of return from 
investing in capital is denoted by Wij+iRf+i, where B^+ l and ^ i , t + 1  are the non-idiosyncratic and 
idiosyncratic components of firm i ’s rate of return to capital, respectively.7
The random variable zvi,t + 1  is assumed to be log normally distributed with mean unity, E(zJij+i) = 
1, and variance r 2, and is independently and identically distributed (i.i.d .) across time and firms.8 
Formally, the distribution of the random variable tu^t+i can be summarised as follows:
lnct7j)f+i N (—^cr2,<72), where a2 =  ln(l +  r 2)
In addition to idiosyncratic risk, firm i also encounters aggregate risk. This is because the 
non-idiosyncratic component of return associated with period-t capital investment, R^+i, will not 
be realised until the end of period t + 1. The timeline of the model will be discussed in detail in 
subsection 1.3.1.4.
We assume that firm i can borrow external funds from a representative bank, say bank j , to 
partially finance its capital investment. All financial contracts, including both loan and deposit 
contracts, are assumed to have one period maturity. Following the CSV literature, the realisation of 
idiosyncratic component of return, Wi^+i, is private information and bank j  has to pay a verification 
cost in order to observe its value. This, as mentioned earlier, motivates entrepreneur i to hold his 
inside capital as the existence of a verification cost drives a wedge between internal and external 
costs of funds. Moreover, following Krasa and Villamil (1992), we assume that the realisation of 
G7i,t+ 1  is privately revealed only to the agent who requests CSV technology. This assumption is 
essential to the analysis since if all information could be made public ex post there would be no need
6Firm i  and entrepreneur i  will be used interchangeably throughout the chapter.
7Throughout the chapter, the time subscript denotes the period in which the value of an underlying variable is 
realised.
8D enote and 1 ) as c.d .f .  and d.f .  o f respectively, and let
hazard rate, the assumption that Wi,t+i  is log-normally distributed im plies that the restriction a c^g»|tF 1 >  o
holds. This regularity condition is a relatively weak restriction as it is satisfied by m ost conventional distributions 
(Bernanke et al., 1999).
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for depositors to pay a verification cost to observe banks’ return on their portfolio of loans.9
Denote firm z’s inside capital held at the end of period t by W£. Given that the total outlay of 
the investment is QtK%, loans borrowed from bank j ,  L\, is defined as follows:
L\ = QtK l - W i  (1.1)
Using the fact that the total return from investing Q tK \ is W i^+ iR ^iQ tK l, fifm *’s threshold 
value of zjitt+i, is defined such that it satisfies the following equation:
™lt+lQtR?+lK i= rltL\ (1.2)
where r f t is defined as the non-default loan rate associated with the loan contract between firm 
i and bank j  signed in period t. For the realisation of idiosyncratic component below the threshold 
level, a7i,t+i < E ^t+u firm i ’s realised revenue from investing Q tK l is strictly less than the amount 
required to fulfil its loan contract with bank j .  Thus firm i declares bankruptcy and faces liquidation. 
In contrast, when zvi,t+ 1 > ^ f t+ 1 > firm * does not go bankrupt as its realised return in period t +  1 
is sufficient to  repay its debt obligations to bank j .10
1.3.1.2 Banking Sector
Banks in this economy operate under a perfectly competitive environment. Similar to entrepreneurs, 
they are assumed to be risk neutral. They function as financial intermediary, i.e. they borrow from 
a representative depositor and lend to a representative entrepreneur.
As commonly shown in the conventional one-sided costly state verification literature11, given 
that uiij+i is identically and independently distributed (i.i.d.) across firms, the idiosyncratic risk 
associated with each investment project is completely diversified in the infinitely large portfolio of 
bank loans, by virtue of the law of large numbers. Thus, depositors can be guaranteed an equivalently 
riskless rate of return and banks have no incentive to hold any inside capital.12 However, as argued 
by Krasa and Villamil (1992), the diversification would not be complete if the portfolio is of a f in ite  
size, in which case the idiosyncratic risk associated with firms’ investment projects remains at the
9This assumption is consistent with institutional features which characterise m ost lending arrangements. As 
Diam ond (1984, p .395) illustrated, “Financial intermediaries in the world monitor much information about their 
borrowers in enforcing loan covenants, but typically do not directly announce this information or serve an auditor’s 
function.”
10As r o ft+1is realised in period t  +  1, its value is contingent on the ex-post realisation of R%+i-
^ D iam on d  (1984), Gale and Hellwig (1985) and W illiamson (1986)), am ongst others.
12This assum ption is taken in the macro m odels which incorporate the balance sheet channel of m onetary policy  
but com pletely ignore the role o f bank capital, e.g. Bernanke et al. (1999).
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bank level and therefore is passed on to ultimate depositors. This gives an incentive for depositors 
to monitor banks and thus motivate an explicit role of bank capital.13
In general, given that the size of bank loan portfolio is finite, the distribution of return within 
each individual bank’s loan portfolio becomes essential to the analysis.14 To maintain the model’s 
tractability, we assume that a bank can only lend to one entrepreneur. This assumption is essentially 
tantamount to the case in which a bank can finance multiple firms but the return on firms’ investment 
projects is assumed to be perfectly correlated within a bank but i.i.d. across banks (Holstrom and 
Tirole (1997) and Chen (2001)).15 Although this assumption is obviously unrealistic, it is meant to 
avoid the equally unrealistic conclusion that banks can never collapse and its intermediation service 
can be carried out without any inside capital.
Bank j  can borrow external funds from a representative depositor, say depositor m, to partially 
finance its lending to firm i. Given the assumption that a bank can only borrow from one entre­
preneur, the idiosyncratic risk associated with firm i ’s investment is passed on directly to bank j ’s 
returns on its lending. As firm i ’s return on investment is private information, so is the return on 
bank f  s loans. Given the CSV problem at the bank level, depositor m has to pay a verification 
cost if he or she wishes to observe the return on bank f  s lending. This creates an external finance 
premium for bank j  in obtaining external funds from depositor m, thereby motivating the bank to 
hold inside capital. So, the holding of bank capital in this model is a market-based, as opposed to 
a regulatory-based, requirement.
In period t , a representative bank which finances its lending to firm i (L\) by its own inside
capital (A \ ) and deposits acquired from depositor m  (D\) has the following balance sheet identity:16 
17
13Thus the CSV problem becom es too-sided. On the one hand, banks act as delegated m onitors on firms’ invest­
ment projects. On the other hand, in the term inology of Krasa and V illam il (1992), depositors perform the role of 
‘m onitoring the m onitor’.
14For example, the contract term and the aggregation process depend on the distribution of an individual bank’s 
portfolio of risky loans.
15 Technically, the assumption that each individual bank could only lend to one firm while is allowed to be
i.i.d.  across tim e and firms gives the sam e result as the case in which each bank can lend to m ultiple firms but W itt + i  
is assumed to be perfectly correlated within a bank and is i. i.d.  across banks. T hey im ply that the idiosyncratic risk 
is fully diversified at the aggregate level, but not at the bank level.
16 As mentioned, similar to loan contracts, we assume that all deposit contracts have only one period maturity.
17Compared to the asset side of the balance sheet of a typical bank in reality, there are three im portant elem ents that
this m odel lacks, namely short term bonds, cash and equipments. Because banks have to m aintain the convertibility  
com mitm ent with depositors at any  point in time and loans are a relatively illiquid kind of asset, banks have an 
incentive to hold short-term government bonds as a means of reducing their exposure to liquidity risk. However, the 
model at hand is not rich enough to accom m odate the prevalence of liquidity risk.
Banks also have to hold cash or reserves (the liabilities of central banks) owing to their inability to  forecast 
perfectly their payment flows and to arrange transactions in the interbank market throughout the day so as to 
maintain settlem ent balances constant at a balance greater than, or equal to, zero (Goodhart, 2000). As central banks 
have m onopoly power in issuing ‘cash’, this gives them the power to set the short-term risk free rate. However, as 
em phasised by Woodford (2000), this power does not  depend on the size of the banks’ cash holding. To sim plify the 
analysis, we therefore assume that the size of cash holding by banks is negligibly small, i.e. approaching zero.
Lastly, we assume for sim plicity that the value of equipments required in conducting banking service is zero.
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L \= D \  + A} (1.3)
The verification cost that bank j  has to pay in the event that firm i declares bankruptcy is as­
sumed to equal a proportion ‘0B’ of the realised gross return to firm i ’s investment ( 0B w  .
In such event, bank j  would receive the net liquidation revenue from firm i equivalent to (1—9B)zuijt+i 
Q t $ t + Given this value, bank j ’s threshold value of Wij+i, & Bt+1 > is defined such that it sat­
isfies the following equation:
(1 -  eB)igBt+1 Q tK f^ K l  =  rPt+lD\ (1.4)
where rBt+1 denotes the non-default deposit rate realised in period t + 1 associated with the 
deposit contract between bank j  and depositor m  signed in period t. When rui,t+i >  ^ f t+ i i  the 
bank’s net revenue received from liquidating firm i is sufficient to fulfil the deposit contract. In 
contrast, when TZitt+ 1 <  the bank declares bankruptcy as its net liquidation revenue is
insufficient to repay its debt obligation to the depositor.18
1.3.1.3 Depositor (Household)
Depositors invest their savings by depositing their money with banks. Unlike entrepreneurs and 
banks, they are neutral to idiosyncratic risk but are averse to aggregate risk. This implies that 
aggregate risk inherited in the firms’ project has to be completely absorbed by entrepreneurs and 
banks. As can be seen from equations (1.2) and (1.4), unlike the non-default lending rate which is 
determined instantaneously once the loan contract is signed, the non-default deposit rate associated 
with the deposit contract signed in period t will not be realised until period t +  1. Consequently, 
as period £ +  1 arrives and aggregate risk associated with period-i capital investment is uncovered, 
in response to a lower than expected realised return on non-idiosyncratic component of return to 
firm’s i investment in period t 1 <  Et (R ^ i) ) ,  depositor m will be compensated with a higher 
non-default deposit rate, so they are completely hedged against any plausible realisation of aggregate 
risk. Crucially, this assumption implies that the adjustment of the lending rate will be relatively 
stickier in response to a monetary shock compared to that of the deposit rate. As discussed in the 
Introduction, this proxies realistically the effect of having a maturity mismatch in the bank’s balance




Because the return on bank f s  portfolio is private information, depositor m  has to pay a ver­
ification cost if he wishes to observe its realisation. The verification cost is assumed to equal a 
proportion 9D of the gross liquidated return that can be recovered from his debtor. Thus, in the 
event that bank j  declares bankruptcy, the verification cost that depositor m  has to pay amounts to 
0D(1 — 0B)w ijt+i Q tRf+iK lt . However, if depositor m  lends directly to firm i, the verification cost 
that he has to pay in the event that firm i declares bankruptcy is QDWij+i QtBj^+1K l. The ‘special’ 
role of bank j  as a delegated verifier can be summarised by the following assumption:
— F  —  B
(.9° -  9B) [  > ( 1  -  9b )9d f
Jo Jo
Intuitively, the left hand side (the right hand side) is the expected benefit (cost) from having 
banks in the economy. The expected benefit arises from the fact that bank j  can verify the outcome 
of the project relatively cheaper compared to depositor m, i.e. 9B is sufficiently lower than 9D. 
On the contrary, the expected cost arises from the fact that depositor m  has to pay an extra cost 
of monitoring ‘the monitor’ in certain states of the world. Thus, having bank j  as a financial 
intermediary dominates the one-sided financial contract between firm i and depositor m  because the 
aggregate expected verification cost is lower.
1.3.1.4 The Tim eline
To summarise the structure of the financial contract model, its timeline is shown in Figure 1.1.
At the end of period t, entrepreneur i chooses his optimal demand for capital (K \). To partially 
finance his investment, he engages in a loan contract with bank j  and thus borrows L\. The non- 
default lending rate associated with the loan contract (rf t ) is simultaneously determined. To finance 
its lending to firm i, bank j  also engages in a deposit contract with depositor m from whom it borrows
d \-
As time approaches the end of period t +  1 , the non-idiosyncratic component of firm z’s return 
on its period-t investment ( i ? ^ )  is realised. The deposit rate associated with the deposit contract 
signed in period t (rBt+1) is then realised, which, as emphasised before, implies that the depositor 
is perfectly hedged against any plausible aggregate risk.
After the aggregate risk (but not idiosyncratic risk) associated with period-t financial contract
19As all the financial contracts in the model have only one period m aturity, m aturity m ism atch in banks’ balance 
sheet cannot be explicitly modelled. The assumption concerning the risk profile of depositors is a m odelling device 
which is m eant to implici tly  deliver the effect of having m aturity m ism atch in the m odel while, at the sam e time, 
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Figure 1.1: The timeline of the model
is uncovered, firm i decides on its optimal purchase of capital and its borrowing from bank j  in 
period t +  1, K\+i and L\+i respectively. The corresponding lending rate (r^t+1) is simultaneously 
determined. The bank then borrows Dl+1 from the depositor.
Lastly, the idiosyncratic return to firm z’s investment in period t  is realised. In the event
that the entrepreneur (the banker) goes bankrupt, he pays whatever is left to his debtor and departs 
from the scene.
1.3.2 The Contract Term
Given that all firms and banks are subject to limited liability clauses, as shown by Gale and Hellwig 
(1985), optimal financial contracts with the presence of CSV become those of risky debt contracts. 
In this section, we study an optimal financial contract amongst firm z, bank j , and depositor m, 
and derive the firm’s optimal demand for capital. We proceed by finding the agents’ expected profit 
functions in the following subsection 1.3.2.1 . Subsection 1.3.2.2 then uses these functions to solve 
for firm z’s demand for capital.
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1.3.2.1 The A gents’ E xpected Profit Functions
Firm t’s Expected Profit Function: As can be seen from equation (1.2), when 1>
the return to firm i ’s project is sufficient to repay its debt obligation to bank j ,  r f tL\. So the firm does 
not default. It pays the contractual amount and retains the remaining profit, [vJij,+\QtRjf+\Kt — 
rfjZ/J]. However, when w^t+i < firm i declares a default, liquidates its asset, and retains
nothing. Given that firm i ’s opportunity cost of funds is the real risk free rate (r/+1), its expected 
profit function in period t +  1 conditional solely on the realisation of idiosyncratic risk (7rft+1) is 
given by20:
7*00
*i,t+1 =  _  [^i,t+iQtR^+iKlt -  i f tL \]f{w itt+i)dwitt+i ~  W?r/ + 1  (1.5)
Substituting equation (1.2) in equation (1.5), we obtain:
pOO
7rM+ 1  =  [ _  m,t+if(&i,t+i)diVi,t+i -  (1 -  F (w ?t+1)m[jt+1}QtR?+1K lt -  WtV / + 1  (1.6)
Bank j 1 s E xpected Profit Function: Bank f  s expected profit function, unlike that of firm i,
depends in general on the relative values of z^ft+1and zz ft+1. However, under the restriction that 
^ f , t + 1  >  ^ f t+i21, Appendix A of this chapter shows that the expected profit function for bank j  
in period t + 1 , conditional on the realisation of idiosyncratic risk, is given by:
7r f t +  l | w f t + 1 > w »  , =  I  [ ( 1 - ^ B ) r o M + l Q * ^ + l ‘K ? - r S + l - D t, ] / ( « 7 M + l ) ^ i , t + l
+ [i -  F « t+i ) ] [ + £ j  -  + +1 c ;]  -  £ 4 + i  (i-7)
Depositor m’s Expected Profit Function: Similar to that of bank j ,  depositor m ’s expected
profit function depends, in general, on the relative values of the threshold CT^ t+1and ^ Bt+i • However, 
under the restriction that w f t+l > ™i,t+i, it can be seen from equations (1.2) and (1.4) that when 
Wij+i < both firm i and bank j  declare bankruptcy. So after paying the verification cost,
depositor m  retains (1 — 9D){ 1 — 6B)zuij+iQtRt+iKl. When zuijt+i > vift+ n  bank j  does not go 
bankrupt and therefore does not default on its debt obligation with the depositor. In this case, the 
depositor gets r^t+1D\. The depositor’s expected profit function in period t+ 1 ,  conditional on the
20In period t +  1, aggregate risk associated with period-t capital investm ent has been resolved. Therefore, expec­
tation is taken solely over the remaining idiosyncratic risk.
21 A ppendix A of this chapter shows that this restriction holds under two assum ptions, both of which are satisfied  
under a reasonable parameterisation. Descriptively, this restriction implies that, in the event of no bankruptcy, bank 
j ' s  total revenue from its lending to firm i  has to be sufficiently larger than its total repayment cost to depositor m .  In 
other words, the bank’s profit must be sufficiently large in the event that both firm i  and bank j  do not go bankrupt.
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realisation of idiosyncratic risk, is therefore given by:
— B
’rt+l|®f,+1>w,e+, = J  [ ( 1  — 0 ( 1  -
+ (1 -  F(wfit+l)\rPt+1D\ -  D\r(+l (1.8)
where the last term represents the depositor’s opportunity cost of funds from depositing his 
money with the bank. For notation simplicity, \fj G {F, B }, we define:
1 ) 
G(™U+1 )
Using the notations defined above together with equations (1.2) and (1.4), after some algebraic 
manipulations, the expected profit functions of firm i (equation 1.6), bank j  (equation 1.7) and 
depositor m  (equation 1 .8 ) can be rewritten as:
=  [ i - r ( w 5 +1)]Rg.1Q«K'ti - w tS + i  (i-H )
’rM-i|®f.+1>wS,+1 =  [r « « + i )  -  ( 1  -  +i) -  «BG « t+1)] R?+lQ tK
-A\r{+1 (1.12)
=  V - e B) [ n v ? ,t+i ) - e DG(wfit+1) ] lg +1Q tK > -D lr{+l (1.13)
1.3.2.2 Optimal Dem and for Capital
Thus far, we have derived the expected profit functions for firm i, bank j  and depositor m, where 
expectation is conditional solely on idiosyncratic risk, as given in equations (1.11)-(1.13). This 
subsection employs these equations to derive firm i ’s optimal demand for capital, K \.
Given the assumption that depositors are completely averse to aggregate risk, depositors’ opti­
misation requires that their expected profit functions conditional only on idiosyncratic risk be equal 
to zero. Thus, from equation (1.13), the optimal zero expected profit condition for depositor m  is 
given by:
(i -  eB) [r(w£t+1) -  eDG(wBt+1)] r?+1q ,k i -  D\r{+1 = o (i.u )
Unlike depositors, banks are risk neutral and therefore are willing to bear both aggregate and
idiosyncratic risks. Given that banks operate under a perfectly competitive environment, optimality
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/* i , t+ l
=  /  m ,t+ i f {™ i , t+ i )d z O i , t+ i  +  [1 -  F { ^ t + i ) W i , t + i (1-9 )
=  I /& i,t+ lf{ '& i,t+ l)dzV i,t+ l  (1 -10)
Jo
conditions for banks require that their expected profit functions conditional on both aggregate and 
idiosyncratic risks be equal to zero. Thus, from equation (1.12), the optimal zero profit condition 
for bank j  is given by:
Et [{[ r « (+1) -  (i -  «e ) r (® 5 +1) -  0b g ( s £ +1)] r ?+1}Q,k ; -  4 4 +1] = o (1 .1 5 )
where Et(-) denotes rational expectation taken as of time t.
It is important to examine equations (1.14) and (1.15) carefully. The assumption that depositors 
will not bear any aggregate risk implies that as the risk free rate, r{+1, rises unexpectedly, ceteris 
paribus, bank f  s threshold w f t+l will instantaneously increase via equation (1.14). Consequently, 
the non-default deposit rate associated with the deposit contract signed in period t , r^ t+1, has to 
increase correspondingly via equation (1.4) in order to compensate depositor m  for an unexpected 
rise in his opportunity cost of funds. In contrast, banks are risk neutral and therefore are willing to 
bear aggregate risk. The non-default lending rate associated with the loan contract signed in period 
£, r f t , will be determined as of period t via equations (1.15) and (1.2). As a result, unlike the deposit 
rate, the lending rate associated with period-t loan contract has been predetermined as of period 
t+ 1  and therefore will not respond instantaneously to an unexpected monetary shock. Importantly, 
the result that the lending rate adjusts to an unexpected rise in the risk free rate relatively slower 
compared to the deposit rate implies that bank f  s inside capital has to deplete as its interest rate 
cost rises relatively faster compared to its interest rate revenue. This, as we shall see, underpins 
the operational mechanism of the bank capital channel of the monetary policy transmission in the 
model.
As firm i is risk neutral, it maximises its expected profit function, where the expectation is condi­
tional on both aggregate and idiosyncratic risks, subject to bank f  s balance sheet identity (equation 
(1.3)) and the zero expected profit conditions of depositor m  and bank j  (equations (1.14) and (1.15), 
respectively). The maximisation problem taken as given the values of A\, Et (B^+i ) ,E t (r{+1 ) and
Qt22, can be written as follows:
OO
m axt f i £ { [ l  -  T(wftt+1+j)\Qt+jS ^ .l+ jK i+j -  W;+/ t+1+j]
K t>r i,t>r i, t j = 0
22These variables are endogenised in the next section.
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subject to
( i  -  e B ) [ r ( ® j f ,+ 1 ) -  e D c ( © 5 + 1 ) ]  b?+1 q ,k *  -  D'tr{+1 =  o  (a)
£ t { [ r « t + l ) -  ( 1  - 0 B)T(W?t+1) -  0 BG « t+1)] S?+1}QtK't -  AiE,(rf+1) =  0  (b)
Q t K i - W i - A l ^ D l  (c)
The maximisation problem implies that firm i chooses its optimal demand for capital, non-default 
lending and deposit rates23 so that it maximises its expected profits, given that bank j  and depositor 
m  are paid just enough to participate in the contracts and that bank fi  s balance sheet is balanced. 
Put differently, because loan and deposit markets are competitive, bank j  must offer the contracts 
which maximise the expected profits of firm i and assure depositor m  with his expected reservation 
payoff. Otherwise, other banks would offer an alternative contract.
The solution to the maximisation problem is given in Appendix B of this chapter. Define k\ =
q \  E t ( r ^  )
(w f+ \i)' St -  Et ( J ’ Ut+1 =  Et(R?+1j ' » where Ut+1 captures the source of aggregate
risk in the model, the first order necessary conditions from the maximisation problem given that 
k\ > l 24 yield the following optimal demand for capital:
=  M s u A \ W i  +  4 )), where * £ £ >  > 0 , <  0  (1.16)
Equation (1.16) describes the key relationship in the model as it crucially implies that the 
Modigliani-Miller (1958) theorem does not hold. In particular, it effectively relates the financial 
positions of the agents to the real capital investment decision of the firm. The rationale underlying 
the strictly positive sign of the first derivative is as follows. Other things constant, a higher expected 
discounted return on capital investment (st ) decreases the expected default probability of the firm 
and the bank. This attracts more savings from the depositor and allows the entrepreneur to expand 
the size of the firm. The second derivative is strictly negative because, other things constant, a 
higher A\/(W% +  A\) implies that the agency problem is relatively more severe at the firm level, as 
opposed to the bank level. The bank in turn has to impose a higher interest rate margin between
23 The choice of the non-default lending and deposit rates together with the realisation of aggregate risk then  
determine the state-contigent values of and &jft ■
24Otherwise the sum of the firm’s and bank’s inside capital would be sufficient to finance the firm’s investm ent 
outlay, in which case the bank does not need to obtain any deposits from the depositor. To illustrate, when 1-
A t)  <  fcj <  1, entrepreneur i's inside capital is insufficient to finance his investm ent project. He therefore has to 
borrow from bank j .  However, bank j ’s inside capital alone is sufficient to finance the demand for loans by entrepreneur 
i. Thus the source of external finance premium in this case draws solely from financial frictions at the firm level. 
Essentially, this case is consistent with Bernanke et al. (1999). If k\  <  W l / ( W l  +  A \) ,  entrepreneur i ’s inside capital 
is sufficient to finance his own investm ent outlay. In this case, there will be no external finance premium, st  =  1. This 
is the standard case for models in which financial frictions are absent.
32
the non-default lending and deposit rates. As the firm faces a higher cost of borrowing, its capital 
demand declines. However, under a reasonable parameterisation, the magnitude of the latter deriv­
ative is so small that ignoring the effect of changes in A \/{W l +  A\) on the firm’s optimal demand 
for capital does not affect the dynamics of the model.25 Thus, equation (1.16) can be approximately 
written as:
</>(««), </>'(•)> o (1 .17)
Alternatively equation (1.17) can be rearranged to express the following inverse demand for 
capital:
t * i ] . % ^ >0  <L18)
Equation (1.18) implies that as firm i and bank j  increase their leverage, or equivalently their 
financial positions worsen, the expected discounted return to capital -which can also be interpreted 
as the external finance premium- has to increase. The key to understand this relationship is to 
recognise the link between the agents’ financial positions and the market interest rates which is 
captured by equations (1.2), (1.4), (1.14) and (1.15). Other things constant, a higher demand for 
capital relative to the sum of the firm’s and bank’s inside capital ( |  k\) implies that depositor 
m is exposed to a higher agency problem. This implies, via equations (1.4) and (1.14), that a 
higher non-default deposit rate is required ( |  r tDt+1) in order to induce him to supply more savings. 
Given rational expectation, bank j  anticipates a higher borrowing cost. The non-default loan rate, 
therefore, has to increase ( |  r£t ), via equations (1.2) and (1.15), in order to satisfy the bank’s zero
expected profit condition. This directly imposes a greater cost of borrowing on firm i which in
turn implies that a higher external finance premium (j  st) is required. Thus, it is the relationship 
k\ ri t^+1 =K ri,t =^t st that underpins the positive sign of the derivative shown in equation
(1.18).
1.3.3 Aggregation
In general, when the demand for capital depends on the financial position of agents, aggregation 
becomes difficult as it depends on the distribution of wealth among firms (similarly for banks). 
However, owing to the assumption of constant returns to scale throughout the chapter, a firm’s 
demand for capital is proportional to its net worth with the factor of proportionality being the same
25B y taking into account the effect of A \ / ( W l  +  A |)  on kt  in the sim ulation analysis (not reported), the result in 
terms of the dynamic responses of the key variables is virtually the sam e as the case when such effect is ignored.
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for all firms (Bernanke et al., 1999). In other words, firms will have the same leverage ratio.
Q tK i _  Q tK l  _  _  Q tKt 10,
w i w i    Wt ( ' ’
where the variables without superscript denote aggregate variables. Similarly, each competitive 
bank will optimally choose its lending in the same proportion to its inside capital.
  *  (1.20)
A\ A* At
Given equations (1.19) and (1.20), the ratio is the same across firms.26 This implies that
the aggregation of entrepreneurs’ demand for capital, equation (1.17), is straightforward .27 Thus,
the aggregate demand for capital as a positive function of the external finance premium can be given
as follows:
QtKt = iP(Et
Wt +  At rft+1
) ^ ' { E t Z?+i
L 't+ i J
) > 0  (1.21)
Because the ratios q k^i an<^  QtK\ 8X 6  same for all i, the zero expected profit conditions 
for depositors and banks, given in equation (1.14) and (1.15) respectively, hold in aggregate. As a 
result, via equations (1.2) and (1.4), the non-default lending rate (non-default deposit rate) charged 
to different firms (banks) will be the same. The intuition is as follows. Since all firms have the same 
leverage ratio (equation (1.20)), they possess the same degree of risk ex ante. This implies that 
banks will charge all firms the same non-default lending rate. Similarly, as all banks have the same 
leverage ratio, depositors are exposed to the same degree of risk ex ante. As a compensation, they 
would thus universally charge the same non-default deposit rate to all banks.
Given the above argument, the aggregate zero expected profit conditions for depositors and banks 
as well as the economy-wide non-default lending and deposit rates can be given by:
(i -  eB) [r ( s f+1) -  e°G (E f+1)] h?+1q , k ,  -  (QtK t - w t -  At)r{+1 =  o (1.22) 
Et{ [r ( s f+1) -  (1 -  0B)r (5 f+1) -  0BG(®f+1)] B & M tK ,  -  A ,Et (rl+ l) =  0 (1.23)
™f+iQtR?+ lKt =  + L t (1.24)
(1 -  0b )57?+1 Q,R?+1K t =  r?+1D, (1.25)
26 Wt+At. _  Wt , (Aj sf  Lt ■> _  Wt , (A l \(  1 _  wt \
Q t K t  -  Q t K t  Q t K t  > -  Q t K t  ^   ^ A  Q t K t >
27N ote that the aggregation would remain straightforward for the exact form of firm z’s optim al demand for capital
j4*(equation 1.16). This is because, given the assumption of constant returns to scale technologies, j * ■ is the sam e
w t  + A t.
for all z.
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In the next section, equations (1.21)-(1.25) will be embedded into the general equilibrium set­
ting. As we shall see, they add the source of financial imperfection both in the loan and deposit 
markets into the otherwise frictionless dynamic general equilibrium model and therefore underpin 
the operational mechanism of the balance sheet and bank capital channels of the monetary policy 
transmission within the model.
1.4 G eneral Equilibrium
In this section, we embed the partial equilibrium analysis developed in section 1.3 into the otherwise 
standard DNK model. This allows us to endogenise the risk free interest rate, return to capital, 
price of capital, entrepreneurial net worth and bank capital, all of which were taken as given in the 
previous section.
As mentioned earlier, there are five types of agents in this economy; entrepreneurs, households, 
banks, retailers and the Central Bank. Section 1.3 explains the basic set-up of the first three sectors, 
addressing only the issues relevant to the financial contract problem. This section completes the 
task by explaining the remaining, e.g. the production function and the household sector’s optimal 
consumption choice, and illustrating the basic set-up of the retailer and the Central Bank. However, 
as only entrepreneurial and banking sectors are non-standard in the DNK literature, the emphasis 
will be placed on them.
1.4.1 Entrepreneurial sector
In order to motivate the coexistence between aggregate and idiosyncratic risks, as discussed in section 
1.3, entrepreneurs cannot instantaneously use their purchased capital to produce wholesale goods. 
Thus, capital purchased in period t — 1 will be used in production, together with labour hired in 
period i, to produce wholesale output in period t. Assuming a constant returns to scale production 
technology, the aggregate production function is given by:
Yt = T tK ^ H } - *  (1.26)
Tt is an exogenous technology parameter. K t~i is the aggregate amount of capital purchased in 
period t — 1 . Ht is labour input hired in period t. Yt is the aggregate wholesale output . 28
28 N otice here that idiosyncratic risk is com pletely diversified in aggregate. T his stem s from the assum ption that 
)-i is identically and independently distributed across firms and time.
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Entrepreneurs are assumed to sell their wholesale output only to retailers. Let be the relative 
price of wholesale goods. Equivalently, X t is the gross mark-up of retail goods over wholesale goods. 
The gross return from holding capital from period t — 1 to t is given by:
Qt-]
(1.27)
where is the rental payment paid to capital as implied by the Cobb-Douglas production
technology, ip is the capital depreciation rate, Qt is the price of capital in period t. In sum, the 
non-idiosyncratic component of return from holding capital from period t — 1 to £, R ^ ,  is the sum 
of rental revenue and capital gain netting off depreciated capital stock.
Equation (1.27) represents the standard downward sloping demand for capital. In particular, 
owing to diminishing returns, the return to capital falls as more capital is demanded. Essentially, 
this equation has endogenised the non-idiosyncratic component of return to capital, R ff , which was 
taken as given in the previous section.
In contrast to the conventional literature, entrepreneurs in this economy do not have access to 
unlimited amount of funds at the sole opportunity cost equivalent to the risk free rate. Rather, 
equation (1 .2 1 ) which expresses entrepreneurs’ aggregate demand for capital as a function of the 
external finance premium captures the source of financial imperfection in the model. In particular, 
firms as well as banks can acquire more external funds only at a higher external finance premium. 
P ut differently, given their inside capital, they face an upward sloping cost of external finance.
We now turn to find the evolution of capital. We follow the standard literature by assuming the 
following equation:29
K t =  n ( - £ - ) K , - l +  ( l - < p ) K , - 1 (1.28)
where I t denotes aggregate investment expenditures and ip denotes the depreciation rate.
Following the standard literature, we assume that there are increasing marginal adjustment 
costs in the production of capital, captured by assuming that aggregate investment expenditures 
(It ) yields a gross output of new capital goods &(KItt_1 )K t- 1 , where Q(-) is increasing and concave 
and fi(0) =  0. The introduction of the adjustment cost is made in order to permit a variable price 
of capital (a variable asset price) which in turn will further enrich the model dynamics through the 
asset price channel. In equilibrium, given the adjustment cost function, the price of a unit of capital
29 See, among others, King and Wolman (1996), Gertler (2000) and Bernanke et al. (1999) for detail.
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in terms of the numeraire goods, Qt , is given by:30
Q t  — (1.29)
Next, we proceed to endogenise aggregate entrepreneurial net worth. As a technical matter, 
we are required to start entrepreneurs off with some net worth in order to allow them to begin 
operation. For simplicity, we assume that, in each period, each entrepreneur is endowed with a 
small endowment, eF. Moreover, in order to prevent entrepreneurs from accumulating sufficient 
wealth to become self financed, we assume that each entrepreneur faces a constant probability of 
dying equal to 7 s . The dying entrepreneurs simply consume their remaining net worth (C f)  and 
depart from the scene. We also assume that a new generation of entrepreneurs is born, where the 
birth rate is such that the population of entrepreneurs remains constant over time.
We can write the evolution of aggregate entrepreneurial net worth and dying entrepreneurs’ 
consumption as follows:
w ,  =  ( l - 7 E)[V,E +  eF] (1.30)
c f  =  7E[VtE +  6E] = ( T2 — )Wt (1.31)
where Wt is the expected aggregate entrepreneurial net worth available in period t right before 
period-t capital decision is made. VtE is the expected entrepreneurial gross return from investing 
in capital. The expectation is taken solely on the unrealised idiosyncratic risk associated with the
last period capital investment since the corresponding aggregate risk component has been resolved.
From equation (1.14), VtE can be written as:
VtE =  [1 -  r(rof (1.32)
Substituting equation (1.32) into equation (1.30), we obtain the following evolution of entrepre­
neurial net worth equation:
Wt =  (1 -  7e ){[1 -  r (w f  )]<3,_ifif K t- t  +  eF] (1.33)
30Following Gertler (2000), there are capital-producing firms which use final goods (/*) together with rented capital 
to produce new capital goods via the production function 0 (  ) K t - \ .  T hey then sell the newly produced capital to
wholesale good producers at the price Qt-  Capital good firms therefore m axim ise their profit, Q tO( ^ ~ ) K t - 1 — It —
Z kK t ~ i ,  where Z k is the rental cost. FOC with respect to It is given by equation (1.29). Gertler (2000) shows that, 
via FOC with respect to K t - 1 , the value of Z k, and therefore the capital goods firms’ profit will be approxim ately  
zero in the neighbourhood of the steady state.
37
Lastly, analogous to capital, the return to labour (real wage) is equal to the marginal product of 
labour. This demand for labour condition is given by the following equation:
Nt
P t
' 1  ( 1  - a ) Y t  
X t H t
(1.34)
where denotes real wage in period t.
1.4.2 Banking Sector
In section 1.3, we have established equilibrium conditions for most of the key variables which are 
relevant to the banking sector treating as given only bank capital. In this section, we endogenise 
this variable.
We assume that the cost of raising bank capital directly is prohibitively costly. Thus bank 
capital can only be accumulated via retained earnings. Similar to the evolution of entrepreneurial 
net worth, we need to start off banks with some endowment so that they can begin their operation. 
We therefore assume that each bank is given a small endowment equal to eB. Moreover, to prevent 
banks from accumulating sufficient capital to become self financed, we assume that they face a 
constant probability of dying, ~fB. The dying banks simply consume all of their remaining capital 
and depart from the scene. At the same time, new banks are established. Their birth rate is such 
that the number of banks in the economy remains constant over time.
We can write the evolution of aggregate bank capital and banks’ consumption, respectively, as 
follows:
At =  ( l - i B)[VtB +  eB] (1.35)
C? =  7S [V,® +  eS] =  ( y ^ ) ^  (1.36)
where A t is expected aggregate bank capital in period t. V B is expected banks’ gross profits
excluding their opportunity cost. Again, the expectation is taken conditional solely on the unrealised 
idiosyncratic risk associated with the capital investment in the previous period. From equation 
(1.23), V B is given as follows:
V B =  [r(E if) -  (1  -  9B)T (w f) -  8BG(W[ )] R f Q t - i K t - i  (1.37)
Substituting equation (1.37) into equation (1.35), we obtain the following evolution of bank
38
capital equation:
At = (1 -  7s )[ r(t?7f) -  (1 -  9B)T {w f)  -  9BG(w? )] R ^ Q t- iK t - i  +  eB] (1.38)
1.4.3 R etail sector
This sector is introduced solely as a means to present some form of nominal price stickiness into the 
model without complicating the aggregation process.31 This section follows Appendix B of Bernanke 
et al. (1999).
Monopolistic competition is assumed at the retail level. Retailers purchase wholesale output 
from entrepreneurs, slightly modify and resell them in the form of CES aggregate to households. 
Let Yt (z) be the quantity of output sold by retailer z, measured in units of wholesale goods, and let 
Pt(z) be the nominal price of retail goods 2 . Total final usable goods, Y / , is the following composite 
of individual retail goods:
Y /  = f  Yt (z)l 
.Jo
‘-W 'd z (1.39)
with the elasticity of substitution e > 1. The corresponding price index is given by:
Pt = f  P t i .4 1
Jo
(1.40)
Final output may either be transformed into a single type of consumption goods, invested, or 
used up in verifying costs.32 In particular, the economy wide resource constraint is given by:
rf _=  Ct + C? + C ? + I t
r  — — tS
+  \&B J  zutf ( w t)dwt + ( 1  - 9 B)9D J  zutf(rut)dwt (1.41)
where C f  is dying entrepreneurs’ consumption, Ct is dying bankers’ consumption,
[#S So* ^tfipJt)dvat + (1 -  9b )9d f™1 vot f ( w t)dta^ Qt_ iE ^  K t- \  is aggregate resource used 
up as the verification cost.
Given the index that aggregates individual retail goods into final goods, equation (1.39), the
31Had the retailers not been introduced, entrepreneurs would have to be price setters them selves, thereby having to  
face a downward sloping demand curve. This would have added non-linearities in entrepreneurs’ demand for capital 
as a function of entrepreneurial net worth and bank capital. Consequently, the aggregation process would have been  
com plicated.
3:iIn general, aggregate final output, y / , differs from aggregate wholesale output, Yt.  However, as shown by Gertler 
(2000), they are approximately the sam e in the neighbourhood of the steady state. Hence, in the simulation analysis 
they will be treated as the same.
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demand curve faced by each retailer is given by:
Y t(z )  =
P t(z )
Y / (1.42)
To introduce price stickiness in the model, we assume that retailers can adjust their selling prices 
only with probability 1 — p in a given period (Calvo, 1983). Let Pt* denote the price set by retailers 
who are able to change prices at t , and let Y f(z )  denote the demand corresponding to this price. 
Retailer 2: chooses his price, P*(z), to maximise the expected discounted profit taken as given the 





P t  r t+k
Pt+k
Y tlk W (1.43)
where the discount rate A t ,k = " is households’ intertemporal marginal rate of substitution33
and P™ =  -^  is the nominal price of wholesale goods.
The optimal price setting is obtained by differentiating the objective function, equation (1.43), 
with respect to Pt*. This implies that the optimally-set price satisfies the following equation:
k=0
t+k =  0 (1.44)
P t+ k '  V ' r  ( « - ! ) '
Intuitively, retailers set their prices so that the expected discounted marginal revenue equals the 
expected discounted marginal cost, given the constraint that the nominal price is fixed in period k 
with probability pk. Given that the fraction p of retailers do not change their price in period t, the 
aggregate price evolves according to the following equation:
(1.45)
where Pt* satisfies equation (1.44).
Equations (1.44) and (1.45) form the evolution of aggregate price.
1.4.4 H ousehold sector
Households in this model are standard. They consume CES aggregate of retail goods, save, and 
supply their labour. They save by depositing their money with banks, given that the opportunity 
cost of funds is equal to the risk free rate. In addition, because retailers are monopolistic competitors,
33 As will be seen in the next section, we assume that households own retail firms.
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they will earn positive profit in equilibrium. We assume that such profit is transferred to households. 
Put differently, we assume that households own retail firms. A representative household’s problem 
is given by:
OO
max E t { ^ x ?  [In(Ct+j) +  g \ n ( l  -  H t+ j)]}
j = 0
subject to
c , + 1  =  ^ j ± H t + 1  +  R ° + 1 D t  -  D t + 1  +  n t + 1
<+l
where x  is households’ coefficient of relative impatience, Ct households’ consumption, Dt is 
interest-rate-earning deposits (in real term) held at the bank in period t, is real wage, Ht is 
household labour, lit is dividends received from owning retail firms. is the actual rate of
return on depositing money with banks which will not be realised until period t +  l .34
Although depositors are perfectly hedged against any realisation of aggregate risk, they are still 
exposed to idiosyncratic risk. Importantly, as of period t, the expectation of the actual rate of return 
on deposits (Et {R^+i)) conditioning on the realisation of aggregate and idiosyncratic risks must be 
equal to the expected real risk free rate, Et(r{+1), in order to satisfy the depositors’ zero expected 
profit function as implied by equation (1.22). As a result, the solution to the above optimisation 
problem yields the following two standard first order conditions:
—  =  E tCt
't+ i x -
Ct+i 
1
P tC t  C1 - H t
N t 1 
(1.46)
(1.47)
Equation (1.46) is a standard inter-temporal consumption Euler equation. Equation (1.47) is 
a standard intra-temporal Euler equation between households’ consumption and their labour sup­
ply-
34N ote here that the budget constraint is evaluated at the end of period t + 1 .  Thus real consum ption, and new 
deposit contract are financed by realised return on deposit invested last period (period t), real labour income, and 
profit redistributed from retailers.
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1.4.5 The Central Bank
The Central Bank sets the nominal risk free rate via a variant Taylor-type rule.35 Define the nominal 
gross risk free rate, as follows:
r f = r ft Et ( ^ )  (1.48)
-nt
A form of Taylor’s rule is given by:
rt^  = f(.r t~ v  ......) (1-49)
-nt-i
1.5 Equilibrium  and The C om pletely Log-linearised Version  
o f the M odel
Equilibrium is defined as an allocation {Y t,C t,C f , C f  ,I t,K t,W t,A t,H t} t^Q  together with a vec­
tor of price variables , Q t , r { , r j ? , X t , Pt, P * ,N t} ^ 0 satisfying equations (1.21)-
(1.25), (1.26)-(1.29), (1.31), (1.33)-(1.34), (1.36), (1.38), (1.41), (1.44)-(1.49), given a sequence of 
the initial values of a vector of the model’s state variables {Q -i, K - i ,  W -i, A - i ,  r £ 1? r ”{, P_i}, a 
sequence of a vector of exogenous process {Tt } ^ . 0 and a sequence of interest rate shock {g:£}£l0.
In order to study the dynamic response of the model to a monetary shock, we log-linearise the 
model around a unique stationary steady state equilibrium. Define 7rt = Pt — Pt~\ and let the 
variables with a tilda (~) denote percentage deviations from the steady state and those without a 
time subscript denote the steady state values, the completely log-linearised version of the model 
around the steady state can be given by the following 20 equations in 20 variables. They are divided 
into 5 blocks of equations: 1) aggregate demand; 2) aggregate supply; 3) financial markets; 4) 
evolution of state variables; and 5) monetary policy rule and exogenous process.
35 The Central Bank has power to set the nominal risk free rate due to the assum ption that banks have to hold 
cash, though the amount is assumed to be approaching zero (see footnote 17).
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1) Aggregate demand
~ C  ~ C E ~ C B ~ I ~  ~ ~ ~ ~F ~ B
Yt =  —Ct + ~ y ~ C + ~y~Ct + —It +  o>i[Qt-i +  K t - 1 +  R ^]  +  ct2^t +  a3'&t (LI)
E ,(C t+1) =  C t +  E t (7ft+ 1) ( L 2 )
C f  =  Wt (L3)
C f  =  A t  ( L 4 )
5 ?  +  Q t - 1  =  ( 1  -  & i ) K  - X t -  i t t - i ]  +  h Q t  ( L 5 )
(,{Et ( ^ +1) -  Et (r{+1)] =  {Q t +  K t -  ~ ( w T a )  I , }  (L6)
Q t  =  f i [ h  -  K t - i l  ( L 7 )
2) Aggregate Supply
Y t = f t + a K t - 1  +  (1 -  a)H t (L8 )
Y, = Ct + X t + (l + -±F)H, (L9)
7Tt =  x E t (7Tt+l) ~  u X t (L1 0 )
3) Financial Markets
( W T A  -  1)l?‘ -  ^  "  W T a W‘- '  -  w T a Z - 1 -  ~ 0 <L11>
ET _  _  D _  _  U /    4  ^
(F T 7 - 1 ) l i J f+ w ‘ - ^ l - « ‘- '  +  ^ - ' ) + M 7 T A ^ - 1 +  i y T A '4 t - 1 = 0  (L12)
j iE t {zot+i) — j 2E t (wt+1) + E t (R?+ i) + Qt + K t — A t — E t (r{+1) =  0 (L13)
-  ( ^ 7 r ) [ 5 * - i  +  K t- 1] +  R f  =  rf_! -  ( x ^ - r ) ^ - !  (L14)
w 1 w  1
4) Evolution o f state variables
K t = (pit +  (1 -  ¥>)£*_! (L15)
Wt =  ci {Qt- 1  +  R t- i  +  -Rf) +  C2 ^ t (L16)
At =  di(<5t-i +  K t- i  +  R ) +  d,2,cot +  d^wt (L17)
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5) M onetary policy rule and exogenous processes
=  I- (i-o B)r'(wB) _ 1J2 ~  Lr(wF) - ( i - 0 B)r(^B) - 0 BG(roF)J
rt = ~ Et(*t+i) (L18)
r?f  = + 92*t-i + £rt (L19)
f t =  V2 f t- x (L20)
where,
O! =  [(9b G{Wf ) +  (1 -  eB)6DG(WB)]RK f  d3 =  - ( 1  -  7 S )(1 -  9b )Rk %v5b T'{Wb )
„ — a B — F m < — F \  r>K K  <■ — R ka2 = v  zu G {tu )K y  £ =
o3 =  (1 -  0B)eDw BG'{zoB)R K §  U =  ^ ( 1  -  xp)
b =  — —  eQ =  2 0 . &.
XTT+C1-1^ ) 3 7? *3
d  =  ( 1  -  7 £ ) ^ # [ 1  -  r ( ^ F)] eH = | | |
— /1 E \ t>K K — F r < / /— F ^  • _  T r ' ( w F ) — 1 — F
<* =  - ( 1  -  7 3 ) R K W &  r  (ro ) ;/i =  [ r (CTp)- ( i - f l^ )r(ro°)-g^G(CTA')J ro
d.l =  ( l - ~ , B) R K %{T(WF)
- ( 1  -  eB)V(zdB) -  8b G(z5f )\
*  s  ( i  -  7 fi) ^ f ^ [ r (^ )  -  «b g '( © 7 ]  h  = T O l f f g g f l ] { w t a  - 1 )
Equation (LI) is the log-linearised version of equation (1.41), the economy wide resource con­
straint. The variation in aggregate output depends on the variation in consumption, investment, 
dying entrepreneur’s and dying banker’s consumption and the aggregate expected verification cost.36  
Equation (L2) is the log-linearised version of equation (1.46), a standard forward-looking consump­
tion Euler equation. Equations (L3) and (L4) are the log-linearised version of equations (1.31) and 
(1.36), respectively. They imply that the variation in (dying) entrepreneur’s and (dying) banker’s 
consumption depends on the variation in the respective values of their inside capital.
Equations (L5)-(L7) characterise investment demand. They are the log-linearised version of 
equations (1.27), (1.21) and (1.29), respectively. Equations (L5) and (L7) are conventional in the 
DNK literature. While the former implies a standard downward sloping demand for capital, the 
latter relates investment demand to the price of capital. Equation (L6 ) is unconventional in the 
frictionless monetary model. It implies that the variation in the external finance premium increases 
as the variation in the aggregate demand for capital is higher compared to that of aggregate sum of 
entrepreneurial net worth and bank capital.
Equations (L8)-(L10), all of which are standard in the DNK literature, represent the aggre­
36However, under a reasonable param eterisation, the weight given to the variation in dying entrepreneur’s con­
sum ption, dying banker’s consum ption and the verification cost will be very small.
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gate supply block of the model. Equation (L8 ) is the log-linearised version of equation (1.26), the 
production function. Equation (L9) characterises the labour market equilibrium. It is obtained by 
equating the log-linearised aggregate labour demand (equation (1.34)) to the log-linearised aggregate 
labour supply (equation (1.47)). Equation (L10) combines the log-linearised version of equations
(1.44) and (1.45). It captures the source of price stickiness in the model and therefore underpins the 
effectiveness of monetary policy in affecting real variables.
Equations (L11)-(L14) constitute the equilibrium in the financial markets. Equations (L ll) and 
(L12) are the log-linearised version of the aggregate depositors’ zero profit condition (equation (1.22)) 
and the equation which characterises the equilibrium banks’ threshold value of idiosyncratic compo- 
nent (zut ) (equation (1.25)), respectively. Equation (L ll) implies that, ceteris paribus, an increase 
in the variation of aggregate capital demand relative to the sum of the aggregate entrepreneurial net 
worth and bank capital in the previous period will result in a higher variation of the current value 
of zz7t . This implies, via equation (L12), that the variation in the non-default deposit rate in this 
period has to rise. Thus, equations (L ll) and (L12) together imply that the variation in deposit 
rate will respond positively to an increase in the variation of the leverage ratio of firms and banks.
Equations (L13) and (L14) are the log-linearised version of the aggregate banks’ zero profit 
condition (equations (1.23)), and the equation which characterises the equilibrium firms’ threshold
~  F
value zut (equation (1.24)), respectively. They together imply that, ceteris paribus, the variation in 
the non-default lending rate is a positive function of the variation in the non-default deposit rate. 
This is because a higher deposit rate imposes a greater borrowing cost on banks. In order to maintain 
their optimal zero expected profit condition, they must increase their lending rate correspondingly. 
However, it is very crucial to notice from these two equations that the response of non-default lending 
rate to an unanticipated increase in the deposit rate will be subject to a one period lag. This implies 
that the variation in the non-default lending rate will be relatively stickier compared to that of the 
non-default deposit rate in response to any unanticipated aggregate shock.
Equation (L15) is the log-linearised version of equation (1.28), the standard evolution of capital 
equation. Equations (L16) and (L17) are the log linearised version of equations (1.33) and (1.38), 
respectively. They are the transition equations for the aggregate entrepreneurial net worth and 
bank capital. Equation (L16) implies that the variation in the aggregate entrepreneurial net worth 
depends positively on the variation in the last-period price of capital, the return to capital, the
~  F
demand for capital and negatively on the firms’ threshold value zot . Equation (L17) implies that 
the aggregate bank capital is a positive function of the last period price of capital, return to capital,
~  F
demand for capital, the firms’ threshold value mt and is a negative function of the banks’ threshold
45
value w t .
It should now become clear how adding financial imperfection at the firm and bank levels works 
to enrich the dynamic of the model. Equations (L11)-(L14), which represent the financial market 
block of the model, effectively link entrepreneurial net worth and bank capital to the equilibrium 
non-default lending and deposit rates. These links underpin the mechanism in which the financial 
position of firms and banks works to augment the real investment decision of firms. This mechanism, 
which is completely absent in frictionless models, is captured by equation (L6 ) . 37 Equations (L16) 
and (L17) then characterise the evolution of firm’s and bank’s financial positions, i.e. entrepreneurial 
net worth and bank capital, respectively.
Equations (L18) and (L19) are the log linearised version of equations (1.48) and (1.49), respec­
tively. The former relates the nominal risk free rate to the real risk free rate whereas the latter 
is a variant Taylor-type interest rate rule. Following Bernanke et al. (1999), we consider the rule 
in which the Central Bank sets the current nominal risk-free interest rate as a function of lagged 
inflation and lagged nominal interest rate. Essentially this implies that the Central Bank puts zero 
weight on the output stabilisation objective.38 This is intended to highlight the financial accelerator 
effect. As Bernanke et al. (1999) emphasised, the greater the extent to which monetary policy can 
stabilise output, the smaller is the role of any kind of propagation mechanism in amplifying and 
propagating business cycles.
Lastly, equation (L20) characterises the exogenous process of the variation in technology. As the 
main focus of this chapter is on the transmission mechanism of monetary policy, we will not analyse 
the dynamic responses of the model to a technology shock.
1.6 M odel Sim ulation
1.6.1 Calibration
The model is calibrated at a quarterly frequency. The values assigned to most of the parameters 
relevant to preference, technology and price stickiness are standard in the DNK literature. The
37 A rise in capital investm ent dem and compared to the sum  of aggregate entrepreneurial net worth and bank  
capital, i.e. both firms and banks becom e more leveraging, im plies, via equations ( L l l)  and (L12), that the non­
default deposit rate has to be higher in order to induce depositors to be willing to supply more of their savings. A  
higher non-default deposit rate implies a rise in the cost of borrowing for banks. In order to maintain their zero 
expected profit condition, they in turn have to raise their non-default lending rate (via equations (L13) and (L14)). 
Given a higher opportunity cost of external funds, i.e. a higher lending rate, firms have to require higher return to 
capital in order to justify their investm ent. Thus the external finance premium rises as firms
and banks becom e more leveraging. This is captured by equation (L6).
38In other words, this implies that the Central Bank adheres to a strict form of inflation targeting. (Svensson, 
1995)
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discount factor, x ,  is set to be 0.99, which implies an annualised real interest rate of about 4 
percent. The depreciation rate, ip, is set to 2.5 percent. We select the steady state capital share, 
a, to be 0.35. We choose the labour supply elasticity, eH, to  be 3 and, following Bernanke et al. 
(1999), the elasticity of the price of capital with respect to the investment capital ratio, e® , to be 
0.25. The elasticity of substitution, e, is set so as the steady state mark-up price X  is equal to 1.05. 
The probability that a retail firm does not change its price in a given period, p, is chosen to be 0.75, 
implying an average price duration of one year. The autoregressive parameters in the policy rule, 
gi and g2 , are set to 0.9 and 0.11, respectively.
The unconventional choices of parameterisation are those relevant to the financial contract prob-
B
lem. The endowment given to each firm and bank as a proportion of their inside capital, ^  and 
is arbitrarily set to be 0.01. Its magnitude is meant to be so small that it does not affect 
the model’s dynamics. We then treat the proportional factors of the verification cost paid by a 
bank (0B), and a depositor (0D), the death rate for a firm (fyE) and bank (/yB), and the standard 
deviation of In zu (a) as unobservable and choose their values to match the following steady state 
outcomes: [1] an annualised risk spread, R k — r?, of 200 basis points, approximately the historical 
average spread between the prime lending rate and the six-month Treasury bill rate (Bernanke et 
al., 1999, and Carlstrom and Fuerst, 2001); [2] an annualised business failure rate, F(W f ), of 3 
percent, the approximate value in the data (Bernanke et al., 1999); [3] an annualised bank failure 
rate, F (w B), of 0.5 percent, the average value for commercial banks insured by Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation (FDIC) during 1988-200239; [4] a leverage ratio of entrepreneurial net worth 
to capital ( ^ )  of 0.4, the approximate value found in the empirical literature for small firms in the 
U.S.40; [5] a bank’s capital to asset ratio, j;, of 0.12, the average value of ( tierlisCk-wltghtedrasset‘U1) 
for U.S. commercial banks during 1990-1999 41. To satisfy [l]-[5], the values of 6B,0D, 'yE,'yB and 
a are 0.01, 0.4, 0.03, 0.02, and 0.2, respectively.
1.6.2 The Transm ission M echanism  o f M onetary Policy: The R ole o f  
Bank Capital
Figure 1.2 shows the response of the model to an unanticipated rise in the nominal risk-free pol­
icy rate by 1 percent from the steady state. Owing to price stickiness, the real interest rate rises
39Source: Quarterly Banking Profile, FDIC.
40Using the data from the 1993 National Survey of Small Business Finances, Gibson (2002) found that equity  
accounts for approximately 40 percent of U .S. small firms’ overall source of finance. It should be noted that the  
emphasis is placed on sm all firms, as opposed to large firms, because they are relatively more bank dependent which 
in turn can be more appropriately rationalised in this model where bank loans are the only source of external finance.
41 Source: OECD, Bank Profitability.
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Figure 1.2: Responses to a monetary shock (All panels: time horizon in quarters)
correspondingly. Consumption and thus aggregate demand fall via the standard intertemporal sub­
stitution effect. Because capital stock has to be purchased one period in advance, an unexpected 
decline in aggregate demand causes the return to capital purchased last period to fall. As deposi­
tors are completely hedged against any realisation of aggregate risk (recall that they are completely 
risk averse to aggregate risk by assumption), the non-default deposit rate associated with deposit 
contracts signed last period has to rise instantaneously in order to compensate them for the lower- 
than-expected realisation of return to capital, R jf < E t~ as well as the higher-than-expected 
realisation of their opportunity cost of funds, r{ > E t~i(r{). This directly imposes a higher cost 
of borrowing on banks. However, the lending rate associated with loan contracts signed last pe­
riod was determined in period t - 1  (recall that banks are risk neutral and therefore are willing to 
bear aggregate risk). This in turn implies that banks’ interest rate cost has to rise relatively faster 
compared to their revenue counterpart, thereby depleting banks’ inside capital. Moreover, a lower 
than expected return to capital decreases entrepreneurial net worth directly. The decline in both 
firms’ and banks’ inside capital means that both firms and banks have less to contribute to firms’ 
investment projects which in turn implies that depositors are exposed to greater agency cost. As 
a compensation, the non-default deposit rate associated with deposit contracts signed in period t 
(which will not be realised until period t + 1) has to rise. Rational expectation then implies that 
banks will have to increase their non-default lending rate immediately, in anticipation of the higher 
expected future interest rate cost. Given the instantaneous increase in the non-default lending rate,
rK
firms face a higher cost of borrowing, implying that the external finance premium, E t (—r*- ), must
rt+1
rise. The demand for capital, investment and asset price have to fall as firms’ external cost of 
borrowing becomes more expensive. A kind of multiplier effect then arises as a higher non-default 
lending rate, together with a lower asset price, decrease entrepreneurial net worth further in the 
subsequent period. Moreover, in response to the initial fall, bank capital slowly accumulates back to 
trend at the rate equivalent to the real risk free rate. Given that the accumulation process is slow 
enough, bank capital will be persistently below trend. The negative effect of persistent decline in 
bank capital and entrepreneurial net worth then feeds into the subsequent periods by aggravating 
the deposit rate, the lending rate, and therefore the external finance premium, which in turn works 
to depress the demand for capital, investment and aggregate output further.
As a theoretical counterpart to the result shown in Figure 1.2, Figure 1.3 summarises how 
the transmission mechanism of monetary policy works within the model. Crucially, it exhibits the 
unconventional transmission channel in which a monetary shock affects real economic activities partly 
via its effect on bank capital; the bank capital channel. This channel and its dynamic interplay with
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the balance sheet channel (via entrepreneurial net worth), and asset price channel (price of capital) 
work to ‘augment’ the otherwise standard investment decision of firms via exacerbating the two- 
sided agency problem, the double CSV problem. We turn now to the issue of amplification and 
propagation properties implied by the model.
1.6.3 A m plification and Propagation M echanism
The importance of the role of bank capital in amplifying as well as propagating responses of aggregate 
economic activities to a monetary shock can be seen from Figure 1.4. In the figure, we compare 
the dynamic responses of the model to a negative monetary shock with those of the frictionless 
model (FLM) and the model with bank capital channel turned off (NBM). In the FLM, the role 
of entrepreneurial net worth and bank capital is completely shut off and firms can borrow external 
funds at the sole opportunity cost equivalent to the risk free rate. Thus the transmission mechanism 
of monetary policy in the FLM relies solely on the conventional interest rate channel. For the NBM, 
we ignore the assumption that depositors are averse to aggregate risk but assume instead that they 
are risk neutral when engaging in financial contract decisions. As a result, similar to banks, they 
are willing to bear aggregate risk. This eliminates the operational mechanism of the bank capital 
channel that we discussed in the previous section as the adjustment of the lending rate to aggregate 
shock is no longer stickier compared to that of deposit rate. This implies that, in response to 
a negative monetary shock, the interest rate cost may not necessarily rise faster compared to its 
revenue counterpart and thus bank capital may not decline. Put differently, turning off the bank 
capital channel is analogous to assuming away the effect of having maturity mismatch in banks’ 
balance sheet.
As can be seen from the figure, adding the bank capital channel amplifies as well as propagates 
the effect of a negative monetary shock on aggregate output and investment. The initial response 
of investment is twice as great compared to that of FLM and approximately 25 percent greater 
compared to that of NBM. As for output, the effect is approximately 65 percent greater compared 
to that of FLM and 20 percent greater compared to that of NBM. Moreover, the persistence of 
the real effects implied by the model is significantly greater compared to those of FLM and NBM. 
Evidently, the responses of investment and output persist the least under FLM, e.g. investment 
reverts back to trend only after 9 quarters while those of the other two models remain well below 
trend even after four years. This is because, as can be seen from the figure, the role of entrepreneurial 
net worth and bank capital are passive under FLM. This implies that the role of the external finance
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premium, which operates to constrain the demand for capital and thus future investment and output, 
is nullified. More interestingly, when the bank capital channel is turned on, in comparison with the 
NBM, the persistence of the real effect is evidently larger; e.g., relative to trend, investment and 
output in the full model after 10 quarters are about where they are in the NBM after only 6  
quarters. Although the responses of entrepreneurial net worth are not markedly different under the 
two models, the opposite is true for the responses of bank capital. When the bank capital channel 
is shut off, i.e. the deposit rate no longer adjusts to a monetary shock relatively faster compared to 
the lending rate42, the immediate response of bank capital is to decline slightly and turn positive 
in the subsequent periods. Thus unlike the role of bank capital in the full model, the response of 
bank capital in the model when the bank capital channel is turned off operates to lessen the agency 
problem arisen as a result of persistently declining entrepreneurial net worth. The relatively more 
active role of bank capital in magnifying the agency problem in the full model is mirrored by a 
substantially stronger response of the external finance premium. Crucially, the strongest response 
of the external finance premium in the full model compared to those in the other two models serves 
as the main amplifying and propagating mechanism in the model.
All in all, in the terminology of Bernanke et al. (1999), the simulation result shows that the 
transmission mechanism of monetary policy implied by the model exhibits a financial accelerator 
effect in that endogenous evolution of bank capital, together with entrepreneurial net worth and 
asset price, works to amplify as well as propagate the effect of a monetary shock in the macroeconomy.
1.7 C onclusion
In this chapter, we propose a model to illuminate how the monetary policy transmission process from 
its initial impulse to the ultimate response on aggregate economic activities can get amplified and 
propagated through its effect on bank capital; the bank capital channel. This channel and its dynamic 
interplay with the balance sheet channel and the asset price channel work to augment the real 
investment decision of firms by magnifying the two-sided agency problem, the double Costly State 
Verification. The simulation results confirm the quantitative importance of the financial accelerator 
effect in that endogenous evolution of bank capital operates to amplify and propagate the effect of 
a monetary shock in the macroeconomy.
To keep the model as simple as possible, the banking sector in this model has been highly
simplified. Amongst others, it abstracts from the fact that banks in reality hold other assets besides
4 2 T h u s ,  t h e  i n t e r e s t  r a t e  c o s t  ( p a id  t o  d e p o s i t o r s )  d o e s  n o t  r is e  f a s t e r  c o m p a r e d  t o  t h e  i n t e r e s t  r a t e  r e v e n u e  
( c o l l e c t e d  f r o m  f ir m s ) .
loans, and acquire external funds from other sources besides short-term deposits. Relaxing these 
simplifying assumptions would allow us to identify other transmission channels in which monetary 




This appendix shows the assumptions which ensure that is strictly greater than ^ Bt+i in
equilibrium. In general, 3 scenarios are plausible concerning the relative values of and &iBt+i-
For notation simplicity, we ignore the time subscript in this appendix.
To begin, we first re-state equations (1.2) and (1.4) in the text:
w [Q R k K { = rBV  (Al)
(1 -  9b )Wf  QRKK i = r? D l (A2)
Scenario 1: w f  < (1 — 9B)WB
Under this scenario, equations (Al) and (A2) imply that r f'L 1 < r f D 1. Given a strictly positive 
opportunity cost for bank j, A %r f  >  0, the bank will always go bankrupt as its revenue from lending 
can never cover its cost. Thus we can dismiss this scenario as a potential equilibrium solution.
Scenario 2: (1 — 9B)w B < w f  < w f
When Wi < w f , the firm will go bankrupt. After paying the verification cost, bank j  receives 
(1 - 9 B)w iQRKK i as its net liquidation revenue. Since this revenue is less than the bank’s obligation 
to repay depositor m, i.e. (1 — 9B)w iQ R K K l < (1 — 9B)w BQ R K K l — r ^ D 1, the bank will go 
bankrupt.
When zui firm i is able to pay back to bank j  according to the contract. Since the
bank’s revenue in this case is enough to fulfil the deposit contract, r f L 1 =  w f  QRk K % > ( 1 -  
9B)w fQ R KK l = r®Dl, the bank does not default and pockets the profit equivalent to r ^L 1 — r ^ D 1. 
Given the opportunity cost of funds equivalent to the real risk-free rate, r^, the bank’s expected 
profit function conditional only on the realisation of idiosyncratic risk is given by:
pOO
* = /  \-ri Li ~  r P D y ix v jd w i  -  A lr f  (A3)
Jw f
Using equations (Al) and (A2), equation (A3) can be rewritten as:
7rKi-*®)wf <wf <ssf = ~ 0- ~  9)™?)[l ~  F (w [)]Q R k K 1 -  A lr f  (A4)
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Scenario 3: w f  > w f
When Wi < w f , firm i goes bankrupt. Since bank f s  revenue after paying the verification 
cost is insufficient to fulfil the deposit contract, i.e. (1 — 9B)w iR KQ K % <  (1 — 9B)WBR KQ K l =  
r f  £>*, after declaring a default, the bank passes all its revenue to the depositor and retains nothing. 
When w f  >  W{ > w f , the firm remains bankrupt. However, the bank’s revenue netting off the ver­
ification cost is now enough to fulfil the deposit contract, ( l —0B)w iR KQ K l > (1—9s ) w f  R k Q K 1 — 
r f D 1. Hence the bank pockets (1 — 9B) w i R K Q K l — r f D 1. Lastly, when Wi > w f ,  both the bank 
and the firm do not declare bankruptcy. In this case, the bank pockets r f  L 1 — r f D 1.
The bank’s expected profit conditional on the realisation of idiosyncratic return Wi in this 
case is given by:
7r^f> _B = I [(1 -  9B)w iR KQ K t -  rP D l]f{wi)dwi +  [1 -  F ( w f  )][rf V  -  r? D l] -  A lr f  (A5) 
' *
Using the simplifying notations given in the text (equations (1.9)-(1.10)) together with 
equations (Al) and (A2), equation (A5) can be rewritten as:
>wf = [r(wf) -  (i -  0B) r ( s f ) -  eBa(wf)] r kq ic  -  a V  (A6)
Although scenario 1 can be ruled out, the equilibrium value of w f  can in general fall onto 
either scenarios 2 or 3. However, we will show below that under certain assumptions, we can restrict 
the equilibrium w f  to lie strictly in scenario 3. For notation simplicity, we first define R B such that 
the following equation holds:
7tb  = R BR KQ K i -  A lr f  (A7)
From equations (A3) and (A6), using equation (A7), the value of R B can be given as follows:
< 0 jscenario 1
R b = ( w f  — (1 — 9B)wf) [  1 — F(wf) \  ;scenario 2
=  [r (w f)  — (1 — 9B) T ( w f ) — 9BG ( w f  ) J  ;scenario 3
As mentioned, scenario 1 can be immediately ruled out as R B < 0 , implying that ttb  < 0.
First, we take limit of R B at w f  =  w f :
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lim R b  = lim [ r ( w f ) — (1 — 0B)T(zuf) — 9BG (tu f)\ = 0s  w f [1 -  F ( w f )]
=F_>t=B+ = F _ k= B +  L JI I
lim R B = lim (w f -  (1 -  0B)zv f )[1 -  F ( w f )] =  0 " w f  [1 -  F ( w f )]- F \ i  q B — B \
So we have shown the following:
lim =  lim R B =  0Bw f  [1 — F ( w f )] > 0
7=rF_,=rB+ 5=7F _ ,t= b -
(A8)
Next, we take the partial derivative of R B with respect to the threshold value w f  for both 
scenarios 2 and 3 to obtain:
dR B
|(1 -0B)wf <®f <wf
=  [1 -  F ( w f )][! -  (w f  -  (1 -  0s )w ? )/i(w f)] (A9)
= r'(wf) -  eBG \w f ) = [i -  F(w f)] [i -  fc(®f)] (aio)—F\U1 bB—F l/= F n
|wf>wf
where, as defined in the text, /i(w*) = is the hazard rate.
Then by taking limit of the two derivatives at w f  =  w f , we obtain:
_  lim _ ^ = F  =  [1 -  F (w f  )][1 -  0Bw fh (w f)]  (A ll)
- ^ F  |(l-0B)wf <rof<wf
flpB
lim =  [ l - F ( w f ) ] [ l - 0 s w f/i(w f)] (A12)
Wf ^ f + aw f |Wf>^ f
As Wi is log normally distributed, it satisfies an increasing hazard rate restriction (see footnote 
8). This implies that R B reaches a global maximum at a unique w* and is an increasing and concave 
function for w f  < w f 43 Put differently, we have:
43From equation (AIO), q1?f )2 _ =  - [ / ( « * f  h (z u [ ) ) + 0 B whe r e  / ( r o f )
and h( wf )  are df  and the hazard rate of w f , respectively. The increasing hazard rate restriction, as shown in footnote  
8 in the text, implies a_Jp.0 <  0. Thus, the function R B is concave.
a(rof) m?
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=  0 for w f  - w*
§g£  > 0 for w f  < w*
< 0 for w f  > w \
Since w f  > w* can never be an equilibrium, in order to restrict the equilibrium value of w f  to 
be greater than that of w f  as given by scenario 3, it must be the case that w f  < w*. To achieve 
this, we must assume that evaluated at w f  =  w f  be greater than zero. From equations (A ll) 
and (A12), this implies the following assumption Al.
A ssum ption  A l:  [1 — F (w f  )][1 — 0Bw f h ( w f )] > 0
From equation (A8), another assumption to ensure that equilibrium w f  will be greater than w f  
is given as follows:
A ssum ption  A2: 0Bw f  [1 — F (w f) \ < r k1qKi
Assumption A2 implies that the normalised opportunity cost of funds for the bank, RkQKi , 
is greater than the bank’s expected revenue when w f  = w f .  Thus, assumption A2 means that 
w f  =  w f  cannot be an equilibrium as the opportunity cost of funds outweighs the expected revenue. 
Assumption A l means that at w f  = w f ,  the slope of the R B curve is positive. This together with 
the assumption of increasing hazard rate imply that equilibrium w f  must lie within the range 
( w f  ,w \)  given that the bank’s opportunity cost is not too high, i.e. < R B If the
bank’s opportunity cost is too high, pKQKi >  R B\w?=-w*i the firm is rationed. However, we will
focus only on the non-rationing equilibrium.44
All in all, we have shown that, assumptions A l and A2 are sufficient to ensure that equilibrium 
w f  will be strictly greater than w f .
A ppendix B
In this appendix, we derive the optimality conditions for the firm’s demand for capital. For notation 
simplicity, we drop the i subscript.
First, we define the following variables:
_  QtKt = ip ( -^t+i ^ _  -ftf+i ^ ( r /+i)
* - W - t +  At ’S* -  y r/+1 J  ,Ut+1 ~  Et(Rf+i)  r{+1
44In order to ensure non-rationing equilibrium, it m ust be the case that
= r'(tuf) -  eBG'{mf)  > o.ctv5\ i—F ^ —b x \zvf
This restriction holds under the param eterisation taken in this chapter.
58
where ut+i captures the source of aggregate risk in the model.
We restate firm i ’s optimisation problem given in the text as follows:45
^  - I '(™t+l+j)]Ut+l+jSt+ jh+j}
subject to
(1 -  9s ) -  0d G(w ?+1) ut+is tkt -  (fct -  1) =  0
E t{ [ r(w t+i) -  (1 -  9B)V{wB+l) -  6BG(w(+1j\ ut+i}s tkt -
A t
W t + A t 
where
=  0
— F  _  Tt  ^  W t + A ^  
r{+1ktstut+1
t A t * /p.-. \^ t+ i — f ; (**1/
— B _  r t + i ( k t  1 )
t + 1  ( i  q B \  f  i  ^ '{ 1 - 9  )rJt+lktstut+i
Using Dynamic Lagrangian, we can write the dynamic optimisation problem as follows:
OO
L  — E t {^  ]([! ~  lXCTt+i+?0]Mt+i+ js*+j^*+j 
j=o
+^t+j{ [^(^t+ l+ j) — {1 — 9 )r(u7tBhl+i) — 9 Ut + l + j S t + j k t + j  — Wt+j+At+j  }
+A?+ i{(l -  9B) [T(w?+j) -  9DG{wB+ j)] ut+jSt- 1+jkt- 1+j -  {kt-i+j -  1)})}
The resulting first order conditions are as follows:
r?+i : ^  (B3)' t+1> A} T'(zuB+l) - 9 DG '(izB+1)
s,[(r'(wf+1) -  eBG'(w[+1) ) ^ - u t+l]
where A* is the ex-ante value of the Lagrange multiplier on the constraint that bank j  earns 
zero expected profit prior to the realisation of aggregate risk and A*+1 is the ex-post value of the 
Lagrange multiplier on the constraint that depositor m  earns zero expected profit after the realisation
’Here kt =  *s choice variable. This is because the production functions are constant returns to scale.
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of aggregate risk.
kt ■ r f ,  rf+1) = E t [pt+iu t+is t -  Aj+1] =  0 (B5)
where p t+1 = [1 -  +  A j ^ r o ^ )  -  (1 -  9B)T{wf+l) -  9BG(wf+1)]
+ \a+1(i -  eB) [r(w?+1) -  eDG(wf+1)j
Af+ 1 : (1  -  6B) [ r ( ® f + 1 ) -  0DG(z5B+ l ) ]  ut+lstkt -  {kt -  1) =  0  (B 6 )
A‘ : Et{ [r(wf+1) -  (1 -  flB)r(wf+1) -  0SG « +1)] Ut+i}stkt -  = 0 (B7)
From equations (B1)-(B7), there are 7 equations in 7 variables ( t t f+i ,w f+i, r t+u rt i  kt, ^t+i) A^), 
taken as given the value of st and mw^ At • Thus, in equilibrium, it is possible to write kt solely as a 
function of st and Xvf+At ? kt =  ^ ( s t, w?+At )-
In what follows, we will show that > 0 and < 0-
From equations (Bl) and (B2), given that kt > l 46,
d sf+ t _  ( k - j f e )  > 0 (B8)
^ t  ^t+iktStUt+i
> 0 (B9)^ f + i  _  (kt ~  1)
drt+ 1  (1 -  9B)r{+1ktstUt+ 1
Substituting equation (B8) into equation (B4), the latter can be rewritten as:
E tp ^ ± A ]
Xt ~  >(™[+1)-eBG>(w(+1))  ^ (B1°)
rt+1
Given the increasing hazard rate assumption and the result from Appendix A that w* > w f  > 
w f ,  (wf+f) — 9B G '(w f+1) and (w f+f) — 9D G'(wf+f) are strictly positive. These imply, via 
equations (B3) and (BIO), that A* > 0 and A^ +1 > 0.
From equation (BIO), we take the partial derivative with respect to zuf+i to obtain:
U/Kt _  ________________r t+l_________________r t+ l_______________________rt+ 1_________________r t+ l
d w t + 1 W 1 / +l)) -  9BEt (G'{y ^ ))}2
rt+i rt+1
46 Otherwise the sum of bank capital and entrepreneurial net worth would be sufficient to finance the firm’s 
investm ent outlay, in which case the bank does not need to obtain any deposits from the depositor.
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Using the fact that T ' ^ ^ )  =  1 — F  (/&[+1) , and G'(ujf+ x) =  <^t+ i/(^ t+ i), where F  (xzf+i) 
and are °df and df of zu[+1 respectively, we can then write ^=7*— as follows:
^ 1 _ ^ ( ro t + l ) \ p  / ^ ( ^ f + l / t ^ f + l ) )  1 \ I p  /"/ ( ^ t + l )  A Cl z'a7t + l / ( ra7t + l )  M
d \ l  & ^ — p  >Et \ p ~ > + Et  ^ p  — ^ ; jr#J_1 1 NJ.1 '*_L1 • + -L1
q /-^ j F f(^p F \\
In general, the value of *+Lp *+ could be either positive or negative. However, under a 
reasonable parameterisation, including the one used for calibration in this chapter, it will be strictly
positive in the neighbourhood of the steady state, in which case > 0.dzv* 
-= FFrom equation (B3), take the partial derivative with respect to w^_1and zzf+i, we obtain:
8>h+i =  r ' ( g f +1) d \ j  =  A|± i_ 9 ^ _
dw[+1 T '(w f+l) - S DG '(w f+l)8w [+1 A,1 SW(+l
q ,2  /jDrp/ /-—-R \ r "!(-— 1 r"  1-—-R \/~ui-=B \i 9^11 — F(zo?, i )l  ^^° \ + i  _  V ir  C^t+iJ^ (CTt + i ) ~ r  (CTt+i)J^i =  1 v t+1Ji 9&t+1 ^ 1
[r'(®?+1) - 0 DG '(s f+1)]2 ‘ [ r '( s f +1) - 0 DG '( s f+1)]2
Due to the assumption of an increasing hazard rate, ^±i2 > 0, where h(w f+1) =
/ t e f l  \ ^^2
) is the hazard rate evaluated at it follows directly that > 0.
Thus far, we have established that Ah A?,,, , f—ffi1 , f_  j -1 , ■^ p t-  are all positive fora w t , j a t u t , x o r t a r t+\
>f+1 €
To show that ^  > 0, take the derivative of JJ t(s t ,r^ , r^t-i) or<^ er condition with
respect to capital, equation (B5)) with respect to st .
dJJt d J J t d r i  d F h d r ^ ,  d J J t d r f  dJJt d r ° dkt =  
dst dr f  dst dr^+1 dst drf dkt dr?+1 dkt dst
and rearrange to obtain:
\ dJJ t  , d JJ t  dr^ d J J t  d r?+\ i
I ft  o  . ' A m  L  ft a . • D ft a . \
(B ll)
d k t  dat d r f  d s t drjD+1
dst rdJJ t  d r£  , dJJ t  d r ?+i
1 d r f  dkt ®Tt+\
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Prom equation (B5),
d J J t
dst
d J J t
drb
Et(pt+iUt+i) > 0
£,[-r'(rof+1) ^ i «t+i + At1(r'(wf+1) -  eBG'(mi+1) ) ^ ^ u t+1}3t 
+E‘l^ r  [r (“ f+i) -  (i -  «B)r(rof+1) -  #flG(sf+1)J u,+i]s,
-\-Et
dXt+i
dr,L ((1 -  eB) [iXrog.!) -  9DG(wB+1)j ut+ist -  l)
Equation (B6) can be rearranged to obtain:
( ( i  -  eB) [ r ( s f+1) -  eDG(w?+1)] - 1)  =  - 1
Equation (B7) can be rearranged to obtain:
* { [ r « + i )  -  (i -  »B)r(® f+1) -  eBG(®f+1)]
From equation (B3),
d rtL \ ]  d r f
Substituting equations (B4), (B13), (B14) and (B15) into equation (B12), we obtain:
d J J t _  (dX ]+1
—  -C'td rf d r f  kt
A , A J
W, +  A, A2
-  1
■*+1
Because > 0, < 1, and ^V! t r r
From equation (B5),
rr1-  < 1, it must be that 4 ^  < 0.
■«+i
dJJt -  E t i - \ l ( i - e B)r'(w?+1) f ^ u t+1
+A?+1(i -  0B)[r'(wf+1) -  oDG'(wf+ 1) ] ^ . u t+i]St 
+ * l f f £ « i  -  «B) [r(®f+1) -  »DG (s f+ l)] ut+lst - 1}]
Using equations (B3) and (B13), we can write:








From equation (B6), we take the partial derivative with respect to st and kt , respectively to 
obtain:
[r(^?+ i) -  eDG (w f+1)
dst
< 0 (B18)
( i - d - 0 [ r ( r o f + i  ) - e DG (w B+1) Ut+lSt)
( 1 - 0 T'(WB+l) - e DG’(WB+l)] S ^ . u t+1stk,
> 0
d r DUsing equation (B13), g ^ 1 can be rewritten as:
d r t + i  = ___________________________K^____________________________
d h  (1  _  9b ) [ p ( ® f + 1 ) -  0d G’(W?+1)] tS jg -u t+ M k,





(1 -  eB)T’(w?+1) f T£  S th u t^
-  [r ( 0 - i )  -  (1 -  O r ( © f + i )  -  0s G(raf+1)] ut+1kt J
£ t{ r '(® f+1) -  9BG'(wf+1) ) ^ « t+1}*«*t
By substituting equation (B18) into the above equation, we obtain:




[r ( 0 + i )  -  ( !  -  O r ( r a f + 1 ) -  0 s G ( w f + 1 )]  ktu t+1 )
E t{r '(® f+ i)  -  6BG’(W?+1) ) ^ P - u t+ i}a ,k ,
( i - e B)r'(wf+l) ^ ^ - s tktu,+1 N
y -  [r(®tB i) -  (i -  O r  (® & i) -  eBG(wf+l) u t+i s , ) 
f t{ r '(® f+ i)  -  eBG'(w[+1) ) ^ f u t+1}sth  





d r f  =  J_____________ ^ { ~ l f  ~  WT+a_____________
dkt kt E t { r (w [ +1) -  ^ G ' i n f + ^ ^ ^ u t + i S t k t }
(B21)
Because, > 1 and < 1, it must be the case that -g^ > 0.
r\ j  j  a  * j  Q ^ ,L  q  j  t
Thus far we have shown that ^ “xS g^p ) "a^ 1 1 and are strictly negative and that g ^ 1,
ive. Plugging these values into equation (B ll) implies that ^  is strictly
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and are strictly posit
positive as required.
We turn now to show that — < 0. From equation (B5), take the derivative of J J t with
dWt+At
respect to Wf+At to  obtain:
aJJi drj- dJJ t d r j  d JJ t drf+, dkt
d r t  d y f a z  d r t  dkt drl>+1 dkt d y f e ;
i d JJt. d r t
dkt _  [ drt
d „ rAl A r d J J td r *  I dJJ t  d r t + i 'W t+ A t  dkt  +  dkt  .
(B22)
In order to obtain - —^ — , take the derivative of equation (B7) with respect to and
9 Wt+At ‘ *
rearrange to obtain:
d rf
d w?+At Et {T'{wf+1) -  9BG,{wf+1) ) ^ ^ - u t+1}stkt
> 0 (B23)
As and ^p *  are strictly negative and 3 gp,^ , are strictly positive, by substi­
tuting these values into equation (B22), it must be that — < 0.
In sum, we have shown the following:
*  = (B24) 
where H  > °’ < 01 °  W t + A t
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The Role o f M oney and the  
Transm ission M echanism  o f  
M onetary Policy: Evidence from  
Thailand
A b strac t
This chapter shows that the scope of changes in relative yields of various assets for which money 
is conventionally argued to proxy can be empirically segregated into (i) changes in relative prices 
along the term structure (term-structure effect) and (ii) changes in relative risk premia component 
of different kinds/classes of assets (risk-premium effect). Using Thailand data, we found that both 
effects are significant. We argue from this finding that standard macro models which are based on 
the two-asset assumption are distorting and that the problem can be alleviated by introducing an 
explicit role of money in these models.
2.1 Introduction
The current trend for downgrading the role of money in small-scale macroeconomic models for
monetary policy is indeed widespread.1 As emphasised by King (2002) and Meyer (2001), this trend
is no longer just an academic phenomenon since it has already been popularised in large scale macro­
lrTo name a few, these models range from the forward-looking m odels w ith  m icrofoundations of M cCallum  and 
Nelson (1999) and Rotemberg and Woodford (1997) to the pure backward-looking m odel w ithout m icrofoundations 
of Rudebusch and Svensson (2002).
econometric models employed by various leading central banks, including the Fed and the Bank of 
England.
The main goal of this chapter is to examine whether this trend may have major disadvantages 
in neglecting important channels of the monetary policy transmission mechanism; specifically, the 
channels which operate through changes in relative yields on a wide array of assets (Meltzer, 2001b). 
In doing so, we use Thailand quarterly data as the basis of investigation. As related evidence on 
this issue is all from developed countries, it should be interesting to see whether consistent results 
would be obtained for a developing country such as Thailand.2
Although Nelson (2002) attempted a similar type of empirical exercise for the U.S. and U.K., 
we argue below that his empirical methodology does not allow for the optimal forward-looking 
consumption behaviour typically encapsulated in models with microfoundations. In particular, the 
novel feature of the analysis in this chapter is that we test for the significance of the role of the 
real monetary stock in a hybrid IS equation, which essentially allows for both forward looking 
and backward looking behaviours of rational agents. As we shall argue, this allows us to identify 
separately the two distinct forms of changes in relative yields of assets that money is conventionally 
found to proxy; one being changes along the term structure of interest rate (the term-structure 
effect) and the other being changes in relative risk premia amongst different kinds and classes of 
assets (the risk premium effect). Given that the risk premium effect is found to be strong and 
statistically significant, the two-asset world assumption which has long underpinned conventional 
macro models, including the class of models with microfoundations, becomes inherently distorting. 
This problem can be ameliorated by introducing an explicit role of money into the model.
The organisation of this chapter is as follows. Section 2.2 illustrates a literature review on the 
independent role of money in the monetary transmission mechanism. Section 2.3 discusses the 
theoretical background. Section 2.4 illustrates the empirical methodology while section 2.5 shows 
the empirical evidence. Section 2.6 provides policy implications and concluding remarks.
2 The fact that financial markets in developing countries are im m aturely established im plies that the transmission  
process in these countries should rely less on the standard channel via m oney and bond markets and may therefore 
rely more on the non-standard channels via changes in relative prices o f various assets. As will be elaborated below, 
it is precisely these non-standard channels for which M eltzer (2001b) argues that money may serve as an auxilary 
proxy. In this light, it is natural to expect strong evidence in support o f an independent role of m oney in a developing 
country such as Thailand.
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2.2 A  Literature R eview
2.2.1 A  conventional macro m odel w ith  no explicit role o f m oney
A version of the standard closed economy macro model with microfoundations in the spirit of Clarida, 
Gali and Gertler (1999) can be described as follows:
Vt — —di[Rt ~  1)] +  Etyt+i +  £t (2-1)
* t  =  h y t  +  h E t i n t + i )  +  e*  (2-2)
Rt =  ciyt +  c2(7rt -  7r*) +  e\ (2.3)
m t = di +  d2 [Rt — Et(itt+1 )] +  d^yt +  £™ (2-4)
where yt denotes the output gap3,7rt denotes inflation, 7r* denotes the inflation target, R t denotes 
the (nominal) short-term interest rate, m t denotes the real money stock, elt , e™ axe i.i.d.
disturbance terms with zero mean and a2 variance, and Et (-) is the rational expectation operator 
conditional on the information available in period t.
Equations (2.1) and (2.2) are a standard forward-looking IS equation and a standard forward- 
looking Phillips curve equation, respectively. Equation (2.3) is a Taylor-type rule. Equation (2.4) is 
the derived real money demand equation. The transmission mechanism of monetary policy in this 
typical model works as follows. The Central Bank sets the nominal policy rate via equation (2.3). 
Due to nominal rigidity in price setting, an increase in the policy rate increases the real interest 
rate. Consequently, rational agents demand more bonds and less money, and reduce aggregate 
consumption and output. The equilibrium money stock is supplied by the Central Bank to satisfy 
the demand for money (equation (2.4)).
This transmission mechanism represents the standard interest rate channel. Apparently, equa­
tions (2.1) to (2.3) sufficiently determine the dynamic behaviour of output, inflation and interest rate 
without requiring further information on the money stock. In other words, the LM curve, equation 
(2.4), is not part of the simultaneous structure of the model and the real money stock, therefore, 
does not play an independent role beyond that summarised by the interest rate.
In the literature, several arguments have been proposed concerning the plausibility that money 
may have an independent role in the monetary transmission process. These are the real balance 
effect, the transaction cost effect and the argument that money serves as an auxiliary proxy for
3 In the standard optim isation-based IS-LM framework, the output gap is defined as the deviation of output from 
its natural level, which in turn is defined as the output level at the flexible price.
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unidentified transmission channels.
2.2.2 The real balance effect
The idea that the money stock is part of agents’ net wealth can be traced back to Pigou (1943) 
and Patinkin (1965). The underlying idea is that, with the presence of nominal rigidity in price 
adjustment, an increase in the nominal money stock also increases the ‘real’ money stock. As the 
real money stock, which is part of agents’ net wealth, increases aggregate output should expand 
by more than what the conventional interest rate channel suggests. In other words, equation (2.1) 
is misspecified as it should have incorporated the real money stock as one of the right hand side 
variables. Ireland (2001b) has formalised ‘the real balance effect’ into an otherwise standard dynamic 
stochastic general equilibrium model. The main result shows that there is no liquidity trap and 
monetary policy remains effective through the real balance effect even when the nominal interest 
rate hits the zero bound.
Although the real balance effect is likely to  prevail, its magnitude is arguably small. As pointed 
out by King (2002), the only part of money supply which constitutes the economy’s net wealth 
is monetary base. Since it accounts for a very small fraction of financial wealth, the quantitative 
significance of the real balance effect is likely to be of second order importance. Moreover, as argued 
by Metzler (1951), a monetary expansion usually requires an exchange of money for bonds. As bonds 
are also part of agents’ financial wealth, the initial real balance effect may therefore be mitigated.4
2.2.3 The transaction-cost effect and non-additive separability in th e util­
ity  function
McCallum (2001) and Ireland (2001a) have formalised the idea that holding money helps reduce the 
transaction cost into the otherwise standard macro model with microfoundations. While McCallum 
(2001) captures the idea by explicitly adding a transaction cost term in the representative household’s 
budget constraint, Ireland (2001a) and Svensson (2001) relax the standard assumption of additive 
separability between money and consumption in the representative agent’s utility function. After 
some algebraic manipulation, it could be shown that a real money term enters the derived IS equation 
explicitly.
However, McCallum (2001) argues that a reasonable parameterisation in the utility function 
leads to an insignificantly small value of the coefficient of the real money stock in the derived IS
4However, the wealth status of bonds has later been challenged by the literature on Ricardian equivalence.
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equation. Ireland’s (2001a) empirical finding, using M2 as the measure of money, lends support to 
McCallum’s conclusion: the transaction cost effect is arguably small.
2.2.4 M oney as an auxiliary proxy for unidentified m onetary transm ission  
channels
“The transmission of monetary policy from initial impulse to final effect involves changes 
in many relative prices of assets and output. That last statement may seem obvious to 
many of you, but it is inconsistent with most, if not all, recent work on quarterly, dynamic 
models of monetary policy” (Meltzer, 2001a, pp.30)
One critical assumption underlying standard macro models is that assets other than money, both 
financial and real, are perfect substitutes. This implies that all these assets can be treated as a single 
composite goods and the interest rate on the short-term government bonds is a perfectly accurate 
stand-in for all other yields. Agents in these models can therefore be perceived as if they were living 
in the two-asset world, money and the short-term riskless bonds.
However, owing to the fact that most assets in agents’ portfolio are gross substitutes, not perfect 
substitutes, Meltzer (2001b), in line with Friedman and Schwartz (1982), Brunner and Meltzer 
(1993), argues, as the quote above suggests, that monetary policy operates by changing the relative 
yields of these assets. As the short-term riskless yield is no longer an adequate stand-in for all 
other yields, the assumption that monetary policy operates within the two-asset world may mask 
important monetary policy transmission channels. Because the demand for money is generally 
a function of these yields5, the monetary stock could arguably serve as a good proxy for these 
unidentified monetary transmission channels.
Meltzer (2001b), following Koenig (1990), tested a two-stage backward looking model of changes 
in consumption, with changes in real money balances, real interest rates, income, and other variables 
as arguments of the consumption function using U.S. quarterly data. Similar to Koenig’s result, 
he finds that changes in real money balances have a positively significant effect on changes in 
consumption even after the short-term interest rate is included as one of the explanatory variables. 
Meltzer (2001b) concludes from his finding that money plays an independent role in determining 
aggregate demand even when the role of the short-term interest rate has been taken into account. 
He further argues that the evidence lends support to the idea that money serves as a proxy for
relative prices of other assets that are relevant to aggregate demand.
5B y virtue of the portfolio theory of money demand, see, amongst others, Friedman (1956).
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Nelson (2002) employs variant versions of Rudebusch and Svensson’s (2002) pure backward- 
looking IS equation to test for the independent role of money using U.S. and U.K. quarterly data. 
His specification for the U.S. is given as follows:
4
yt =  fPi +  *l>2Vt-i + ^ 3,yt- 2  +  V>3r*-i +  +  £t
j =i
£t ~  N (  0, a2)
where yt is the output gap, rt is the real interest rate, and A m t is real monetary base growth.
Nelson finds that lags of real monetary base growth enter equation (2.5) sizably, positively and 
significantly even when the short term interest rate has been explicitly controlled for.6 In Nelson’s 
terminology, real monetary base growth has a ‘direct effect’ on aggregate demand. Although his 
result implies that conventional backward-looking IS equations, e.g. equation (2.5) with no money 
terms, are clearly misspecified, he argues that forward-looking IS equations derived from the standard 
optimisation-based framework, e.g. equation (2.1), are not, provided that a portfolio adjustment cost 
is introduced.7 However, we shall argue on the contrary; IS equations which are based on the two- 
asset world assumption, whether or not they have allowed for the forward-looking behaviour of 
rational agents, are misspecified. In other words, the result that money terms enter equation (2.5) 
significantly cannot be fully rationalised even within the modified optimising IS-LM framework 
proposed by Nelson (2002). This, as we shall argue below, is owing to the empirical significance of 
the ‘risk premium’ effect.
2.3 T heoretical Background: T he term  structure and risk 
prem ium  effects
According to Meltzer, unidentified monetary transmission channels that the real money stock might 
be proxying are the channels which arise from changes in relative prices of a wide array of assets. 
There are two distinct aspects of changes in these relative prices; one being the changes along the 
term structure (the term-structure effect) and the other being the changes in relative risk premia 
(the risk premium effect) amongst different kinds and classes of assets.
6For the case of the U .S., in line with Bernanke and Blinder’s (1992) conclusion, Rudebusch and Svensson (2002) 
report that, using M2 as a proxy, real m oney growth terms enter the backward-looking IS equation insignificantly. 
However, Nelson (2002) finds that the conclusion does not hold when the m onetary base is used as an alternative 
proxy.
7Given this m odification, the derived demand for money becom es a function of both short and long term interest 
rates. This in turn implies that money growth is highly correlated with the long rate.
72
2.3.1 The term -structure effect
The term structure effect captures the fact that an initial monetary impulse, i.e. a change in the 
short-term policy rate, changes relative yields along the term structure of interest rate. This implies 
that aggregate spending should also be a function of longer-term real interest rates, in addition to 
the real short term rate. Importantly, this effect partially captures the expectation channel of the 
monetary policy transmission.
To elaborate, when the Central Bank decreases its short-term policy rate, the ultimate effect on 
aggregate spending, ceteris paribus, depends on agents’ beliefs about the persistence of the initial 
impulse. If agents believe the impulse to be transitory, a decrease in the short rate would not lead 
to a significant decline in the long-term rate and hence the effect on aggregate spending will not be 
as strong as it would have been had the policy been believed to be permanent.8 In this light, the 
typical backward looking IS equation is misspecified and, as the work of Nelson (2002) shows, the 
statistical significance of the real monetary base growth term in equation (2.5) could, in one and 
only one respect, be interpreted as evidence in support of the term structure effect.
2.3.2 The risk-premium effect
In addition to the term structure effect, monetary policy also operates through changes in the risk 
premia component of relative prices of various assets. This effect encompasses several monetary 
policy transmission channels commonly known in the literature, e.g. the balance sheet channel, 
the asset price channel, the expectation channel etc., all of which are absent in conventional macro 
models simply because all assets besides money are assumed to be perfect substitutes.
T h e  balance shee t channel: An unanticipated increase in the short-term policy rate impairs 
firms’ financial position (e.g. through higher interest rate expenses, and unexpectedly lower return 
on prior investment). As their net worth deteriorated, a higher external financial premium may be 
required to compensate lenders (i.e. banks) as the default probability increases. Thus lending rates 
may not increase on a one-to-one basis with the policy rate as the relative riskiness of bank loans 
has been altered. This channel has not been incorporated as part of the transmission process in 
conventional macro models as risky bank loans are treated as perfect substitutes for riskless bonds.
T h e  asset p rice  an d  ex p ecta tio n  channels: In one scenario, rational agents could interpret a 
reduction in the short-term policy rate as a demand stimulus and thus a signal for future growth. This
8In fact, the im pact on longer-term yields could go either way. T his is because they are influenced by current and 
expected short-term yields. The outcom e therefore depends upon the direction and the extent of the impact of the 
policy rate changes on the expectation of the future path of interest rates.
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unexpectedly good news leads to a reduction in the relative risk premia of various risky financial 
assets, e.g. equities. A decrease in relative yields of equities (higher prices) compared to those 
of riskless bonds could in turn produce an additional wealth effect, further stimulating aggregate 
demand. In contrast, rational agents could interpret a reduction in the short-term rate as a sign 
of the authority being pre-emptive against future recession. As the relative risk premia increases, 
stock prices decline, the negative wealth effect could therefore work to attenuate the initial stimulus 
effect on aggregate demand.
2.3.3 Separating the risk-premium effect from  th e  term -structure effect
Although Nelson’s (2002) and Rudebusch and Svensson’s (2002) empirical IS specifications can be 
employed to test for the direct effect of the money stock on aggregate demand, they cannot be used 
to separately identify the risk premium effect from the term structure effect. This is because their 
specifications are of a pure backward looking type and therefore include only the real short-term 
interest rate. Based on the theoretical argument of Meltzer (2001b), this implies that the existence 
of real monetary base growth in equation (2.5) could proxy either real longer-term rates (the term 
structure effect) or relative yields of other risky assets (the risk premium effect).
The distinction between the two is important to our understanding of the monetary transmission
mechanism. To understand this, iterate equation (2.1) forward to  obtain:
OO
y t  =  E t 'y'] [—0,1 (R t+ j  ~  7rt+ j)]
3=0
OO
=  —a iE t^ > ^ [{R t+ j  — 'n’t+ j) ]  (2*6)
j=o
Applying the expectation theory of the term structure of interest rates, equation (2.6) can be 
rewritten as:
Vt =  —o-ir't (2.7)
where r\ is defined as the real long-term interest rate.
The above equation emphasises the point stressed by Rotemberg and Woodford (1999) and 
Clarida, Gali and Gertler (1999) in that it is the real long-term interest rate that matters for 
aggregate demand in optimisation-based forward looking macro models. Hence, except for the pure 
backward looking type, conventional macro models have already implicitly taken into account the 
term structure effect. However, as all assets other than money are treated as perfect substitutes
74
in these models, the risk premium effect has not been incorporated as part of the monetary policy 
transmission mechanism.
In order to identify the risk premium effect, we base our analysis on the aforementioned Meltzer’s 
argument and estimate an equation which adds money terms into the otherwise standard hybrid IS 
equation. As the hybrid IS equation allows for both forward and backward looking behaviours of 
rational agents, following the above line of argument, if the money terms enter the hybrid IS equation 
sizably and significantly, we may interpret the results as evidence in support of the prevalence of the 
risk premium effect.
The above line of argument, as equations (2.6) and (2.7) clearly show, depends largely on the 
validity of the expectation theory of the term structure. As its empirical justification is largely 
controversial9, to ensure the validity of our result, we also explicitly control for the term structure 
effect by adding a proxy for the real long-term interest rate into the hybrid IS specification. The 
detail will be given in the next section.
Indeed, if the risk premium effect is found to be empirically insignificant, we could then infer that 
the interest rate channel currently identified in conventional macro models is sufficient to capture 
the main transmission process. Moreover, the widely adopted two-asset world assumption would be 
a justifiable simplifying assumption. Another implication is that real monetary growth would have 
no independent role in the forward-looking class of models as the term structure effect has already 
been encapsulated.
In contrast, if the risk premium effect is found to be empirically and sizably significant, the 
validity and completeness of conventional macro models which are based on the two-asset world 
assumption become seriously doubtful, particularly in light of its being a tool to identify and un­
derstand the transmission mechanism of monetary policy. As typical IS equations derived from 
the standard optimising agent framework are based on the two-asset world assumption, they are 
misspecified. Thus, the claim made by Nelson (2003) and McCallum and Nelson (1999) that “while 
recognizing many distinct assets ‘is clearly correct for some purposes..., disaggregation provides ben­
efits but also costs, so two-asset models will often prove convenient and s a t is fa c to r y (McCallum 
and Nelson, 1999, page 298-299) would become unjustified and that the problem imposed by the 
two-asset world assumption could be ameliorated by explicitly taking into account the independent 
role of money in the model.
9See, amongst others, Thornton (2000).
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2.4 Em pirical M ethodology
2.4.1 The backward looking IS specifications: The direct effect o f the 
money stock
We first estimate a version of pure backward looking IS equations along the line of Nelson (2002) 
in order to investigate whether the conclusion that he obtained for the U.S. and U.K., i.e. the 
real money stock contains information content over and above that captured by the real short-term 
rate, holds when using Thailand data. The sample covers from the period 1993:Q1 to 2002:Q2.1011 
However, as Thailand is a small-open economy, the baseline specification has to be modified in 
order to allow for open-economy factors. Specifically, we estimate the following backward looking 
IS equation:
yt — Pi + /322/t—i +  /33yt-2 +  + Pzrt - 1 +  P&^Vt-1 +  Pr&Qt-i +  Ps A m t_i +  et (2.8)
i 3
r‘ =  4 ( X > - i ) - A 4 P i  (2.9)
i= 0
A„« = ----------^ ----------As, /  + ----------^ --------p i ---- ------Ay?  (2.10)
trJ,t + trus,t + trs ,t t r j j  + trus,t + t rS,t t r J,t + trus,t + trs,t
m t = M t -  pt (2.11)
Et ~  N ( 0,cr2)
yt is Thailand output gap, defined as the deviation of (log) seasonally adjusted real GDP of Thai­
land (yt ) from the potential output (yt)- As the potential output is not observable and alternative 
detrending filters may plausibly extract different types of information from the data (Canova, 1998), 
we use four methods to estimate y* (and therefore yt) as a means to check for robustness. These are 
linear detrending (LT), quadratic detrending (QT), Hodrick-Prescott filtering (HP), and Beveridge
10This is owing to the lim ited availability o f T hailand’s quarterly G D P data. One common way of dealing with  
the relatively short sample size o f the GDP series is to use M anufacturing Production Index (M PI), which is available 
from 1989 in m onthly frequency, as a proxy for real G DP. However, based on a sim ple correlation statistics, we found 
that the ability of such index to proxy real G DP is quite poor. To elaborate, we used H odrick-Prescott (H P) Filtering  
m ethod to estim ate the output gap series from 1989:M1-2002:M6, where real G DP is proxied by M PI index. The series 
is then quarterly averaged and compared with that estim ated using the original quarterly real G DP data over the 
period 1993:Q1-2002:Q2. We found that the correlation of the two series is only 0.56 over this period. One possible  
reason for this finding m ay be that Thailand’s M PI is com piled based on a restricted sample size (255 producers). 
As noted by Jiwaskapimat (2000), owing to the lim itation of staff and legal power, the index accounts for 62.4% of 
the total manufacturing sector in 1995. We also found that if the sam e correlation is com puted using the Industrial 
Production Index (IPI) and real quarterly G DP of the U .S., which has com paratively more resources and expertise  
in com piling the IPI, the correlation becomes 0.81. Given the lim itation of T hailand’s M PI, the analysis throughout 
this chapter is based on the original quarterly real G DP series, bearing in mind when interpreting the results that 
such analysis is based on a relatively short sample.
11 Unless stated otherwise, the source of data is from the Bank of Thailand.
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and Nelson’s (1981) decomposition (BN) methods.12 Figure 2.1 shows the results of estimated y% 
and yt obtained from the four detrending methods. rt is the real short-term interest rate which 
is explicitly defined in equation (2.9). Rt is the short-term policy rate, defined as the quarterly 
averaged RP14 rate. A 4 is the fourth-difference operator and pt is (log) core consumer price index. 
Thus the real short-term interest rate, rt , that we use here, following Nelson (2002) and Rudebusch 
and Svensson (2002), is a smoothed version of the pseudo-real interest rate. A y™ is a proxy for the 
world output growth, and is defined in equation (2.10). Specifically, Ay™ is the weighted average 
of the first difference of (log) seasonally adjusted real GDP of the top-three trading partners of 
Thailand, namely Japan (J), U.S. {US) and Singapore (5).1314 tr^t is the total value of export 
plus import between Thailand and country i, where i = J ,U S ,S . A qt is the first difference of (log)
Thailand real effective exchange rate (REER), where an increase in qt indicates a real appreciation
in Thai baht.15 M t is the (log) quarterly average of the (seasonally adjusted) monetary stock. We 
use three proxies for this variable, namely M0 (monetary base), Ml and M2, as an additional means 
to check for robustness. Given these definitions, equation (2.8) is estimated using Ordinary Least 
Square (OLS) method.16
As shown in Table 2.1, Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) and Phillips-Perron (PP) tests indicate 
that the null hypothesis of the series being nonstationary 1(1) can be rejected at the 10 percent level 
of significance for all variables included in equation (2.8) except for rt . In the case of rt , the result is 
ambiguous as ADF test could reject the null that the series is 1(1) while PP  test could not. To ensure 
that the empirical result obtained from equation (2.8) is not sensitive to  the ambiguous stationarity 
property of rt, we also regress the following equation, equation (2.12), using OLS method where 
rt- 1 in equation (2.8) is replaced by its first difference, A rt_i.
Vt =  7 i  +  7 2 & - 1  +  l zV t-2  +  7 4 ^ - 3  +  7 5 A r t - i  +  7 e A C - i  +  77 A 9 t - i
+ 7sAm t - i + et (2-12)
£t ~  7V(0, a2)
12For the BN m ethod, we use a quick com putational procedure proposed by Cuddington and W inters (1987) where 
the initial value of the potential output is taken to be that estim ated by the QT m ethod. Various A RM A(p,q) m odels 
are initially estim ated on the changes in log seasonally adjusted real G D P up to A R M A (3,3) and the Akaike Info 
Criterion is used to select the best m odel, which turned out to be A R M A (2,2).
13 The value of trade (export+ im port) between Thailand and the top three trading partners accounts, on average, 
for approximately 45 percent of Thailand’s total external trading.
14The source of real quarterly G DP data for U .S. and Japan is IMF International Financial S tatistics and that for 
Singapore is Singapore Departm ent of S tatistics.
15We use A q t  instead of qt in equation (2.8) because, as Table 2.1 shows, the null hypothesis that qt is 1(1) cannot 
be rejected at the 10 percent level o f significance.
16Higher order lags of Am * are included in the preliminary regressions analogous to equation (2.8) (not reported), 
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Figure 2.1: Estimated potential output and output gap from four detrending methods
As will be shown in section 2.5, the main results obtained from regressing equations (2.8) and 
(2.12) are not sensitive to the specification of the interest rate term. Thus, throughout the rest of 
the chapter, we shall assume that rt is a stationary series.
2.4.2 The Hybrid IS Specifications: The risk prem ium  effect
In order to investigate the risk premium effect, a version of the small-open economy hybrid IS 
equation is employed. Following Gali and Monacelli (2002) and Clarida, Gali and Gertler (2001), a 
small-open economy IS equation with microfoundations can be written as follows17:
Vt =  Et(St+1 ) +  W  -  Et (irt+1 )] +  62E t (Ay?+1) (2.13)
where, as usual, y t is the domestic-economy output gap, R t is the nominal short term rate, nt is
CPI inflation, and y™ is the (log) world output.
Equation (2.13) is similar to a standard optimisation-based IS equation found in its closed-
economy counterpart (i.e. Clarida, Gali and Gertler, 1999) except that elements representing ‘the
rest of the world’ are factored in.18 More specifically, the coefficients in the open-economy equi-
17Other open economy optimisation-based models include Svensson (2000) and Obsfield and Rogoff (2000), among 
others.
18 For simplicity, we assume that the discount factor of a representative agent in the domestic economy is equal to 
unity and the domestic production technology parameter follows a random noise process.
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Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test Phillips-Perron (PP) test
Vt (LT) -2.47** -2.26**
Vt (QT) -2 .6 8 *** -2.52**
yt (HP) -2.48** -2.13**
yt (BP) -2.15** -1.90*
Tt -3.26** -1.41
A rt -3.31*** -2.43**
AmO -5.60*** -5.64***
A m i -3.84*** -5.35***
Am2 -3.31** -4.00***
Qt -1.94 -1.54
Aft -4 4 9 *** -4.56***
A V? -3.76*** -4.65***
-3.10** -1.18
{rlt - r t ) /r t -2.78* -1.30
N ote: ADF tests for all variables include one lagged dependent variable. 
For PP tests, the number of lag truncation is set to 3. Except for yt (LT, 
QT, HP,BN) and Art , all tests include a constant term. ***, **,* indicate 
significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level.
Table 2.1: Unit root tests
librium, £i and 6 2 , also depend on parameters that are specific to the open economy (the index of 
openness and the elasticity of substitution between domestic and foreign goods), while fluctuations 
in world output also m atter for domestic aggregate demand. The key assumption underpinning the 
derivation of equation (2.13) is that the uncovered interest parity (UIP) relationship holds. Given 
this assumption, the real exchange rate term does not explicitly appear as a determinant of the 
output gap in the reduced-form IS equation, equation (2.13). In particular, the UIP relationship 
is used to substitute the term away, and the effect of the real exchange rate on aggregate demand 
is implicitly captured by the coefficient of the real interest rate, £1 . Given that the Central Bank 
uses the interest rate as its instrument in conducting monetary policy operation, the real exchange 
rate becomes endogenously determined in the model and its movement is fully dictated by the UIP 
relationship. 19 However, the empirical evidence on the UIP relationship has been mostly discourag­
ing (see amongst others, Froot and Thaler, 1990). This implies that, as the Central Bank changes 
the interest rate, its effect on aggregate demand via the exchange rate channel may not be fully 
captured by the coefficient of the real interest rate term and the standard ‘imported inflation’ effect 
via CPI inflation (7^ + 1 ). To account for the remaining effect, we explicitly add the expected lead of 
real exchange rate growth (Et {Aqt+i)) as one of the determinants of the output gap. This is given 
in the following equation:
19Similarly, if the Central Bank uses the exchange rate as the instrum ent, the model implies that the interest rate 
will become endogenous via the UIP relationship.
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Vt — Et(V t+i)  +  &i[Rt — E t ('Kt+1 )] +  o-2E t (A q t+ i)  +  a sE t (Ay^+1) (2-14)
Furthermore, to improve the empirical fit, we assume that the output gap is a convex combination 
of lagged output gap and the right hand side of equation (2.14). This gives the following hybrid IS 
equation:
Vt = w V t-1 +  (1 — w ) |£* (2 /t+ i) +  cn[Rt — Et(^t+ 1)] +  a2E t(A qt+i) + cr3^ t (A y^_1)j (2.15)
In order to test for the existence of the risk premium effect, we add both contemporaneous and 
lagged real money growth terms in equation (2.15). After some algebraic manipulation, the following 
specification is obtained:
Vt = 0 i2/t-i +  faEtiVt+i) +  03 [- t^ — Et (7rt+i)] + <f>AEt {Aqt+i) +  (/>5A m t
+(fi6A m t- i  + (j>rEt (Ay™+l) + (2.16)
e\ ~  N (0 ,a 2)
Assume for simplicity that [Rt — Et(nt+1 )] is approximately equal to the ‘pseudo’ real short-term 
interest rate rt defined earlier, equation (2.16) can be written as:
Vt =  t l i t - l  +  faVt+ l  +  03 n  +  04A ^ + l  +  05A m i +  06A m t - 1 +  07A 2/t+l +  v t (2-17)
where v t = (j>2[Et (y t+1) -  y t+1] + (f>4[Et (Aqt+i) -  Aqt+i] +  <f>7[Et (Ay?+1) -  Ay?+1\ +  z \  is the 
linear combination of the forecast errors of the output gap, the forecast errors of lead real exchange 
rate growth, the forecast errors of world output growth, and the exogenous random disturbance 
{ e \ ). The disturbance term v t is correlated with two of the regressors (yt+i, Ay™+1), hence standard 
least square estimators become biased and inconsistent. Moreover, Vt suffers from serial correlation 
problems. This in turn invalidates any statistical inference made using typical (uncorrected) least 
squared standard errors. To account for these problems, we use General Method of Moments (GMM) 
as a means of estimation.20 Let Zt be the vector of variables within agents’ information set at time t 
that are orthogonal to the disturbance term v t . Plausible elements in Z t include any lagged variables
20A GMM estim ator in this case is a consistent (though not necessarily efficient) estim ator. It is tantam ount 
to a Two Stage Least Square (TSLS) estim ator but standard errors are corrected to allow for the plausibility of 
autocorrelation problems by using Newey and W est’s (1987) H eteroskedastic and Autocorrelation Consistent (HAC) 
estim ator o f the asym ptotic covariance matrix.
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that help forecast the output gap. Since Et [vt \ Z t]= 0, equation (2.17) implies the following set of 
orthogonality conditions that we exploit for estimation:
ES t  -  ^ iV t- l  ~  <l>2Vt+l ~  4>3rt ~  04A ^+1 -  <t>5Am< “  </>6Amt- l  -  ^7A l/t+l I Zt\ = 0 (2-18)
The instrument set Zt includes two lags of each variable in equation (2.17).21 Since the potential 
instrument set-and hence the number of orthogonality conditions-exceeds the number of parameters 
to be estimated, the model is over-identified, in which case we employ Hansen’s (1982) J-statistic to 
test for the validity of the over-identifying restriction. If the null hypothesis is violated, it implies 
that the hypothesis of the model that had led to the moment equations in the first place is incorrect 
and at least some of the sample moment conditions are systematically violated. It is worth noting 
that the J-test is based on an asymptotic property. As the sample size taken in this chapter is not 
very large, the interpretation of the test result must be done with this caution in mind.
As mentioned, identifying the risk premium effect by estimating equation (2.17) relies on the 
validity of the expectation theory of the term structure. To guard our result against the plausibility 
that the theory may not hold, we also explicitly incorporate a proxy for the real long-term interest 
rate into equation (2.17) as an additional control for the term structure effect. Ideally, the yields 
of riskless long term government bonds, e.g. 7 or 10 year riskless T-bonds issued by the Thai 
government, should be used. However, the series on such yields only began in 1999:Q3, which is 
obviously too short to be used in any empirical work.22 We therefore use the quarterly average 
of state-enterprise (SE) bond yield series released by the Bank of Thailand as an alternative.23 
Although SE bonds are not as default free as T-bonds, judging from the fact that most SE bonds 
are fully guaranteed by the government and that their yields are highly correlated with those of 7 
year T-bonds over the available sample periods24, we argue that they could serve as a reasonably 
good proxy for the riskless long term yields.25
Analogous to the definition of the real short term rate, the ‘pseudo’ real SE bond yield is defined
3
as r lt =  ~  A 4Pt» where Ft\ is the nominal SE bond yield. In the preliminary regressions
t = 0
21 Specifically, Z t = [ y t - 1 > r t - 2 ,  A m t _ 2 , A y ^ ,  A y£L2, A q t - i ,  A g t_ 2].
22 One primary reason is that the Thai government had not issued any new governm ent bonds from 1990 to 1997, 
owing to the long and continuous period of government budget surplus. In 1997, in response to the breakdown of the  
financial crisis, the Thai government has begun to re-issue government bonds. However, the secondary bond market 
has not been formally developed until 1999.
23The series is calculated by weighted averaging the yields of new issues in each m onth, where the weight is taken 
to be the face value of the issuance. Alm ost all state-enterprise bonds have initial m aturities o f 3-10 years (mode is 
equal to 7).
24The correlation coefficient =  0.95, see Figure 2.2.
25 As of 2001, approximately 85 percent of the outstanding values o f state-enterprise bonds are com pletely guaran­




------ 7 year T-bond yield
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99:03 00:01 00:03 01:01 01:03 02:01
Note: Sam ple period is dictated by the availability of the 7 year riskless T-bond series. Values on the y-axis are in percentage.
Figure 2.2: State Enterprise (SE) bond yield, 7 year T bond yield, and RP14 rate
(not reported), we directly include r[ as an additional regressor in equation (2.17). However, the 
results suffer from the multicollinearity problem as r[ is highly correlated with rt-26 To attenuate the 
problem, we use percentage deviations of r[ from r (, ? as an alternative additional control for
the term structure effect. More specifically, the following equation is regressed using GMM method;
Ut =  " b  ^ 2 2 / t + i  +  ^3rt +  A 4 A g t - | - i  +  X^Amt +  \Q A m t-i
f  (r 't ~  r t )+A7A y™+l +  A8 +  (2-19)
n
it  — ^ 2 [Et(yt+1 ) -  Vt+i] +  A4[Et (Aqt+i) -  Agt+i] +  \ 7[Et (Ay™+1) -  A y ^ ]  +  e\
As before, the instrument set, Zt , composes of two lags of all variables in equation (2.19).
2.5 Empirical R esults
This section reports the estimation results of various equations outlined in the previous section.27 
For each equation, the results of 12 specifications using four different detrending methods (LT, QT, 
HP, BN) and 3 proxies for the monetary stock (M0 (monetary base), Ml, and M2) are shown.
26Their correlation over the sample is equal to 0.95.
27Throughout the chapter, ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level, respectively.
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2.5.1 The backward-looking specifications: The direct effect of the mon­
etary stock
Table 2.2 reports the estimation results of equation (2.8). For comparison, the first block shows the 
results for the baseline equation which does not include any monetary term. The three remaining 
blocks give the results when lagged real money growth is added. The values of the reported R 2 in all 
specifications which include lagged real money growth are reasonably high and are noticeably higher 
compared to their baseline counterparts. This implies that adding lagged real money growth in 
the baseline specification significantly improves the overall goodness of fit. Using Ramsey’s RESET 
test, the null hypothesis of model misspecification cannot be rejected at the 5 percent level in all 
specifications. Moreover, based on the Ljung-Box Q statistic, the estimation results using OLS 
method are statistically efficient as no serial correlation is found up to 16 lags. As the sample 
includes the financial crisis period, structural changes in the IS equation may be suspected. We 
therefore conduct CUSUM tests and the results indicate that the null hypothesis of no structural 
instability cannot be rejected at the 5 percent level in all specifications (see Figure 2.3 for the results 
of the CUSUM test).
One crucial feature that can be seen from Table 2.2 is that the coefficients of lagged real money 
growth are statistically significant at the 5 percent level in all specifications. On the contrary, though 
correctly signed (negative), the coefficients of lagged real short term rate (rt_i) are statistically 
significant only in 5 out of 16 specifications. Moreover, their magnitude is much smaller compared 
to those of the lagged money growth terms. Turning to the variables which represent ‘open-economy’ 
factors, the coefficients of A a r e  positive and statistically significant at the 10 percent level in 8 
out of 16 specifications. The coefficients of lagged real exchange rate growth (A q t- i ) are statistically 
significant at the 10 percent level in approximately 70 percent of the specifications. However, they 
are of the wrong sign (positive).28
28One plausible explanation for this adverse result could be because the sample taken in this chapter includes the 
crisis period. As Figure 2.4 shows, the Bank of Thailand decided to float Thai baht exchange rate in 1997:Q3, which 
had led to an instantaneous sharp depreciation in the real value o f Thai Baht. The exchange rate ‘shock’ coincided  
with a subsequent fall in aggregate demand. Statistically, the pairwise correlation between the output gap y t (HP) 
and the (log) real effective exchange rate qt, over the full sample is 0.356. If one restricts the sam ple to the post-crisis 
period, 1998:Q1-2002:Q2, for which the exchange rate arguably behaved less abnormally, the correlation becomes 
correctly signed, -0.651.
It is worth em phasising that, even though the sam ple covers the period in which the exchange rate m ovement is 
irregular, particularly owing to the shift from the fixed to the flexible exchange rate regime, based on the result of 
CUSUM test discussed earlier, this does not affect the overall structural stability  property of the estim ated IS equation  
in a statistically  significant way.
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Estimating yt = f i1 + p 2Vt-i +  PsVt-2 +  0 42ft-3 +  /V * - i  +  Pe&Vt-i +  ^ A q t - i  +  /38Amt_i +  et [Equation (2.8)]
Baseline model 
(no money stock’
m  =  mO (monetary base) 771 =  7711 m =  m2
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R2 0.874 0.875 0.824 0.849 0.9 0.902 0.862 0.88 0.914 0.912 0.881 0.891 0.897 0.896 0.858 0.881
Adj-
R2





' 0.715 0.846 0.756 0.889 0.73 0.962 0.995 0.959 0.996 0.991 0.792 0.917 0.764 0.472 0.698 0.343
Note: OLS estimates; Sample (unadjusted): 1993Q1-2002Q2; Numbers in parentheses are standard errors; ***, **, * indicate significance at the 
1, 5, and 10 percent, respectively.
Table 2.2: Estimation result: equation (2.8)
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The next table, Table 2.3, shows the estimation results of equation (2.9) where rt~i in equation 
(2.8) is replaced by A rt_ i .29 Compared to the results shown in Table 2.2, the coefficients of lagged 
real money growth remain positively significant at the 5 percent level in the m  =  mO and m  = m l  
specifications and is positively significant at the 1 0  percent level in the m =  m 2  specification. 
Crucially, this confirms that the evidence found in Table 2.2 that lagged real money growth enters 
the aggregate demand equation sizably, positively and significantly is not sensitive to the ambiguous 
stationarity property of the real interest rate. On the contrary, in none of the specifications does 
A r t- i  enter significantly at the 10 percent level.30 31 For Ay™_1, its effect on aggregate demand 
is much less strong compared to that shown in Table 2.2 as its coefficient is statistically significant 
at the 10 percent in only one specification. Lastly, A qt- i  remains wrongly signed and statistically 
significant at the 1 0  percent level in most specifications.
All in all, the results obtained from Tables 2.2 and 2.3 signify the strong prevalence of the so- 
called ‘direct effect’ of lagged real monetary growth on aggregate demand. This implies that the 
monetary stock has information content concerning aggregate demand fluctuations over and above 
that captured by the short-term interest rate. In contrast, the real short-term interest rate (both 
in level and its first difference) performs much poorly as a direct determinant of aggregate demand. 
These results are consistent and if anything more forceful than those found by Nelson (2002) for 
the U.S. and U.K. as the results shown here are robust against alternative detrending methods and 
different proxies for real monetary growth.
29Similar to Table 2.2, the overall goodness of fit and all relevant diagnostic checking tests [RESET test, Ljung-Box 
Q statistics, CUSUM  test] justify the validity of statistical inference m ade using the estim ated results shown in Table 
2.3.
30The evidence that interest rate terms generally enter IS equations insignificantly is indeed consistent with what 
have been found for the U .S. and U.K. In particular, Nelson (2002) reported that, when removing the pre-1982 sample, 
the interest rate terms enter his backward looking IS specification insignificantly and wrongly signed. This conclusion  
holds for both the U .S. and U.K. economies.
3 A lth o u g h  the real short term rate (the Central B ank’s m onetary policy instrum ent) is consistently found to have 
very little, in several cases no, direct effect on aggregate demand, m onetary policy could at least in principle remains 
effective in affecting aggregate demand via its indirect effect on the relative yields o f other assets. To the extent that 
money serves as a good proxy for these yields, the evidence found in this chapter suggests that it is this ‘indirect 
effect’ that m atters for aggregate demand.
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 (log) real effective exchange rate
 output gap (HP)
Note: Normalised scale on the Y-axis.
Figure 2.4: (Log) Real effective exchange (qt ) rate and output gap (yt)
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Estimating y t = ' y l +  ^ V t - i  +  l sV t - 2  +  7 4 ^ - 3  +  l 5 &rt - i  +  76&Vt-i  + +  7 8 Amt_i +  et [eq. (2.9)]
Baseline model 
[no money stock)
m  = mO (monetary base) m — m l m  =  m 2
LT QT HP BN LT QT HP BN LT QT HP BN LT QT HP BN
cons -0.0003
(0.005)
-0 .0 0 0 1
(0.005)
-0 .0 0 0 1
(0.005)


























































































































t> I h-1 -0.003
(0.003)














-0 .0 0 1
(0.003)






































































(0 .1 )“ *
0.27



















R2 0.87 0.874 0.818 0.843 0.898 0.902 0.859 0.876 0.91 0.911 0 .8 8 0.887 0.884 0.889 0.836 0.861
Adj-
R2





0.85 0.89 0.665 0.931 0.644 0.833 0.376 0.671 0.877 0.987 0.34 0.783 0.553 0.116 0.244 0.273
Note: OLS estimates; Sample (unadjusted): 1993Q1-2002Q2; Numbers in parentheses are standard errors; ***, **, * indicate significance at the 
1, 5, and 10 percent, respectively.
Table 2.3: Estimation result: equation (2.9)
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2.5.2 The hybrid IS specifications: The risk premium effect
The empirical results reported in this section show that the finding of the strong existence of a direct 
effect found in the previous section can partly be attributed to the ‘risk-premium’ effect. Table 2.4 
shows the estimation results of equation (2.17). The evidence of high values of the reported R 2 
across all specifications indicates that the specification of the hybrid IS equation is appropriately 
reasonable.32 Moreover, the reported value of J-statistic implies that the overidentifying restrictions 
can be rejected at the 1 percent level in all specifications. This implies that the moment conditions 
specified and exploited for estimation are reasonably appropriate, though it has to be stressed that 
the results are based on a large-sample property. The appropriateness of the hybrid IS specification is 
also confirmed by the result that the coefficients of both lead and lagged output gap are statistically 
significant in all specifications and that their sum is approximately equal to 1 , which is consistent 
with the value suggested by the theory. 33 Importantly, the significance of the lead terms and the 
reasonably large values of their coefficients across all specifications, with the value ranging from 0.284 
to 0.558, could be interpreted as evidence in favour of the existence of the term structure effect, i.e. 
agents are reasonably forward looking and therefore take into account the expected future path of 
interest rates in formulating their decisions.
32 On the surface, it m ay appear that inconsistency has arisen as the two basic specifications o f aggregate demand, 
namely the pure backward looking IS specification [equation (2.8)] and the hybrid IS specification [equation (2.17)], 
sim ultaneously exhibit a high degree of goodness of fit. However, w ith the assum ption that rational agents form their 
expectation for future and contemporaneous variables based on the past data (i.e. via the instrument set), the hybrid 
version of aggregate demand nests the backward looking version. In particular, it implies that rational agents utilise 
past relevant variables not only as determ inants of aggregate dem and but also as indicators for forecasting future 
variables. For exam ple, rational agents’ consum ption may be a function of lagged interest rates. On the one hand, 
it could be interpreted that the agents use lagged interest rates as an indicator for their opportunity cost of funds 
(backward looking argument). On the other hand, it could m ean that the agent use lagged interest rates as part of 
their information set in determ ining the future interest rate path (forward looking argument).
33From equation (2.17), c(>1 +  (f>2 =  1.
Estimating yt =  fajjt- 1  +  fotit+i +  <!>srt + <t>4&Vt+i + +  +<£6 Amt_i +  <f>7Ay?+1 +  v t [eq. (2.17)]
m  - - mO (monetary base) m =  m l m  =  m 2
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-0 .0 0 1
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(0.0004)*
-0 .0 0 1
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R2 0.947 0.95 0.916 0.93 0.945 0.944 0.918 0.927 0.942 0.942 0.923 0.934



























Note: GMM estimates; Sample (unadjusted): 1993Q1-2002Q2; Numbers in parentheses are standard errors; ***, **, * 
indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent, respectively; Instrument set includes yt—i,yt—2,rt—i>rt—2) Am t_i, 
Amt_2 , AytLi, ApJ^ I_2 ) A<jt_i, A.qt-2] Standard errors are corrected for autocorrelation problem using 
Newey and West’s (1987) asymptotic covariance matrix (Bandwidth=3 as suggested by Newey and West).
Table 2.4: Estimation result: equation (2.17)
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Consistent with the evidence found by Nelson (2002) for the U.S. and U.K., contemporaneous 
real money growth enters the IS equation insignificantly in most specifications. However, the same 
is not true for lagged real money growth. The coefficients of lagged real money growth are sizably 
positive and highly significant (at the 1 percent level) in all specifications. The coefficients of the 
contemporaneous real interest rate term are statistically significant at the 1 0  percent level in 6  out 
of 12 specifications, and are correctly signed (negative). The coefficients of lead world output growth 
(Ay™+i) and those of lead real exchange rate growth (Aqt+i) are not statistically significant in all 
specifications.
In all, given that the term structure effect has been implicitly controlled for under the hybrid 
IS specification, the results reported in Table 2.4 may be interpreted as evidence in support of the 
strong prevalence of ‘the risk premium effect’; lagged real money growth may serve as an indicative 
proxy for changes in the risk premia component of relative prices of various kinds and classes of 
assets.
Table 2.5 shows the estimation results of equation (2.19) which essentially adds percentage de­
viations of r lt from rt in equation (2.17) as an additional and explicit control for the term structure 
effect. 34 The results are generally the same as those reported in Table 2.4. Most importantly, the 
coefficients of lagged money growth remain statistically significant at the 1 percent level in all spec­
ifications. Their magnitude is reasonably large and invariably comparable to that reported in Table 
2.4. Moreover, the coefficients of are found to be insignificant in most specifications. As
the term structure effect has been at least partially captured by the lead output gap term (which 
is reported to be consistently significant in most specifications), the insignificance of this additional 
control should not be interpreted as evidence against the importance of the term structure effect.
Although using three proxies for the monetary stock and four alternative detrending methods 
provide reasonable means for robustness checking, it is interesting to see if the results obtained thus 
far are sensitive to the inclusion of the financial crisis period in the sample. To examine this, we 
re-estimate equation (2.19), restricting the sample period to 1997:Q3-2002:Q2.35 The result is shown 
in Table 2.6.
34Note that the results from the formal unit root tests on r^ fr^  are ambiguous (see Table 2.1). However, as the 
estim ation results reported in Table 2.2 are insensitive to the stationarity property of the interest rate series. We shall 
assume that is 1(0).
35Because the analysis here is based on a very restricted sam ple size, the result should be interpreted with this 
caution in mind.
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Estimating yt = Aiyt_i +  \ 2yt+1 + A3rt +  A4 Agt+i +  A5Am t +  + \6A m t- 1 +  A7Ay?+1 +  Asf1^ - ]  +  [eq. (2.19)]
m  = mO (monetary base) m  = m l m  = m2
LT QT HP BN LT QT HP BN LT QT HP BN
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(rt -  rt ) /Tt -0.00004
(0.001)
-0 .0 0 0 2
(0.001)
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(0.001)
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(0.002)
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-0 .0 0 1
(0.001)
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& 0.942 0.94 0.91 0.925 0.955 0.949 0.935 0.936 0.961 0.957 0.941 0.943



























Note: GMM estimates; Sample (unadjusted): 1993Q1-2002Q2; Numbers in parentheses are standard errors; ***, **, * indicate 
significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent, respectively; Instrument set includes yt-l,y t-2 ,rt - l , rt-2i Am ^-i, Am^-2 ,
Ayt_ i, Ayt_2 , A(ft_i, A q t-2 , r t _ i , rt- ; Standard errors are corrected for autocorrelation problem using 
Newey and West’s (1987) asymptotic covariance matrix (Bandwidth=3 as suggested by Newey and West).
Table 2.5: Estimation result: equation (2.19)
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Estimating (subsample) yt = \ i y t - i  + A2Vt+i +  A3 r t +  A4 Agt+i + A5Am t +  +A6 Amt_ i +  A7Ay?+1 +  Asf14— -] +  £t [eq. (2.19)]
m  = mO (monetary base) 77i =  m l m  =  m 2
LT QT HP BN LT QT HP BN LT QT HP BN
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R 2 0.843 0.833 0.87 0.855 0.854 0.834 0.862 0.864 0.931 0.914 0.927 0.901



























Note: GMM estimates; Sample (tmadjusted): 1997Q3-2002Q2; Numbers in parentheses are standard errors; ***, **, * indicate 
significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent, respectively; Instrument set includes yt—\,yt—2,f't-li rt-2, Am t_i, Am t_2 ,
Ay™_i, Ay™_2i A q t-i, A q t-2 , j— ^~2^ ; Standard errors are corrected for autocorrelation problem using 
Newey and West’s (1987) asymptotic covariance matrix (Bandwidth=3 as suggested by Newey and West).
Table 2.6: Estimation result: equation (2.19); subsample
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The results show that the coefficients of lagged real money growth remain statistically significant 
at the 1 percent level in all specifications and their magnitude is greater compared to that shown 
in the previous two tables in most specifications. This implies that the strong evidence in favour 
of the existence of the risk premium effect found thus far is robust, and if anything stronger, when 
the pre-crisis period is excluded from the sample. Three additional points are worth noting from 
the results of this subsample regression. First, the coefficients of the lead output gap term turn out 
to be statistically significant in only 3 out of 12 specifications. If anything, this casts doubt on the 
robustness of the existence of the term structure effect. Second, the coefficients of the real short­
term interest rate turns out to be statistically significant at the 5 percent level as well as correctly 
signed (negative) in most specifications (10 out of 12). This strengthens our prior conclusion on 
the sign and the significance of the real interest rate terms in that they appear to be much less 
consistent across different specifications (and subsamples) compared to those of the money growth 
terms. Third, while the exchange rate term enters the IS equation insignificantly in all specifications 
in the previous two tables, when the subsample period in which the exchange rate arguably behaved 
less abnormally is considered, it turns out to be statistically significant as well as correctly signed 
(negative) in 6  out of 1 2  specifications.
2.6 P olicy Im plications and C oncluding Rem arks
Using Thailand data, this chapter provides another piece of empirical evidence favouring the inde­
pendent role of money as one of the determinants of aggregate demand. The key finding is that the 
effect of lagged real monetary growth on aggregate demand remains positive, sizable and statistically 
significant even when one controls for the term structure effect, both implicitly and explicitly. Thus 
the scope of changes in relative prices that money is conventionally found to proxy in the empirical 
literature is not limited to the changes in relative prices along the term structure of interest rate 
(the term structure effect). Instead, it may also extend to the changes in relative risk premia among 
different kinds and classes of asset (the risk premium effect). This implies that the two-asset world 
assumption typically assumed in standard macro models, both with and without microfoundations, 
is distorting.
Given that the two-asset world assumption is not empirically justified, the transmission mecha­
nism of monetary policy in reality becomes far more complicated than has traditionally been implied 
by standard macro models. To understand more on how the transmission process works, future work 
is needed to embed more microfoundations into the optimisation-based macro model so that imper-
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feet substitution amongst multiple assets takes place in equilibrium. These additional frictions would 
take the model away from the two-asset assumption as assets other than money can no longer be 
treated as a single composite goods and monetary policy in this world would operate by changing the 
relative risk premia of these assets. Until this ambitious task is fully developed, the results in this 
chapter suggest that taking into account the explicit role of money in these models can mitigate the 
problem. This is because the transmission process from its initial impulse to its ultimate response 
involves various changes in relative yields of various financial assets, and real monetary growth may 
serve as a justifiable stand-in for these relative yields. At the very least, the monetary stocks should 
be monitored closely and the information attained has to be utilised as important informative indi­
cators in the conduct of monetary policy. As John Taylor emphasised, “it is useful for central bank 
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Chapter 3
A M odel to  Analyse Financial 
Fragility: Applications
Abstract
The purpose of our work is to explore contagious financial crises. To this end, we use simplified, 
thus numerically solvable, versions of our general model [Goodhart, Sunirand and Tsomocos (2003)]. 
The model incorporates heterogeneous agents, banks and endogenous default, thus allowing various 
feedback and contagion channels to operate in equilibrium. Such a model leads to different results 
from those obtained when using a standard representative agent model. For example, there may 
be a trade-off between efficiency and financial stability, not only for regulatory policies, but also for 
monetary policy. Moreover, agents who have more investment opportunities can deal with negative 
shocks more effectively by transferring ‘negative externalities’ onto others.
3.1 Introduction
The purpose of this work1 is to explore contagious financial crises. To this end we need a model of 
heterogeneous banks with differing portfolios; if all banks were identical, or there was only one bank, 
there would be no interbank market and no contagion by definition. We also require a set-up in 
which default exists, and can be modelled. Otherwise there would be no crises. Similarly financial 
markets cannot be complete, since, if they were, all eventualities could be hedged. Finally, since we 
are concerned with financial crises, there must be an inherent role for money, banks and interest 
rates. We have constructed a rational expectations, forward-looking dynamic general equilibrium 
model along these lines in Goodhart, Sunirand, and Tsomocos (2003).
^ h i s  chapter is based on a joint paper with Charles A.E. Goodhart and Dim itrios P. Tsom ocos. The paper is 
published in Journal o f F inancial S tability  (forthcoming).
98
Default is modelled as in Shubik and Wilson (1977) and Dubey, Geanakoplos and Shubik (2000). 
By varying the penalties imposed on default from 0 to infinity, we can model 100% default (0 
penalty), no default (infinite penalty) or an equilibrium default level between 0 and 100%. The 
main financial imperfection is that we assume that individual bank borrowers are assigned during 
the two periods of our model, by history or by informational constraints, to borrow from a single 
bank . 2 Money is introduced by a cash in advance constraint, whereby a private agent needs money 
to buy commodities from other agents; commodities cannot be used to buy commodities. Similarly 
we assume that agents needing money can always borrow more cheaply from their (assigned) bank 
than from other agents; banks have an informational (and perhaps scale) advantage that gives them 
a role as an intermediary.
In our general model (Goodhart, Sunirand and Tsomocos (2003)) there are a set of heterogeneous 
private sector agents with initial endowments of both money and commodities; it is an endowment 
model without production. There is also a set of heterogeneous banks, who similarly have differing 
initial allocations of capital (in the form of government bonds)3. There are two other players, a 
Central Bank which can inject extra money into the system, e.g. by buying an asset or lending, and 
a Financial Supervisory Agency, which can set both liquidity and capital minimum requirements 
and imposes penalties on failures to meet such requirements and on defaults. We do not seek to 
model the actions of these official players. They are strategic dummies.
The game lasts two periods. Period one involves trading in bank loans, bank deposits (including 
interbank deposits), a potential variety of other financial assets, e.g. an Arrow-type security or bank 
equity, and commodities. Such trading is done in anticipation that nature will randomly select a 
particular state, s e  5  =  {i, i i , ..., S}. In period 2, dependent on the state actually selected, there 
is further trading in commodities; all loans, including interbank loans, are repaid, subject to any 
defaults, which are then penalised, and the banks are in effect wound-up. The timeline of this model 
is shown in Figure 3.1.
In Goodhart et al. (2003) we demonstrate that such a model has an equilibrium and that 
financial fragility emerges naturally as an equilibrium phenomenon. In our model financial fragility is 
characterised by reduced aggregate bank profitability and increased aggregate default as in Tsomocos 
(2003 and 2004). Whenever such financial fragility is present in the economy, the role of economic
2 Restricted participation can also arise as an outcom e of banks aim ing to outperform each other by introducing a 
relative performance criterion into their objective functions. For more on this, see Bhattacharya, G oodhart, Sunirand  
and Tsom ocos (2003).




CB= Central Bank 
B = Commercial Banks 
H = Households/ Investors
1. O M O s(C B )
2. Borrow  and deposit in the interbank m arkets (B)
3. Borrow  and deposit in the com m ercial bank credit 
m arkets (B and H)
4. Equity  m arkets o f  banks (H)
1. Trade in asset+com m odity m arkets (H  and B)
1. Consum ption at t= l  (H )
2. Capital requirem ents’ violations penalties (B)
N ature decides w hich o f  the s e S  occurs
1. Com m odity trading (H )
2. Secondary tradings o f  b anks’ equity (H)
1. A ssets deliver (H and B)
2. Settlem ent o f  loans and deposits (H and B)
3. Settlem ent o f  interbank loans and deposits (CB and B)
4. L iquidation o f  com m ercial banks (CB)
1. Consum ption at f= 2  (H )
2. D efault settlem ent
(Penalties for capital requirem ents’ violations, loan/deposit 
requirem ent and asset deliveries (H and B))
Figure 3.1: The time structure of the model
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policy is justified. Regulatory and monetary policies are shown to be non-neutral due to the lack 
of the classical dichotomy between the real and nominal sectors of the economy. We also show that 
a non-trivial quantity theory of money holds, and the liquidity structure of interest rates depends 
both on aggregate liquidity and the risk of default in the economy. Finally, we address formally the 
Modigliani-Miller proposition, and establish the conditions that cause its failure. In particular, it 
fails either due to  limited participation or incomplete (financial) markets or different risk preferences 
among banks. Given the scale of the model with B  heterogeneous banks, H  private sector agents, S  
states, a variety of financial assets, default and default penalties, and a variety of non-linearities, it is 
impossible to find either a closed-form or a numerical solution to the general model. The purpose of 
this chapter, therefore, is to present a smaller, specific version of this model which can be numerically 
solved.
3.2 T he B ase-line M odel
We first simplify the general model fully developed in Goodhart et al. (2003) to the case of three 
households, h E H  = {a, /3,</>}, and two banks, b E B  =  {7 ,5}, with a Central Bank which 
conducts monetary policy through open market operations (OMOs) and a regulator, which fixes 
the bankruptcy code for households and commercial banks as well as sets the capital-adequacy 
requirements for banks. The decisions of households and banks are endogenous in the model, whereas 
the Central Bank and the regulator are treated as strategic dummies with pre-specified strategies. 
The time horizon extends over two periods (t E T  = {1,2}) and three possible states (s E S  = 
in the second period.
Given the cash-in-advance constraint, money is essential in the model.4 There are 4 active 
markets in this economy: commodity, consumer credit, interbank, and financial asset markets. 
In period 1, the commodity, asset, credit and interbank markets meet. At the end of this period 
consumption and settlement, including any bankruptcy and capital requirements’ violation penalties, 
take place. In period 2, the commodity market opens again, loans are settled and assets are delivered. 
At the end of this period consumption and settlement for default and capital requirements’ violations 
take place. Also, commercial banks are liquidated.
In order to show inter-connections between banks, we need at a minimum two banks. One bank, 
bank 7 , is relatively poor at t  =  1 and therefore has to seek external funds to finance its loans. As
4T he cash-in-advance constraint can be traced back at least to Clower (1965 and 1967). The modeling of money  
in this chapter is similar to the m odels developed by D ubey and Geanakoplos (1992) and Dr&ze and Polemarchakis 
(20 0 0 ).
101
in the general model, we assume a limited participation assumption in the consumer loan market. 
Thus, bank 7  lends to its nature-selected borrower, Mr. a. Bank 7  can raise its funds either by 
borrowing from the default free interbank market5 or selling its securities. In general, there are a 
variety of financial assets, besides deposits and bank loans, that we can introduce into the model, 
but owing to the size of the system, amounting to over 60 equations, we can only do so one at a 
time. In our first base-line model, we introduce an Arrow-type security, which the weaker bank 
(bank 7 ) can issue. This pays out 1 in state i in period 2, and nothing in any other states. In this 
way, state i is regarded as the ‘good’ state whereas the other two states, states ii and Hi, are treated 
as ‘bad’ states .6 Bank 7  can be thought of as a typical straightforward small commercial bank. 
Its assets comprise only its credit extension to the consumer loan market. This way we can focus 
on the effects of policies on banks that cannot quickly restructure their portfolios by diversifying 
their asset investments, perhaps due to inaccessibility of capital and asset markets, during periods 
of financial adversity. The other bank, bank S, is a large and relatively rich investment bank which, 
in addition to its lending activities to its nature-selected borrower, Mr. (3, has a portfolio consisting 
of deposits in the interbank market and investment in the asset market (i.e. purchasing bank 7 ’s 
Arrow security). Its richer portfolio allows it to diversify quickly and more efficiently than bank 7 . 
As we shall see later, this extended opportunity set enables bank 5 to transfer the negative impact 
of adverse shocks to the rest of the economy without necessarily reducing its profitability.
Given our restriction that agents can borrow only from a single bank, we need three agents, two 
who want to borrow in period 1 (Mr. a  and (3), because they are comparatively more constrained in 
money and goods in period 1 relative to period 2, and want to smooth consumption over time. The 
third agent, Mr. f>, is richer in both goods and money in period 1, relative to period 2, and hence 
deposits money with the banks in period 1 and sells goods to the borrowers. He deposits money with 
bank 7 , which in equilibrium offers the highest default free deposit rate, and buys Arrow securities 
to transfer wealth from t = 1 to t  = 2, and thus smooth his consumption. In a sense, Mr. a  and j3 
represent the household sector of the economy in which their main activity is borrowing for present 
consumption in view of future expected income. On the other hand, Mr. (j) represents the investors’ 
sector, with a more diversified portfolio consisting of deposits and investments in the asset market, 
in order to smooth his intertemporal consumption. At this stage we assume that the deposit rate
5In section 3.3, we relax this assum ption, allowing default both in the interbank and deposit markets.
6N ote that there are three states, two unconstrained assets (interbank investm ent and the Arrow security), loans 
with short-selling constraints for banks, and limited participation in the loan markets for households. Thus, markets 
are incom plete and equilibria are constrained inefficient. This in turn implies that there is scope for welfare improving 
economic policy (both regulatory and m onetary).
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Agent Bank
a P 0 7 <5
Period 1 Poor in Poor in Rich in Weakly Well
goods/money goods/money goods/money capitalised capitalised






State i State ii State Hi
Good state Bad state Bad state
(Arrow Security pays-off)
Table 3.1: The structure of the base-line model
is always equal to the lending rate offered by bank 7  i.e. perfect financial intermediation .7 We 
summarise the structure of our base-line model in Table 3.1.
We have chosen to begin with this specification since it is the simplest version possible given 
that we need at least two heterogeneous banks in order to analyse the intra-sector contagion effect 
within the banking sector via their interaction in the interbank and asset markets and the possible 
inter-sector contagion effect involving the real sector via the credit, deposit, asset and commodity 
markets. Moreover, by allowing two separate defaultable consumer loan markets, default in one 
market can produce an additional channel of contagion to the other and to the rest of the economy; 
a ‘consumer loan contagion’ channel.
In the following section (3.2.1) we formally summarise the agents’ optimisation problem and the 
market clearing conditions. Section (3.2.2) then explains the resulting initial equilibrium given the 
exogenous parameters. Section (3.2.3) shows the results of a number of comparative statics exercises.
3.2.1 The A gents’ O ptim isation Problem s and M arket Clearing Condi­
tions
3.2.1.1 Household o ’s and /3’s O ptim isation Problem
Each consumer h G {a, /3} maximises his payoff, which is his utility of consumption minus the 
(non-pecuniary) default penalty he incurs if he does not pay back his loans. He also observes his 
cash-in-advance and quantity constraints in each period. These constraints are consistent with the 
timeline of the model.
As in Goodhart et al. (2003) and Tsomocos (2003 and 2004), we assume that asset and loan 
markets clear automatically via a background clearinghouse whereas commodity markets are more
7A n assum ption that we shall relax in section 3.3.
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sluggish. Put differently, agents cannot use contemporaneous receipts from commodities to engage 
in other purchases.
The maximisation problem of households a  and /3 is as follows:
max FT'* =  [Xo — co(x5)2] +  -  4 ( x J ) 2] “  max[ ° > ^  ~ VrtA**
W ,9J ,» i> ,.e s  ^  i t s
subject to
.jh b
bo <  77~ \  (3 -1 )0 “  (1 + r ^ )  v '
(i.e. expenditme for commodity < borrowed money from the consumer loan market)
x S  <  ^  ( 3 . 2 )
Po
(i.e. consiunption < amount of goods purchased)
VsbPhb < A(3.1) + p sqs +  ™g, S ^ s  (3-3)
(i.e. loans repayment < money at hand +  receipts from sales of commodity +  initial private
monetary endowment in state s)
0 < e f , s e S  (3.4)
(i.e. 0  < endowments of commodities)
Xs < es ~  rf, s e  S  (3.5)
(i.e. consumption < initial endowment - sales) 
where,
A(x) =  the difference between RHS and LHS of inequality (x),
bg =  amount of fiat money spent by h e  H  to trade in the market of commodity, s = {0} U 5 ,
q% =  amount of commodity offered for sales by h E H, s =  {0} U S,
[j,hb =  amount of fiat money agent hb e H b =  {a^,/3s} chooses to borrow from his nature selected 
bank b8,
8 i .e .  M r . a  b o r r o w s  f r o m  b a n k  7  w h e r e a s  M r . /? b o r r o w s  f r o m  b a n k  8 .
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v3b = the corresponding rates of repayment in the loan market by household hb to his nature-
selected bank b in states s E S,
Xg =  commodity consumption by h E H  in state s E {0} U S,
Xh3b =  (non-pecuniary) penalties imposed on h when contractual obligations in the consumer loan
market are broken,
rb = lending rate offered by bank b, 
ps =  commodity price in s =  {0} U S,
trig =  monetary endowment of household h in states s =  {0} U S,
ehs =  commodity endowment of household h in states s = {0} U 5, and
cls =  exogenous parameters in the utility/profit functions of agent I where I E H  U B.
3.2.1.2 H ousehold  (f)’s O p tim isa tio n  P ro b lem
Mr. 0 ’s maximisation problem is as follows:
max
r? h* h* H?
(3.6)
(i.e. expenditures for the Arrow securities +  bank deposits < initial private monetary endow­
ments)
(3.7)
(i.e. sales of commodity < endowments of commodity)
(3.8)
(i.e. consumption < initial endowment - sales)
(3.9)
(i.e. expenditures for commodity in state i < cash at hand +  receipts from sales of commodity 
from period t — 1 +  deposits and interest payment +  asset deliveries)
bf < A(3.6) +Po<7o +d%(l + r 7), s — 
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(3.10)
(i.e. expenditures for commodity in states ii and Hi < cash at hand +  receipts from sales of 
commodity from period t  = 1 +  deposits and interest payment)
X? < -  (3.11)
Pa
(i.e. consumption < purchases)
where,
b*j = amount of money placed by Mr. (j) in the Arrow security market,
= amount of money that Mr. <j) deposits with bank 7 , and 
9 =  asset price.
3.2.1.3 B ank  7 ’s O p tim isa tio n  P rob lem
Bank 7  (similarly for bank S) maximises its profit in t =  2 and suffers a capital requirement vio­
lation penalty proportional to its capital requirement violation. Moreover, it observes its liquidity 
constraints as described in the timeline of the model in Figure 3.1.
Bank 7 ’s optimisation problem is as follows:




(i.e. credit extension < interbank loans -I- consumer deposits +  receipt from asset sales)
P 1 +  q]  +  (1 +  r 1)dt( < A(3.12) +  vf^(l + r'y)m y + e{ (3.13)
(i.e. interbank loan repayment +  expenditure for asset deliveries +  deposit repayment < money
at hand +  loan repayment +  initial capital endowment in state i)
/ / 7  +  (1 +  r 7 )d^ <  A(3.12) +  vf7(l +  v1)™1 + e7, s = {ii, Hi} (3-14)
(i.e. interbank loan repayment +  deposit repayment < money at hand +  loan repayment +
initial capital endowment in state s =  {ii, Hi})
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where,
n'l =  A(3.13) for s =  i, and A(3.14) for s = { ii,iii}
Z5v°1 (l+r~<)rn'i » S ^  ’
k =  capital adequacy requirement set by the regulator,
A s^ =  capital requirements’ violation penalties on bank b € B  in state s € S  set by the regulator,
Id - risk weight for consumer loans,
m b = amount of credit that bank b € B  extends,
qj = bank 7 ’s quantity supply of Arrow securities,
ebs =  initial capital endowment of bank b G B  in state s =  {0} U S,
p = interbank rate, and
p 1 = amount of money that bank 7  borrows from the interbank market.
3.2.1.4 Bank <5’s O ptim isation Problem
Bank <5’s optimisation problem is as follows:




(i.e. deposits in the interbank market < initial capital endowment)
jjr5 +  b] < A(3.15) (3.16)
(i.e. credit extension +  expenditure for asset < money at hand)
(3.17)
(i.e. 0  < money at hand +  money received from asset payoffs +  loan repayments in state i +  
interbank deposits and interest payment +  initial capital endowment in state i)
0 < A(3.16) +  v^Wi? ( 1  +  r5) + d5( 1 +  p) +  ef, s =  {n ,m }
107
(3.18)
(i.e. 0  <  money at hand +  loan repayments in state s =  {ii, iii} +  interbank deposits and
interest payment +  initial capital endowment in state s = {ii, iii})
where,
7rf =  A(3.17) for s =  {i}, and A(3.18) for s = {ii,iii} ,
1.6__ ____________________
* — a . b? ’( l+ r fi )m s +u>ds ( l+ p )+ w  -jf-
k6* = -  a — 7^5,--77T,— r , f°r s =  {ii, iii},u/v^s ( l + r s )m s +u;ds ( l+ p )  1 J
uj (cJ) = risk weights for interbank market deposits (the Arrow security), 
bj =  amount of money placed by bank 5 in the market of the Arrow security, 
d5 =  bank 5’s interbank deposits, and 
M cb  =  money supply.
3.2.1.5 Market Clearing Conditions
There are 8  markets in the model (one commodity in t = 1 and three in t = 2, one asset, the interbank 
and two consumer loan markets). Each of these markets determines a price that equilibrates demand 
and supply in equilibrium .9
Ifc ft°
po = 0 9 (i.e. commodity market at t — 1 clears) (3.19)
% 
b*ps = ---------— s E S  (i.e. commodity market at t  =  2, s G S  clears) (3.20-3.22)
gf + qs
 t£ _
M CB +  d5
1 + p =  — a  —r (i.e. interbank market clears) (3.23)
ur1 +  r 7  =  — -  (i.e. bank 7 ’s loan market clears) (3.24)
1 +  r 5 = tL-j (i.e. bank <5’s loan market clears) (3.25)




Let a h = (b%,qZ, v*b) e  R  x R 3 x R 3 for h 6  {a, j3 }; <7 * =  (<$, bf, d*) e  R  x R 3 x R  x R- a 7  =  
( p f,rn f,q]) € R 3’, a6 = (d5 ,rns ,bSj)  6  R 3. Also, let 77 =  (po,Pi,P2 ,P3 , P, r7 , rs , 9), B h(rj) = {crh :
9The price formation mechanism is identical to the offer-for-sale mechanism in D ubey and Shubik (1978). The 
denominator of each of the expressions (3.19-3.26) represents the supply side whereas the numerator divided by the 
price corresponds to the demand. N ote that this price formation mechanism is well-defined both in, and out of, 
equilibrium.
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(3.1) -  (3.5) hold} for h G {a,/3}, £ * ( 77) =  {ah : (3.6) -  (3.11) hold}, B^(rj) = : (3.12) -  (3.14)
hold}, B 5(rf) =  { a s : (3.15) — (3.18) hold}. We say that (cra , , u1 , a 6; Po,Pi ,P 2 ,P3 , P, r 7 , r ,5,0)
is a monetary equilibrium with commercial banks and default iff:
(i) (a) a h G ArgmaxUh(xh), h G (a , /?, <j>}
<jh£ B h(rj)
(b) a b G Argm axllb(7rb), b G {7 , 5 } 
crbe B b(r))
and
(ii) All markets (3.19)-(3.26) clear.
3.2.2 Exogenous Param eters and Initial Equilibrium
The values of the exogenous variables are summarised in Table 3.A.1 of Appendix A. The num­
bers chosen are mostly illustrative a t this stage. 10 Thus, of itself a simulation of this kind is not 
particularly interesting, though it was, because of the size of the system, technically quite difficult. 
However, of greater interest are the comparative statics arising from varying the chosen inputs to 
the system. Armed with the propositions of the general model, we can trace the equilibria of the 
simulations and study how the multiple markets and choice variables interact. In turn, we can see 
how the many system-wide effects determine prices, interest rates and allocations.
The values of commodity and monetary endowments of households are chosen so that Mr. a  
and f3 (Mr. (f>) are poor (rich) at t =  1, and therefore are net borrowers (lender). Similarly, the 
selected value of capital endowments of banks ensures that bank 7  is relatively poor at t = 1 and 
has to borrow from the interbank and asset markets, and vice versa for bank S. Furthermore, the 
value of regulatory capital adequacy requirement is chosen to be sufficiently high (0.4) in order to 
ensure that all banks violate their capital requirements and thus are penalised accordingly. The 
risk weight for consumer loans is set to 1, while that of interbank loans and assets is set to 0.5, to 
reflect the fact that loans are defaultable and therefore riskier than the other two types of assets. 
The rest of the exogenous variables/parameters are chosen to ensure a reasonable initial Monetary 
Equilibrium with Commercial Banks and Default (MECBD). The values of the initial equilibrium 
are shown in Table 3.A.1 in Appendix A. In particular, they are chosen to ensure that the values of 
all the repayment rates are realistic, and the interbank interest rate is lower than both the interest 
rates charged by both banks since interbank loans are assumed to be default free and thus do not 
include a default premium. Finally, the loan rate of bank 7 is higher than that of bank 5 so that 
Mr. (j) chooses bank 7 to deposit.
10As will be seen, Chapter Four attem pts to calibrate an alternative version of our general model against real data.
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3.2.3 R esults
This section shows the effects of changes in the exogenous variables/parameters of the model. Table 
3.A.2 of Appendix A describes the directional effects on endogenous variables of changing various 
parameters listed in the first column. We solve the model using Mathematica. We first guessed 
the initial equilibrium described in Table 3.A.1 of Appendix A. Then using Newton’s method, we 
calculated numerically how the initial equilibrium changes as we vary each parameter at a time.
The analysis is conducted using the principles derived in Goodhart et al. (2003). Besides the 
non-neutrality of both regulatory and monetary policies, we have also established the following 
results:
(i) Liquidity Structure of Interest Rates:
Since base money is fiat and the horizon is finite, in the end no household will be left with fiat 
money. Thus, all households will finance their loan repayments to commercial banks via their private 
monetary endowment and the initial capital endowments of banks (recall that banks’ profits are 
distributed to their shareholders). However, since we allow for defaults, the total amount of interest 
rate repayments is adjusted by the corresponding anticipated default rates. In sum, aggregate ex 
post interest rate payments adjusted for default to commercial banks is equal to the total amount 
of outside money (i.e. sum of private monetary and initial commercial banks’ endowments). In 
this way, the overall liquidity of the economy and endogenous default co-determine the structure of 
interest rates.
(ii) Quantity Theory of Money Proposition:
The model possesses a non-mechanical quantity theory of money. Velocity will always be less 
than or equal to one (one if all interest rates are positive). However, since quantities supplied in the 
markets are chosen by agents (unlike the representative agent model’s sell-all assumption), the real 
velocity of money, that is how many real transactions can be moved by money per unit of time, is 
endogenous. The upshot of the analysis is that nominal changes (i.e. changes in monetary policy) 
affect both prices and quantities.
(iii) Fisher Effect:
The nominal interest rate is equal to the real interest rate plus the expected rate of inflation.
We conclude this section by highlighting the key results that we obtain from this numerical 
exercise.
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3.2 .3 .1  A n  Increase in  M on ey  Supply
Let the Central Bank engage in expansionary monetary policy by increasing the money supply 
(M c b ) in the interbank market (or equivalently lowering the interbank interest rate(p)) (see row 1 
of Table 3.A.2 in Appendix A). Lowering the interbank rate induces bank 7  to borrow more from 
the interbank market and therefore to increase its supply of loans to Mr. a , pushing down the 
corresponding lending rate r1. Consequently, agent (f> reduces his deposits in bank 7  and switches 
his investment to the asset market, pushing the asset price up slightly. Given lower expected rates 
of return from investing in the interbank and asset markets, bank S invests less in these markets and 
switches to supply more loans to Mr. /3, causing the corresponding lending rate r5 to decline.
Since more money chases the same amount of goods, by the quantity theory of money proposition, 
prices in both periods and all states increase. Prices in state i increase the most, since Mr. <j> has 
increased his demand for Arrow securities and therefore has more income to spend on commodities 
in state i. Lower interest rates make trade more efficient, since the increase in liquidity results in 
lower default rates for both Mr. a  and Mr. 0, especially in state i where Arrow securities pay off. 11 
Thus aggregate consumer default falls.
Turning now to capital requirements’ violation, both banks break their capital requirement con­
straints more than before, particularly bank S. Higher repayment rates and credit extension over­
compensate for the decrease in interest rates and thus, for given capital, risk weighted total assets 
increase. Bank 5, which is relatively richer than bank 7 , violates its requirements even more, since the 
marginal benefit of the increased profits is greater than the marginal cost of the capital requirement 
violation. Thus, given an initially adverse capital requirement position (and also banks’ inability 
to access capital markets to raise new equity), expansionary monetary policy worsens their capital 
adequacy condition. The reason is that the extra profit effect dominates the capital requirement 
violation cost.
Both regulatory and monetary policies affect credit extension. In addition, default and capital 
requirements’ violation have different marginal costs (due to the different penalties). So, there exists 
a trade-off between earning a greater excess return through interest receipts and the cost of capital 
requirements’ violation. Thus, the interaction of the capital adequacy ratio and credit extension 
should be analysed contemporaneously in order to determine the optimal composition of banks’ 
assets. We also note that lower defaults on consumer borrowing does not necessarily improve capital
11 Since our model is transaction based, lower interest rates generate lower ‘transaction’ costs to agents who borrow. 
In principle, default therefore falls. In the lim it, when interest rates are equal to zero and markets are com plete, full 
pareto optim ality is obtained (see Corollary 2 of Tsom ocos (2003) for further discussion).
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assets’ ratios since profit-maximising banks will respond by lending even more.
As far as the welfare of the agents is concerned, the utility of Mr. a  and the profits of bank 7  
improve whereas the profits of bank S deteriorate. The welfare of Mr. /3 and Mr. <f> remains almost 
unaffected (slight improvement). The welfare improvement of Mr. a  results from lower interest rates, 
(and consequently a higher repayment rate on his loans and thus lower default penalties). The higher 
expected prices in period 2  also contribute to the higher repayment rates, since higher prices imply 
higher expected income from selling commodities. Thus, as predicted by the Fisher effect, higher 
prices imply lower real interest rates at t =  1 since nominal interest rates fall. The profitability of 
bank 7  increases, mainly due to lower consumer default which dominates the higher cost of capital 
requirements’ violations. However, the positive spillover effect of lower consumer default for bank 6 
fails to dominate the lower revenue, due to lower interest rates, whose profitability therefore decreases 
along with higher capital requirements violations.
In sum, even though expansionary monetary policy improves aggregate consumer default rates, 
it does not necessarily induce less financial fragility. Higher liquidity provides an incentive for profit- 
maximising commercial banks to expand without necessarily improving their capital requirements 
condition.
3.2.3.2 An Increase in th e Loan Risk W eights applied to  Capital Requirem ents
An assessment of the effect of an increase in the risk weights on loans for both banks (u;) (see 
row 3 of Table 3.A.2 in Appendix A) underscores the argument that those agents who have more 
investment opportunities, and therefore greater flexibility, can mitigate the effect of a negative shock 
by restructuring their portfolios. In this simulation the initial condition of the economy is adverse 
in the sense that capital requirements are binding and there is no access to the capital markets 
to raise new equity. Bank S will further reduce credit extension to avoid the extra cost of the 
additional capital requirements’ violation penalty, and bank 7  in particular will increase its violation 
since it cannot switch its investments to maintain its profitability. Consequently, its payoff will be 
severely affected both from reduced interest rate receipts and also the higher penalties for capital 
requirements’ violation. In contrast, bank S reduces investments in both the loan and interbank 
markets and increases its investment in the asset market.
Bank 7 , anticipating the higher expected capital requirement violation penalty, will increase its 
credit extension to lessen its profit reduction, by borrowing more from the asset market and thus 
lowering the asset price. Since bank 7  will charge lower interest rates in order to increase credit 
extension, deposits from Mr. <fi decrease and, given lower asset prices, he switches to invest more
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in the asset market. In contrast, bank S, which diversifies away from the loan market, increases 
its interest rates. Moreover, reduced investments in the interbank market by bank S increase the 
interbank market interest rate. Tighter credit reduces commodity prices in all periods, except state 
i where the Arrow security pays and there is extra liquidity in the economy. This in turn implies 
higher default rates, except in the case where the Arrow security pays off (i.e. state i). So, default 
by both agents increases on average, (even though both of them maintain higher repayment rates in 
state i ), because of tighter credit market conditions for Mr. j3 and lower expected income for both 
Mr. a  and Mr. j3.
The profitability of bank 7  is reduced substantially, whereas bank S’s ability to restructure its 
portfolio generates slightly positive profits, even though the aggregate profit of the banking industry 
is reduced. Paradoxically, though, Mr. a ’s welfare is improved. Because in effect bank 7  follows 
a countercyclical policy in response to the higher risk weights, so lower interest rates help M r.a to 
borrow more cheaply and increase his consumption in period 1 , thus slightly improving his utility. 
However, Mr. f3 is hurt by the higher interest rate charged by bank S. Finally, Mr. 0 ’s utility is 
almost unchanged (with ambiguous sign), since the lower purchasing power resulting from lower 
bank deposit rates is more than offset by a higher return on his asset investment.
Regulatory policy may be seen as a mirror image of monetary policy, since it directly affects 
credit extension via the capital requirements’ constraint. Moreover, banks without well-diversified 
portfolios, and thus not so many investment opportunities, follow a countercyclical credit extension 
policy that hurts them, but benefits their respective clients. The countercyclical credit extension 
policy of not-well-diversified banks may also be thought of as a built-in-stabilizer in the economy 
when regulatory policy becomes tighter and the economy faces a danger of multiplicative credit 
contraction. On the contrary, banks that can quickly restructure their portfolios transfer the negative 
externalities of higher risk weights to their clients. Thus, restrictive regulatory policy in periods of 
economic adversity may enhance financial fragility by inducing lower profitability, higher default and 
further capital requirement violations. 12
3.2.3.3 Summary of th e B ase-line M odel Results
All the results of the various comparative statics are tabulated in Table 3.A.2 of Appendix A. 
Their interpretation and analysis can be undertaken using the principles we have used so far. Here
12As shown in Catarineu-Rabell, Jackson and Tsom ocos (2004), if banks are allowed to choose the risk-weights 
of their assets, they would opt for countercyclical risk-weight setting. In this way, they would lessen the profit 
reduction induced by falling loan opportunities in the economy. And if they are not allowed to do so by the regulatory 
authorities, then they would choose procyclical weights rather than forward looking ones, thus exacerbating credit 
contraction in the economy.
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we recapitulate the key results obtained from these comparative statics. First, in an economic 
environment in which capital constraints are binding, which may be viewed as representing adverse 
economic conditions, expansionary monetary policy can aggravate financial fragility since the extra 
liquidity injected by the Central Bank may be used by certain banks to expand, and in some senses 
to ‘gamble for resurrection’, worsening their capital position, and therefore the overall financial 
stability of the economy. Thus, a trade-off between efficiency and financial stability need not exist 
only for regulatory policies, but also for monetary policy.
Second, agents who have more investment opportunities can deal with negative shocks more 
effectively by using their flexibility to restructure their investment portfolios quickly as a means of 
transferring ‘negative externalities’ to other agents with a more restricted set of investment oppor­
tunities. This result has various implications. Among others, banks which have no well-diversified 
portfolios tend to follow a countercyclical credit extension policy in face of a negative regulatory 
shock in the loan market (e.g. tighter loan risk weights). In contrast, banks which can quickly re­
structure their portfolio tend to reallocate their portfolio away from the loan market, thus following 
a procyclical credit extension policy. Moreover, regulatory policies which are selectively targeted 
at different groups of banks can produce very non-symmetric results, e.g. an increase in capital 
requirement penalty of bank 7  vs. bank S (see rows 6  and 7 of Table 3.A.2 in Appendix A). When 
the policy is aimed at banks which have more investment opportunities, e.g. bank 6, much less 
contagion to the rest of the economy occurs since those banks simply restructure their portfolios 
between interbank and asset markets without greatly perturbing the credit market, thus not affect­
ing substantially interest rates and prices in the economy. On the contrary, when the same policy 
is targeted at banks which have relatively limited investment opportunities, e.g. bank 7 , they are 
forced to ‘bite the bullet’ by altering their credit extension. This produces changes in a series of 
interest rates, and therefore the cost of borrowing for agents. This in turn produces a contagion 
effect to the real sector in the economy.
Third, an improvement such as a positive productivity shock, which is concentrated in one part of 
the economy, does not necessarily improve the overall welfare and profitability of the economy. The 
key reason for this lies in that our model has heterogeneous agents and therefore possesses various 
feedback channels which are all active in equilibrium. Thus, a positive shock in one specific sector can 
produce a negative contagion effect in others, even possibly causing the welfare and/or profitability 
of the whole economy to fall. For example, if the commodity endowment of household a  increases 
in state i (see row 9 of Table 3.A.2 in Appendix A), his increased revenue leads him to increase his 
repayment rate on his loans. This in turn pushes bank 7 ’s lending rate down considerably. This
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results in lower profitability for bank 7 , because higher repayments are outweighed by lower interest 
rate payments. Moreover, the fall of commodity prices also adversely affects Mr. /3 whose income 
from commodity sales in state i drops.
3.3 Extension: E ndogenous D efaults in th e  Interbank and  
D eposit M arkets
The comparative static results shown in the previous section can be varied to incorporate a different 
set of assets. So, we next, briefly, describe an extended version of the base-line model. In addition 
to our attempt to examine the robustness of our results in the previous section, this extension aims 
at illuminating how the effect of various shocks can generate contagion effects via the interbank and 
deposit markets. To that end, we modify the structure of the model given in section 3.2.
First, we allow endogenous defaults in the interbank market, i.e. bank 7  can default on its 
interbank loans. Second, we allow separated deposit markets . 13 Moreover, Mr. <j) has a choice to 
deposit his money with either bank. Bank 7 ’s deposit rate differs from that of bank 8 since it is 
allowed to default on its deposit obligation to Mr. (j>. Bank 7  may also default on its loans from the 
interbank market. Third, in order to  incorporate these additional complexities while retaining the 
model tractability, we simplify the model by removing the Arrow security. Finally, we assume that 
the cost of default in the interbank and deposit markets is quadratic. This in turn implies that the 
marginal cost of default in these markets is greater as the size of borrowing is larger. The detailed 
optimisation problems are given in Appendix B. Moreover, Tables 3.C.1 of Appendix C summarises 
the values of exogenous parameters and the resulting initial equilibrium.
3.3.1 R esults
Table 3.C.2 of Appendix C describes the directional effects on endogenous variables of increasing 
various parameters listed in the first column.
3.3.1.1 A n Increase in M oney Supply
As in section 2.3.1, let the Central Bank engage in expansionary monetary policy by increasing 
the money supply (M CB) in the interbank market (or equivalently lowering the interbank market 
rate (p)) (see row 1 of Table 3.C.2 in Appendix C). Given a lower rate of return on interbank
13Recall that in the previous com parative static we assume perfect financial intermediation, i.e. a perfectly elastic 
demand for deposits by bank 7  at the rate of interest equal to its lending rate.
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market investment, bank 8 borrows less from the deposit market and switches to invest more in the 
consumer loan market by supplying more credit to Mr. (3. Thus bank <5’s deposit and lending rates 
both decrease. As the deposit rate of bank 8 falls, Mr. </>, who now has the option to diversify his 
deposits between banks 7  and 8, choose to deposit more with bank 7 , causing its deposit rate to 
decline as well. Moreover, given a lower cost of borrowing in the deposit and interbank markets, 
bank 7  borrows more from these markets and increases its credit extension, thus lowering its lending 
rate offered to Mr. a.
Due to the fact that bank 7  borrows more both from the interbank and deposit markets and the 
default penalty is now quadratic, it increases its repayment rates in these markets. Given increased 
liquidity in the economy, all prices increase in both periods, however more in the first period when 
monetary policy loosens. 14 This in turn generates more income to households, including those who 
sell their commodities in the second period. Thus, they all increase their repayment rates in the 
consumer loan markets. Bank 7  violates more capital requirements because its risk-weighted assets 
increase and it does not have access to equity markets. Their risk-weighted assets increase because 
the effects of higher credit extension and higher borrowers’ repayment rates dominate the effect of 
lower lending rates. In contrast, bank 8 violates less capital requirements since the effect of lower 
lending rates coupled with the effect of lower interbank market investment dominate the effects of 
higher credit extension and higher borrowers’ repayment rates.
As far as welfare is concerned, both borrowers, namely Mr. a  and /3, improve their payoffs due 
to lower borrowing costs and lower default penalties since they increase their repayment. However, 
the creditor who in our case is Mr. (j> suffers from lower deposit rates, thus his expected income 
falls. This causes him to reduce his consumption in period 2. Similarly, both banks end up with a 
lower payoff. This is because the negative effect of lower lending rates dominates the positive effect 
of higher repayment rates by both Mr. a  and (3.
In sum, since there are separate deposit markets and default in the deposit market is also allowed, 
the effects we observed in subsection 3.2.3.1 are now accentuated in the banking sector where the 
profitability of both banks is reduced and financial fragility is further increased.
3.3.1.2 A n Increase in th e Loan Risk W eights applied to  Capital Requirem ents
A tightening of regulatory policy by increasing risk weights on loans of both banks (see row 3 of Table 
3.C.2 in Appendix C) will have similar effects as in subsection 3.2.3.2. However, some differences
14 N ote that in m ost m odels w ith liquidity constraints, there is always an overshooting phenomenon in the period 
when a policy change occurs. For the sam e phenomenon in an international context, see Geanakoplos and Tsom ocos 
(2002 ).
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will be noticeable particularly in the banking sector because we now allow for default in both the 
interbank and deposit markets, and deposit and lending markets are now separated.
As before, tighter regulatory policy is a mirror image of contractionary monetary policy, and 
so the interbank rate increases. Bank 8 will further reduce its credit extension to avoid capital 
requirements’ violation penalties, whereas bank 7  whose portfolio is limited increases its credit 
extension to maintain its profitability. So, bank 7 ’s lending rate decreases and bank 5’s increases. 
However, bank <5 has less flexibility than before because interbank loans are now defaultable and the 
deposit/lending spread is variable. In other words, both bank 7  and the depositor can adjust their 
behaviour in the light of bank 7 ’s action.
We introduce quadratic default penalties that imply that the marginal cost of defaulting is 
increasing. Thus, as regulation tightens, bank 7  not only reduces its borrowing from the interbank 
market, but also lowers its repayment rate to support its profitability. Bank 8 rationally expects 
higher defaults, and thus lowers its deposits in the interbank market, pushing the interbank rate even 
higher. Given higher interbank rates, bank 7  increases its deposit demand by offering higher deposit 
rate to Mr. (f> who in turn deposits more with bank 7  and less with bank 8. This pushes up the 
deposit rate of bank 8. Finally, since bank 7  increases its deposit demand and reduces its interbank 
loans, it increases its repayment of deposits while reduces its repayment of interbank borrowing, 
given quadratic default penalties. 15
Since both deposit rates increase, Mr. (j) receives more income from his investments. He is the 
buyer of commodities in period 2  and since more money chases the same quantity of goods, by 
the quantity theory of money proposition, prices increase in the second period. Note that this is 
in contrast with what happened in the previous comparative static where there was no separated 
deposit market, which in turn implied that deposit and lending rates were, by definition, restricted 
to be the same, since tighter credit was automatically translated to lower income to depositors as 
well. Here we face a wealth redistribution from the banks to their depositors.
Mr. a  and /3, anticipating higher expected income from their commodity sales, increase their 
repayment rates on their respective loans. Finally, both banks, bank 7  in particular, increase their 
capital requirements’ violation. Again the bank with the richer portfolio will follow a procyclical 
credit extension policy, whereas the one with the more restricted portfolio will follow a countercyclical 
policy.
15 Endogenous default and the ensuing penalties can be seen as altering the effective payoff of banks’ liabilities 
which therefore form an optim al liability portfolio, given their risk preferences.
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Turning to the welfare of the economy, Mr. a ’s welfare is improved as before. However, unlike 
previously, Mr. /3’s welfare remains unaffected since higher prices in the second period allow him 
to pay back his loans without increasing his commodity sales. Similarly, Mr. 0 ’s welfare remains 
unaltered since the positive effect from higher deposit interest payments is offset by the negative 
effect from higher commodity prices in the second period. As before, bank 7  is hurt by higher capital 
requirements’ violation penalties. The main difference, however, lies in the reduced profitability of 
bank S. This occurs because bank 7  now has a default option and the separate deposit markets 
allow more room for Mr. 0 to diversify his deposits. Thus, we see that what matters is the number 
of financial instruments available to an agent relative to others. In other words, when a wide array 
of instruments such as the default option and separate deposit markets are available to everybody, 
then banks with stronger and more diversified portfolios cannot simply transfer the negative impact 
of shocks to the rest of the economy. Indeed, they must bear some of it themselves.
To summarise, as regulatory policy tightens in times of adverse economic conditions, bank prof­
itability is further affected. In addition, default may also increase in the interbank market, thus 
increasing financial fragility in the economy.
3.3.1.3 Summary of the Extended M odel Results
The rest of the results are tabulated in Table 3.C.2 of Appendix C and can be analysed along 
the same lines. In principle, they reinforce the conclusion reached in section 3.2. Expansionary 
monetary policy may enhance financial fragility in the short run, and banks with more investment 
opportunities can cope with negative shocks more effectively, thus limiting their profit losses.
When the commodity endowment of Mr. a  increases in state i (see row 9 of Table 3.C.2 in 
Appendix C), bank 5 supplies less credit to Mr. /3 and switches to increase its investment in the 
interbank market. This is so because Mr. ft is adversely affected in state i by lower commodity 
prices and thus defaults more to bank 6. Meanwhile, bank 7  has a lower cost of borrowing, and 
does not decrease its deposit rate commensurately. Indeed, the presence of the deposit markets 
provides an extra degree of freedom to banks to vary optimally the deposit and lending spread and 
thus depositors can diversify their deposits. Put differently, this is testimony that a wider array of 
financial markets, typically, improves economic welfare. Thus, unlike previously, although this shock 
which directly improves the welfare of one agent may worsen that of the others, aggregate welfare 
now improves.
Regulatory policies targeted at the relatively more flexible bank 6, e.g. an increase in capital 
requirement penalty of bank 5 in state i (see row 7 of Table 3.C.2 in Appendix C), now have more
118
real effects in the economy. This is so because bank S does not any longer have the opportunity 
to  invest in the asset market and consequently changes more forcefully its credit extension policy. 
Credit extension changes have more direct effects on the real economy since credit multipliers are 
typically greater than asset multipliers. Put differently, given our initial condition, changes in credit 
extension work through the budget constraints of agents who, in turn, decide how to spend their 
extra liquidity. However, changes in the asset investment portfolio of banks affects not only the 
liquidity of the suppliers (i.e. agents), but also generates a price effect. Thus, the real effect of asset 
portfolio changes is mitigated as contrasted to the credit extension changes.
The contagion effects of a positive shock now depend largely on where the shock is initiated. 
Financial fragility in the interbank and deposit markets now depends on the agent who was first 
affected by the shock. For example, when we conduct money financed fiscal transfer (i.e. an increase 
in an agent’s money endowment) or a productivity shock (i.e. an increase in an agent’s commodity 
endowment) to Mr. a  in state i (see rows 2 and 9 of Table 3.C.2 in Appendix C, respectively), 
average default in the interbank and deposit markets falls. This is so because bank 7 , whose client is 
Mr. a , borrows from the interbank market. However, the opposite is true when the shocks emanate 
from Mr. (3 since his nature-selected bank (bank S) is a net lender in the interbank market (see rows 
10 and 18 of Table 3.C.2 in Appendix C).
In conclusion, policies must be context specific since one size does not fit all objectives in het­
erogeneous models. In particular, real business cycle models that rely heavily on the representative 
agent hypothesis are not able to address policy effects in multi-agent economies. As most of our 
experiments make clear, contagion and its impact to the various sectors of the economy depends on 
the origin of the shock.
3.4  C onclusion
Large, and non-linear, models, such as Goodhart, et al. (2003), normally do not have closed-form 
solutions. They have to be solved numerically. This chapter provides numerical simulations of 
simplified versions of the above more general model.
The ability to do this shows that, in some senses, the model ‘works’. Moreover, it can be made 
to ‘work’ in a massively wide variety of initial starting conditions, e.g. depending on which asset 
markets are included in each variant of the model, and of comparative static exercises to be run. 
Indeed, the exercises and results reported in Sections 3.2.3 and 3.3.1 are a hugely boiled-down version, 
a precis, of the full set of exercises, both those that we have done, and, even more so, those that we,
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in principle, could do. We selected a small sub-set of starting conditions, and of comparative static 
exercises, with the aim of being both, (relatively), simple and illustrative.
What then have we illustrated? These insights fall into two general categories. First there are 
those characteristics of a monetary model which not only hold here, but should hold in any well- 
organised model. We have emphasised three. The first is what we have termed the ‘quantity theory 
of money’, whereby monetary changes feed through into price and quantity changes, both in the 
current and future period (t = 1,2). We have assumed an endowment economy, so the volume of 
goods is, by definition, fixed. But more, or less, everything else ‘real’ in the system does change, 
distributions between agents, ‘real’ interest rates, bank profitability, default penalties, etc., etc. The 
system (and the ‘real world’) is non-neutral.
As noted, our model allows for non-zero expectations of future price inflation. Our model also 
incorporates the Fisher effect, whereby nominal rates (at t =  2) are a function of ‘real’ rates and 
inflation expectations. Finally ‘real’ rates, and rate differentials, are a function of the temporal, 
and distributional, pattern of endowments (time preference), liquidity (i.e. the amount of money 
injected into the system), and default risk (the greater the risk, the higher the required rate).
The second set of insights relates to the implications of the main innovative feature of our model, 
which is that the real world is heterogeneous; agents and banks are not all alike. This has some, 
fairly obvious, implications. The result of a shock may depend on the particular agent, part of the 
economy, on which it falls. The response of a bank to a regulatory change will generally depend 
sensitively on the particular context in which that bank finds itself, and will vary as that context 
changes. The result of a shock can often shift the distribution of income, and welfare, between agents 
in a complex way, which is hard to predict in advance.
In short, heterogeneity leads to greater complexity. What we lose, by including it in our model, is 
simplicity; what we hope to gain is greater reality. In this latter respect, however, simulations, such 
as these, are always somewhat lacking. We have chosen the initial conditions, and so the outcome 
is the somewhat artificial construct of our own assumed inputs. The next step will be to take our 
model, adjusted as may be necessary, to the actual data, to calibrate inter-actions between existing 
banks and (sets of) agents. This is one of the main focuses of the analysis in Chapter Four.
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A ppendix  
A ppendix A
Exogenous variables
Coefficient of Endowment Penalty
risk aversion Commodities Money Capital Default CAR
Cq =  0.032 eo =  0 mg1 = 0 eg = 0 .1 A?7 =  0.2 Xlk = h
cf = 0.046 eg = 18 mg =  0.028 ei =  2 A gJ = 0.1 Ah = 4
eg =  0.048 eg = 18 mg =  0.007 eg = 2 Af7 =  0.05 AJt =3.71
II o o Or e f =  18 mg =  0.037 eg = 2 A?, = 0 .2 Ah =2.49
4  = 0.026 eo ~  0 777,0 =  0 4  = 16 V II O Ah =  0.93
4  = 0.037 e{ = 2 0 mf =  1.65 e{ =  1.5 A& =  0.05 Ah =  0.93
4  =  0.037 ef =  20 m f =  2.368 4  = 1.5 Others
4  = 0.037 e 3 = 20 m f = 2.147 4  = 1.5 M cb  = 0.19
4  =  0.035 4  =  25 m f = 1.707 ZU = 1
4  = 0 .0 2 1 ef = 0 m f = 0 a; = 0.5
4  = 0.019 4  =  0 mf =  0 uj =  0.5
4  = 0.033 4  =  o mf =  0 Aj =  [ 1 0  0 ]'
k  =  0.4
Initial Equilibrium
Prices Commodities Capital/Asset ratio Repayment rate Loans/deposits
Po =  1 =  8 .0 1 kg = 0.19 vgy =  0.94 m 7 =  8 .0 1
Pi = 1.1 qg = 9.5 kg =  0.193 vg7 =  0.927 m 6 =  10
P2 =  1.18 qg =  8.81 kg =  0.194 vg1 =  0.923 <4 =  1.45
P3 = 1.34 5f  = 7-7 kf = 0.085 < 5  =  0.9 
< = 0 . 8 9
d6 =  1.56
4  =  io kg =  0 .1 0 2 /x®7 =  11.19
Interest rates/ 4 = 9 . 5 kg = 0.103 < = 0 .8 8 =  13.49
Asset price 4  =  8-2 /z7  =  2 .1
r7 =  0.4 4  =  7.29 Assets
r* =  0.35 4  =  18.02 4  =  0.26
p = 0.197 4  =  20.9 bg = 4.45
e =  0.278 4  =  2 0 .0 2  
4  =  2 0 .0 2
q] =  16.9
Table 3.A.1: Exogenous variables and Initial equilibrium: the base-line model
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Po Pi P2 P3 r 7 Ar P 9 rrP nT5 d* d5
ai
P 0bPP P 1 *7 kl q A:7 k{ k2 k3 kS k
M + t t t — — t t + — /■v/ S3 S3 t — rsj S3 S3 S3 + + t +
t fa fa — + + t — + S3 S3 + — + + fSS + ~ +
ZU + — — — + + — + — — S3 + — — — — — — — - - — + - -
\ a
l 'y t — — — + — + t — + — S3 + — + + t + + + + + + + + +
t - + + + - + r*j + + - S3 - - + - - + - - - - S3 - + + -
— + + + — — + — + + — S3 S3 — + — — rsj + + t t S3 - + + t
\ dAlk S3 ss S3 S3 S3 S3 S3 S3 S3 S3 S3 - S3 S3 - S3 S3 S3 ss - + + + + S3 S3 S3 S3
e<t>
e 0 - + + S3 S3 - + - - + - + + + t + + + + + + + +
el + — + + — + + + — + — S3 + — — — — — + t + + - + + + +
4 + - + + + - + - - + + - S3 S3 - + - - t - ~ ~ - ± - + + -
e'l S3 — + + + — — + — + + — S3 S3 — + — — + + + + + + - + + +
e i S3 ss S3 S3 S3 S3 S3 S3 S3 S3 S3 - S3 S3 - S3 S3 S3 S3 + + + + + S3 S3 S3 S3
raC1 + — + + — + + rss + — + — S3 t — — — — — +ft* + + + - + + + +
Note: + ( —): substantial increase (decrease), +  weak increase (decrease), approximately equal, + / —:ambiguous effect
W  =  {kj +  k l  +  k l ) /  3, kd =  {k{ +  kd2 + kd3) / 3, k =  (fc7 +  k6) /2
<  =  +  v2^ + v3'y)/3, v% = (v ^  + v%s +  u?a) /3 ,  v = «  +  u£)/2
Table 3.A.2: Simulation results: the base-line model (Directional effects of an increase in exogenous parameters on endogenous 
variables)
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v ** V16 7/26 v36 V6 V ha°0 9i 92 93 4 7 ? 4 4 09o b* 4 603 4 *? 4 u ° UP U 0 U'T u s u h UE
M + + t t t t +
ft ft + + ft f t ft + + + + t f t f t t f t r*j
m “ H"
PS
ft! + + +
£&
+ f t t OJ + t +
f t f t + + f t +
ZD + -- -- + t ft ft
— ± + — -- + + + t ft + /
— t —
\ a17 + — — — + + + + ~
f t + — — + — + + rs t + t
f t
\P
1<5 + + + + +
« «
+ + + + t + «
— + + — + / — ft + + — + +
f t
^lk -- + + t t
--
t t + + + — + + — + ft
+ + / — — f t —
ft! ft! f t f t f t f t ft ft f t ft ft ft ft ft ft f t + + f t f t f t f t - f t -
e 0eo + + + + + + t + + + - - + - - + + + + +
f t
f>ae i — + + — ft + + t + — — + + — — + + — + + + — + — t t
ePei ft + + + — — t + + + t + — — + + — + / ■ — — + + — t +
e y el — + + t t — t + + rs/ t + f t — + + - + — ft ft ft + ft ft +
el ft! ft f t ft ft ft f t f t f t ft ft ft ft ft ft ft ft + + ft ft ft ft + ft +
raC1 — + + — ft + + + + — — + + — — + + — + + — — + — + — —




In this Appendix, we describe the banks’ and agents’ optimisation problems for the extended model. 
However, we only describe the problems of Mr. <j> and the two banks since those of Mr. a  and (3 
remain the same as in the base-line model.
Household
* U<P = [Xo-c<p{Xo?] + ^2[xi-c^sixtf{qt,b*,d*,d*},aes
subject to
«#+d*<m£ (Bl)
4  < 4  (B2)
x t < 4 ~ 4  (B3)
b* < A(B1) +  poq$ + » X ( 1  +  rj) +  4 ( 1  + 4 ) ,  s 6  S (B4)
x t < — , s c S  (B5)
Ps
where,
df =amount of money that Mr. (f> deposits with bank b, b £ B  
rbd =deposit rate offered by bank b £ B , and
v =bank 7 ’s repayment rates in the deposit market in state s £ S.
Bank 7
7 max £/7 =  ^ [ t t 7] -  'JT [AL  max[0, fc -  k]] -  A7 [ ^  -  v > 7]2 -  A ^[ -  v ] ^ } } 2]
y ,r t ,m - y ,v l ,v ^ } , s e s  i t s  i t s 1 J
subject to
m 7 < —^  (B6 )
- ( 1  +  p) ( 1  + r j)  K J
v]fT  + < A(B 6 ) +  < 7(1 +  r ^ m 7  +  e7, s £ S  (B7)
where,
ttJ =  A(B7),
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J-7 =   £a  s  p  C
‘- ’ j
v7  =  bank 7 ’s repayment rate in the interbank market in state s E S, 
libd =  deposit demand by bank b, b E B,
A7  =  default penalty in the interbank market imposed on bank 7  in state s  E S, and 
A7^  =default penalty in the deposit market imposed on bank 7  in state s  E S
Bank S
subject to
n 11' = max[0,k ~  k‘ ]l<* ,Md,m i ses ses
d5 < e60 (B8 )
r f - A(B8) + ( r ^ 3 )  (B9>
l4  <  A(B9) +  v f f i i l  + r s) + v1d?(\ + p) + es,  (BIO)
where,
7rf =  A(B10), and
k i  =
3 u>v^ s ( l + r 6)m s +u!v2ds (l-\-p) '
M ark e t C learing  C onditions
Po = &o +  b0 
%
(i.e. commodity market at t = 1 clears) (B ll)
Ps =
b*
3 s E S  (i.e. 
qf +  <&
commodity market at t =  2, s E S  clears) (B12)
1 + p  = M CB +  ds (i.e. interbank market clears) (B13)




(i.e. bank 7 ’s loan market clears) (B14)
1 + r s = v ?
m 5
(i.e. bank <5’s loan market clears) (B15)
IIf-13+
74k
4 (i.e. bank 7 ’s deposit market clears) (B16)
II+ 
T—H A
4 (i.e. bank <Ts deposit market clears) (B17)




Coefficient of Endowment Penalty
risk aversion Commodities Money Capital Default CAR violation
Cq = 0 . 0 1 1 e 0 =  0 rriQ =  0 eo =  9 Af7  =  0 . 2 A f* = 3
c? =  0 . 1 1 1 e f  = 2 7 m f  =  2.947 e7  =  1.728 Af7  =  o.i Af* =  2
<% -- 0.073 e 2 =  27 m f  — 3.015 el = 1.411 A£y =  0.05 Af* =  1
cf =  0.067 ef =  27 m f  =  1.902 ef =  1.116 \ [ 5 =  0 . 2 A?* = 4
4  =  0 . 0 1 0 4  = o 777,g =  0 es0 = 21.5 AI  =  0 .1 Af* — 2
4  =  0.015 ef =  27 m f = 3.397 ef = 2.047 ^ 3.5 =  6*05 Af* =  1
4  = 0.105 e l  =  27 m f =  1.852 e  ^ =  1.656 Af =  1.576 Others
4  = 0.071 4  = 27 m f =  2.543 ef =  1.316 AI  =  1.123
4  = 0-040 ef =  45 m f =  9 Af =  0.936 M cb  = 0.5
cf =  0.007 ef =  0 m f =  0 Af0  =  1.685 ZJ =  1
4  = 0-009 4  = 0 m f =  0 Af* =  1-404 w =  0.5
4  = 0 . 0 1 1 4  = 0 m f =  0 Af* =  1-203 k = 0 .1
In itia l E qu ilib rium







Po = 1 r 7  =  0.65 m 7  =  19.05 k f = 0.06 v fy =  0.919 6 ft =  19.04
Pi = 1.1 r *5 =  0 . 6 m 6 = 2 1 k l  = 0.05 Ugy =  0.9 q f =  23.5
P2 = 1.2 p =  0.48 d* =  4.31 
d f = 4.69
4  = 0.04 v$7 =  0.89 9 ?  = 2 1
P3 =  1-3 r-2 =  0.48 kf = 0.06 v fs = 0.899 93 =  2 0
rsd = 0.4 d* =  5.24 k&2 = 0.05 < = 0 . 8 7 fef =  20.95
=  31.37 kf =  0.04 v fs = 0 . 8 6 6 q{ = 24.355
=  33.58 v f  = 0.963 4  = 22.82
/ / 7  =  8.5 v] = 0.95 4  =20.4
fik =  6-38 uf =  0.94 gf = 4 0
/ij =  6.58 v i<t> =  0.954 
v2<j> =  0-944 
t&  =  0.935
fef =  52.67 
4  =  52.61 
bf = 52.55
Table 3.C.1: Exogenous variables and Initial equilibrium: the extended model
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P o P i P 2 P 3 r 7
„<5
r p r l r 6r d T O 1 m s d *
A<t> 
6 P d P d d 5
o f
p
3 dp p p 7 V f7 ^ 27 P ?7
+ + + + + + + — + — — PS fa + + + + +a a a fa fa fa fa fa fa
m f p s + +
t
— + + + +
t r*j
— — + + + ~ + + PS PS +
u p s + + + - + + + + + — + — + — — PS PS — + + + +a rs sa a a fa fa
17 + — PS PS — + - — + + — + — + — + — — + + + + +a a RS fa fa fa fa fa RJ fa fa fa fa fa fa
^1<5 + — PS f a + — + + — — + — + — + _ — _ _ — + + __a ~ a fa fa fa fa fa Rj fa fa fa RS fa fa
fa — — — + — — — —
fa
+ — + — + - + - PS PS PS
A 1 k fa — — — — + — — — + — — + — + + + _ + __ _ __ __
fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
d>
e o - PS fa f a + + fa fa fa fa fa PS PS PS fa + + + + + +
p ae l + — fa fa — +
fa fa
+ — + — + — +
t
+ + ~ - +
c>P
e l + — fa fa + — + + — — + — + — + — — + _ — + + _sa fa fa fa fa fa
P 7 e l PS — — — + — — — — — + — + — + — — + _ fa PS PS fafa fa fa fa fa fa fa
p de l P i — — — — + — — — + — — + — + + + — + _ — — __fa fa la fa fa fa fa fa fa
r °i
C1 + — fa fa — +
fa
+ + — — + + — +
t + + -
- +
p de 0 + + + + + + + — + - + + fa + + + + +
e 0 + + + + — — — — — + + — + — + - PS + - + + + +
PS + + + - + — — + + — + — + — — + — — PS fa PS PS
a a a fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fy
fa +
a fa fa fa rs^
+ + — + — + + + + + - - -
H
m f + + + + + — + + + — + — + — + _ — + __ + + + +a a fa ?a fa fa
4>m l + + + + + + + - + - +
±
« + + + + +
Note: + ( —): substantial increase (decrease), +  ^ : weak increase (decrease), ps: approximately equal,
i: approximately equal, +  / —:ambiguous effect
V* =  (vfc + Vgy + iffy) A  VS = (V18 + V25 + *&) A  V = K  + Vs ) / 2
Table 3.C.2: Simulation results: the extended model (Directional effects of an increase in exogenous parameters on endogenous 
variables)
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v P  V 1 6 V 2 5 V 3 S V P  V 6 V v i v 2 ^ 3 V 7 V y  V U V 2d> v y  v 3<t> v l
h a
° 0 Q i 9 2 9 3 4 9 i 4 9 3
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fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa




A I k PS PS w + P i PS P i
\ d A 1 k r>j rs./ r>j + + + + rss -
-
t
PS PS PS - P i P i P i
<j>
e 0 + + + + + p s p s PS p s w PS w w PS « PS PS PS P i
e l — + + — + + + + + + + + + + + PS PS — — PS PS
fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa pa fa fa fa
e l + — — + + PS PS + + £a
fa fa fa fa fa fa fa ps sa fa fa PS
c ; — —
— _ — — — — __ __ __ __ __ __ PS PS PS +
ft} fa fa ss fa fa fa fa fa fa PS fa fa
+ + + + - - - - + PS « PS - p i P i
c f — + + — + + + + + + + + + + + PS __ __ PS
fa fa ps fa fa fa fa fa PS PS fa f i Ri
e 0 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +
fa fa fa fa pa fa fa fa fa pa PS fa fa
e o + + + + + - — — — — — — — + + + + + + + +
fa fa fa fa ca PS fa fa PS PS Ri PS PS fa
a '; + + + + + + — — + + + + + + PS PS PS — PS PS p i
fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa pa PS fa fa fa
A ' / , + + f a + + + + + — — + + PS PS PS — PS P i PS
fa fa fa fa fa fa Ra fa fa fa fa
m f + + + + + _ — — — — — — — — PS PS PS + PS PS PS
fa fa fa fa fa fa PS PS fa fa
m j + + + + + t t + + + t + + + + + t + + + +




% 6f 4 4 u a Uf* u+ U7 u 6 UH UB k? kl ks ks k
M UB ft + t + + + fa - - fa — - — — - + + + + -
m f fa + t + + fa + t + + fa fa
Io ft + + t t f t fa — fa - — — - - - - - —
X01I7 ft fa fa fa + rss t f t + ft rss fa fa + +
^15 fa ?a fa <*w> + t fa fa + f t + fa fa t - + + - t
A?* ft rs»» r*-» t fa t fa + t t t +
Aifc ft + fa fa r>^ + + + t - + + + fa
e<t>e0 + fa ft ft + + + ft ft! + ft fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
pae l — — + + + — + t t fa - fa fa - + + rs»f
e l fa fa fa - + + + + fa + fa fa + - H" t - +
e / fa f t f t
— + fa + fa + + t t t t + + + +
e? ~ + fa + fa + + + + t + + +
C 1 /■**/
fa f t f t — — +
rsj
fa fa - fa fa - + rsj +
p i>
e 0 + + + + + + fa — + + +
+ + + + t t
fa + — + +
r*u
A ? ~ + + + + fa <N-* + fa t r>s + + + + +
A ? *
fa t + n*j fa rsj + fa t r+*> + +




+ + + + + - + t +
Note: UH = (C/a +  if?  +  U %  U* = IP  + U6
W  =  (fc? + k l  + k%)/3, ks =  (jfc{ +  4  +  Acg)/3, A; =  (frT +  fc*)/2
Table 3.C.2 (CONTINUE)
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A Risk A ssessm ent M odel for 
Banks
A b strac t
The objective of this chapter is to propose a model to assess risk for banks. Its main innovation 
is to incorporate endogenous interaction between banks, recognising that the actual risk to which an 
individual bank is exposed also depends on its interaction with other banks and other private sector 
agents. To this end, we develop a two-period general equilibrium model with three active heteroge­
neous banks, incomplete markets, and endogenous default. The setting of three heterogeneous banks 
allows us to study not only interaction between any two individual banks, but also their interaction 
with the rest of the banks in the banking system. We show that the model is analytically tractable 
and can be calibrated against real UK banking data and therefore can be implemented as a risk 
assessment tool for financial regulators and central banks. We address the impact of monetary and 
regulatory policy as well as credit and capital shocks in the real and financial sectors.
4.1 Introduction
The objective of this chapter1 is to propose a model to  assess risk for banks. Existing models 
for this purpose, e.g. stress-testing models, focus almost entirely on individual institutions . 2 The 
major flaw of these models is that they fail to recognise that the actual risk to which an individual 
bank is exposed also depends on its interaction with other banks and other private sector agents 
and therefore is endogenous. This endogeneity aspect of risk may m atter enormously in times 
of financial crises; a negative shock which is ex ante specific to a particular bank can produce a
^ h i s  chapter is based on a joint paper with Charles A.E. Goodhart and Dim itrios P. Tsom ocos. The paper is 
published in Annals o f Finance  (forthcoming).
2 An exception is, for example, an approach developed in Elsinger, Lehar and Summer (2003).
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serious strain on others through a series of interactive contagion effects. The main innovation of our 
approach, therefore, is to take into account such endogenous interaction between banks, particularly 
through their mutual exposures in the interbank market. To this end, we require a set-up which can 
incorporate heterogeneous banks, each with a unique risk/return portfolio; if they were identical, 
there would be no interbank market by definition. We also need default to exist, since if there were no 
default, there would be no crises. Moreover, financial markets cannot be complete. Otherwise banks 
can always hedge themselves against all kinds of shocks, in which case, there would, again, be no 
crises. We have constructed a two-period general equilibrium model along these lines in Goodhart, 
Sunirand, and Tsomocos (2003).
We show in Goodhart et al. (2003) that an equilibrium exists in such model and that financial 
fragility emerges naturally as an equilibrium phenomenon. However, given the scale of the model 
which contains B  heterogeneous banks, H  private sector agents, S  possible states, a variety of 
financial assets and default, it is impossible to find either a closed-form or a numerical solution to 
this general model. In Chapter Three, we therefore present a simplified version of our general model 
and show that it can be solved numerically. This implies that the model, in some sense, ‘works’ 
and can, in principle, be used to assess various policies for crisis management. However, the model 
was solved on the basis of an arbitrarily chosen set of initial conditions. The outcome, therefore, is 
a somewhat artificial construct of our own assumed inputs. In this chapter, we take a step further 
by attempting to calibrate an alternative version of our general model against real UK banking 
data. Thus, we argue that our model is not only rich enough to incorporate endogenous interaction 
between banks, but it is also sufficiently flexible to be implemented as a risk assessment tool for 
financial regulators and central banks.
The model presented in Chapter Three has two heterogeneous banks. A banking system, however, 
generally comprises multiple banks. Thus, although the model can be used to study interaction 
between any two individual banks, its level of complexity is not sufficient to incorporate contagion 
effects arising from their interaction with the rest of the banking sector. In this chapter, we therefore 
introduce an additional bank, which can be thought of as the aggregation of the remaining banks 
in the system. Given the lack of disaggregated household and investors’ portfolio data, we model 
household behaviour via reduced-form equations which relate their actions to a variety of economic 
variables such as GDP, interest rates, and aggregate credit supply etc. In this sense, our model 
is a partially-microfounded general equilibrium model. 3 However, the main aspects of equilibrium
3 As is shown in Chapter Three, household and investor optim isation problem can be introduced. However, owing 
to the lim ited availability of disaggregated household data, we chose not to follow that route.
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analysis which are market clearing, rational expectations, and agent optimisation are maintained. 
Moreover, contagion effects between the banking sector and the real economy still operate actively 
in equilibrium via the reduced-form equations. Thus, we adhere to the general equilibrium spirit of 
our models presented in Goodhart et al. (2003) and Chapter Three. The upshot of our modelling 
framework is that financial decisions generate real effects in the rest of the economy. Our model is 
therefore amenable to welfare analysis.
The rest of the chapter is structured as follows. The next section presents the model. Section
4.3 then explains how the model is calibrated against UK banking data. Section 4.4 provides a 
stress-testing analysis for the UK banking sector. Section 4.5 presents a robustness check of the 
result obtained in section 4.4. The final section provides concluding remarks.
4.2 The M odel
The model has three heterogeneous banks, b G B  = { 7 , S, r}, four private sector agents, h G 
H  =  {o, f t ,0 ,0}, a Central Bank and a regulator. The time horizon extends over two periods, 
t G T  =  {1,2} and two possible states in the second period, s G S  =  {i, ii}. We assume that state 
i is a normal/good state whereas state ii represents an extreme/crisis event. The probability that 
state i will occur is denoted by p.
As in Goodhart et al. (2003) and in Chapter Three, we assume that individual bank borrowers 
are assigned during the two periods, by history or by informational constraint, to borrow from a 
single bank (i.e. a limited participation assumption) . 4 Given this assumption, together with our set­
up of a system of three heterogeneous banks, we need at least three borrowers. We therefore assume 
that agents a, ft, and 6 borrow from banks 7 , 6, and r , respectively. The remaining agent, Mr. (j), 
represents the pool of depositors in this economy which supplies funds to every bank. This implies 
that we have multiple active markets for deposits (by separate bank) and for loans (by borrower and 
bank). In addition, we also assume a single, undifferentiated, interbank market where deficit banks 
are allowed to borrow from surplus banks, and wherein the Central Bank conducts open market 
operations (OMOs).
The time structure of the model is presented in Figure 4.1. At t =  1, loan, deposit and interbank 
markets open. Banks decide how much to lend/borrow in each market, expecting rationally any 
one of the two possible future scenarios to be realised. Moreover, the Central Bank also conducts
4In Bhattacharya, Goodhart, Sunirand and Tsom ocos (2003) we show that restricted participation in the loan  
market can also arise as an equilibrium outcom e given that the objective functions of banks also include a relative 
performance criterion, i.e. a preference to outperform their com petitors.
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t = 2
1. Borrow and deposit in the interbank 
markets (B)
2. OMOs (CB)
3. Borrow and deposit in the commercial 
bank loan and deposit markets (B)
{ Nature decides which o f the seS  occurs
1. Settlement o f loans and deposits (H and 
B)
2. Settlement o f interbank loans and 
deposits (CB and B)
3. Default and capital requirements’ 
violation settlement
All banks are wound up.
C B = Central Bank 
B  =  Com m ercial B anks 
H =  H ouseholds
Figure 4.1: The time structure of the model
OMOs in the interbank market. At t  =  2, depending on the state which actually occurs, all financial 
contracts are settled, subject to any defaults and/or capital requirements’ violations, which are then 
penalised. At the end of the second period, all banks are wound up.
4.2.1 Banking Sector: U K  banks
Without loss of generality, our specification of the banking sector is based on the UK banking sector, 
which we assume to comprise of seven largest UK banks; Lloyds, HSBC, Abbey National, HBOS, 
Barclays, Royal Bank of Scotland, and Standard Chartered. Banks 7  and S can represent any two 
of these individual banks, whereas bank r  represents the aggregation of the remaining banks. As 
will be explained more below, in our calibration exercise, banks 7  and 5 are chosen specifically to 
represent two of these actual UK banks. However, for data confidentiality reason, we do not reveal 
their identities.
All banks in the model, b e  B  — {7 , 5, r}, are assumed to operate under a perfectly competitive 
environment (i.e. they take all interest rates as exogenously given when making their optimal
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portfolio decisions). The structure of their balance sheets is given below;
Assets Liabilities
Loans to agents 
Interbank deposits 
Market book




We assume that all banks endogenise their decisions in the loan, deposit and interbank markets. 5 
The remaining variables are treated as exogenous.6 We further assume that banks in our model can 
default on their financial obligations, subject to default penalties set by the regulator. Thus, by 
varying the penalties imposed on default from 0  to  infinity, we can model 1 0 0 % default, no default 
or an equilibrium level of default between 0 and 100% .7 At first sight, this ‘continuous’ default rate 
approach may seem problematic since in reality banks either repay in full at the due date or are 
forced to close down. However, we interpret a bank’s default rate in our model as a probability that 
such bank chooses to shut down, and hence in the short run to default completely on its financial 
obligations. For example, a default rate of 4 percent implies that there is roughly a 4 percent chance 
of a shut down and a 96 percent chance that the bank will repay in full and continue its normal 
operation. Therefore, a bank’s decision to increase its default rates is isomorphic to its decision to 
adopt a riskier position in pursuit of higher expected profitability.8 Finally, as in Bhattacharya et 
al. (2003), we make a simplifying assumption by assuming that banks’ default rates in the deposit 
and interbank markets are the same, i.e. banks are restricted to repay all their creditors similarly.
Analogous to the modelling of default, banks can violate their capital adequacy requirement, 
subject to capital requirement violation penalties set by the regulator. In principle, each bank’s 
effective capital to asset ratios may not be binding, (i.e. their values may be above the regulator’s 
requirement), in which case they are not subject to any capital requirement penalty. However, 
in our calibration exercise, we assume for simplicity that each bank wants to keep a buffer above 
the required minimum, so that there is a non-pecuniary loss of comfort and reputation as capital
5 The m odelling of the banking sector follows Shubik and Tsom ocos (1992) and Tsom ocos (2003 and 2004).
6 Given the present set-up, we cannot endogenise banks’ decisions on market book or equity. This is because the  
m odel has two states in the second period and one unconstrained asset (i.e. an asset that banks can either go infinitely  
short or long), which is the interbank market investm ent. B y adding another unconstrained asset, markets would be 
com plete. In principle, our model can be extended to incorporate additional states in the second period and therefore 
can be used to study the economic effects on the market (trading) book. For exam ple, we can disaggregate the market 
book into two com ponents according to their riskiness (or rating) and endogenise banks’ decisions on these variables. 
T his would allow us to study the endogenous response of risk premia on corporate debt to a series of shocks. However, 
we face a practical problem on this front since there are insufficient data on the com position of the market book by 
category, e.g. rating maturity, and currency.
7T his m odelling of default follows Shubik and W ilson (1977).
8 For more on this issue, see work in progress by Tsom ocos and Zicchino (2004).
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declines; in this sense the ratios are always binding. Put differently, we assume that banks’ self- 
imposed ideal capital holdings are always above the actual values of all banks’ capital to asset ratios. 
Given this assumption, we can rule out corner equilibria and therefore focus our analysis entirely 
on well-defined interior solutions whereby banks violate their enhanced capital requirements. We 
assume that penalties are linear as capital declines from its ideal level. In practice, there will be 
some non-linearity as capital falls below its required minimum, but this is just too complex to  model 
at this stage.
As will be elaborated in section 4.3, our calibration exercise is based on the data of UK banks 
at the end of 2002. At that point in time, bank <5 is a net lender whereas banks 7  and r  are net 
borrowers in the interbank market.9 Given this setting, we describe the optimisation problems of 
these banks below.
4.2.1.1 T he interbank net borrowers’ (banks 7  and r) optim isation problems
Bank b € {7 , r} maximises its payoff, which is a quadratic function of its expected profitability in 
the second period minus non-pecuniary penalties that it has to incur if it defaults on its deposit 
and interbank obligations. It also suffers a capital violation penalty proportional to its capital 
requirement violation. Formally, the optimisation problem of bank b € {7 , r}  is as follows:
max Ub = ^  ■ — cb3 (  ^ ^ 1 —
m b ,nb 1010 V10 /  “ g
subject to
mh + A b
v biib +  v bfj,bd + Other s b +  €q
where,
9 A s  n o t e d  e a r l ie r ,  w e  h a v e  c h o s e n  b a n k s  7  a n d  <5 t o  r e p r e s e n t  s p e c i f i c a l ly  t w o  o f  t h e  s e v e n  la r g e s t  U K  b a n k s  in
o u r  c a l i b r a t io n  e x e r c i s e .  B a n k  r  t h e n  r e p r e s e n t s  t h e  a g g r e g a t i o n  o f  t h e  r e m a i n i n g  f iv e  b a n k s .
-  (T+p) +  (T + rj) +  e° +  ° thers'‘ (AD
< vfb(l + rb)m b + {l + rA)A b, s e S  (4.2)
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<  =  A ( 4 . 2 )
e‘ =  <4 + ir£ , s  6  S
( 4 . 3 )
( 4 . 4 )
0JVg£ (1 +  rb)m b +  uj( 1 +  rA)A b
, s e S ( 4 . 5 )
A (x)  =  the difference between RHS and LHS of inequality (x) 
ps =  probability that state s £ S  will occur,
cb =  coefficient of risk aversion in the utility function of bank b £ B ,
Xbk3 =  capital requirements’ violation penalties imposed on bank b £ B  in state s £ S  , 
kb = capital adequacy requirement for bank b £ B,
Ag =  default penalties on bank b £ B,
p b =  amount of money that bank b £ { 7 , r}  owes in the interbank market, 
pbd =  amount of money that bank b £ B  owes in the deposit market, 
vb = repayment rates of bank b £ B  to all its creditors in state s £ 5,
m =  amount of credit that bank b £ B  extends in the loan market,
A b =  the value of market book held by bank b £ B,
eb = amount of capital that bank b £ B  holds in state s £ {0} U S,
Othersb = the ‘others’ item in the balance sheet of bank b £ B , 
rb = lending rate offered by bank b £ B, 
rbd =  deposit rate offered by bank b £ B, 
p =  interbank rate,
rA =  the rate of return on market book,
v3£ = repayment rates of agent hb £ H b = {a1, (3s ,9T} to his nature-selected bank b £ B  in the 
consumer loan market,
ZJ =  risk weight on consumer loans, and 
u) = risk weight on market book.
Equation (4.1) implies that, at t = 1, the assets of bank b £ {7 , t} , which consist of its credit 
extension and market book investment, must be equal to its liabilities obtained from interbank 
and deposit borrowing and its initial equity endowment, where ‘Others1*’ represents the residual. 
Equations (4.2) and (4.3) then show that, dependent on which of the s £ S  actually occurs, the profit
that bank b incurs in the second period is equal to the difference between the amount of money that
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it receives from its asset investment and the amount that it has to repay on its liabilities, adjusted 
appropriately for default in each market. As shown in equation (4.4), this profit earned is then 
added to its initial capital, which in turn becomes its capital in the second period. Finally, equation 
(4.5) implies that the capital to asset ratio of bank b in state s G S  is equal to its capital in state s 
divided by its risk-weighted assets in the corresponding state.
4.2.1.2 The interbank net lender’s (bank 6) optim isation problem
Bank 5, unlike the other two banks, is a net lender in the interbank market. Thus it suffers only a 
default penalty in the deposit market. Formally, bank S’s optimisation problem is as follows:
max IT5 =  ~  ci ( = )  J “  Z>*
ses x 7 ses
Xsk3 max[0, kS -  ksa] + ^ [ fj*d -  vj/zj]£ r L1010 s Vl01(7
subject to
A6 +  d6 + m 6 = 6q + ^  ^  ^  +  Others6 (4.6)
vl  /4  +  Others6 +  < v ^ n t6 (I + r6) + A 6 (I + rA) + R sd6 (I + p) (4.7)
where,
Trf =  A(4.7) (4.8)
4  = eg +  7rf (4.9)
4  = S i ---------------------------  (4.10)
ojv3S (1 +  rs)rh? + u)Rsd5( 1 + p) +  ui{\ + r A)A s
d6 = bank <Ts investment in the interbank market,
R s = the rate of repayment that bank 5 expects to get from its interbank investment, and 
ui =  risk weight on interbank investment.
The budget set of bank 5 is similar to those of the other two banks except that it invests in, instead 
of borrows from, the interbank market. Moreover, its risk-weighted assets in the second period, as 
shown in equation (4.10), also includes bank S’s expected return on its interbank investment.
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4.2.2 Central Bank and Regulator
The Central Bank’s and the regulator’s decisions are exogenous. The Central Bank and the regulator 
may, but need not, be a single institution. The Central Bank conducts monetary policy by engaging 
in open market operations in the interbank market. We assume as our base-line specification that 
the Central Bank sets its base money (M) as its monetary policy instrument, allowing the interbank 
rate to be determined endogenously. However, as will be seen in section 4.3, we also consider an 
alternative instrument targeting regime whereby the Central Bank fixes the interbank rate and lets 
its base money adjust endogenously to clear the interbank market. As will be explained below, the 
simulation results depend crucially on which monetary policy instrument the Central Bank employs. 
Therefore, whether monetary authorities target base money or the interbank rates in response to 
shocks has different implications with respect to financial stability.
The regulator sets capital adequacy requirements for all banks (Jc*, b E B) as well as imposes 
penalties on their failures to meet such requirements (A£s, b E B, s  E S) and on default on their 
financial obligations in the deposit and interbank markets (A ,^ b E B, s  E S). Finally, he also sets 
the risk weights on consumer loan, interbank and market book investment (uJ, u>, uj).
4.2.3 Private agent sector
Each household borrower, hb E H b =  {o7, (3s , 0T}, demands consumer loans from his nature-selected 
bank b and chooses whether to default on his loans in state s  E S. The remaining agent, Mr. <f>, 
supplies his deposits to each bank b E B. As mentioned, we do not explicitly model the optimisation 
problems of households. The reason is that it is very difficult, if at all possible, to find real data for 
the (heterogeneous) private agent sector, e.g. the monetary and good endowment of each  banks’s 
borrowers and depositors. This latter is particularly important since one of the key objectives of 
this chapter is to take our model to real data. So, instead of explicitly providing microfoundations 
for households’ decisions, we ‘artificially’ endogenise them by assuming the following reduced-form 
equations.
4.2.3.1 Household Borrowers’ Demand for Loans
Because of the limited participation assumption in every consumer loan market, each household’s 
demand for loans is a negative function of the lending rate offered by his nature-selected bank. 
In addition, his demand for loans also depends positively on the expected GDP in the subsequent 
period. Put differently, we implicitly assume that household borrowers rationally anticipate GDP
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in both states of the next period, which then determines their expected future income, and adjust 
their loan demand in this period accordingly in order to smooth their consumption over time. As 
in Goodhart et al. (2003) and Chapter Three, our money demand function manifests the standard 
Hicksian elements whereby it responds positively to current and expected income and negatively to 
interest rates. In particular, we assume the following functional form of household hb's loan demand 
from his nature-selected bank b, V7i6 G H b, and b G B:
In ( //b) =  ahb>1 +  ahb>2 In\p(GDPi) +  (1 -  p)GDPu} +  ahb>3rb (4.11)
where,
jihb =  amount of money that agent hb G H b chooses to owe in the loan market of bank fe G B, 
and
GDPS =  Gross Domestic Product in state s G S' of the second period.
4.2.3.2 Mr. 0 ’s Supply o f D eposits
Unlike the loan markets, we do not assume limited participation in the deposit markets. This implies 
that Mr. 0 can choose to diversify his deposits with every bank. Thus, Mr. 0 ’s deposit supply with 
bank b depends not only on the deposit rate offered by bank b but also on the rates offered by 
the other banks. Moreover, since banks in our model can default on their deposit obligations, the 
expected rate of return on deposit investment of Mr. 0 with bank b has to be adjusted appropriately 
for its corresponding expected default rate. Finally, Mr. 0 ’s deposit supply is a positive function of 
the expected GDP in the subsequent period.
In sum, since his deposit decisions determine his investment portfolio, given the expected rates 
of return, he diversifies among the existing deposit markets. Mr. 0 ’s deposit supply function with 
bank b, V6  G B, is as follows:
In (df) =  zbA + zb,2 ln\p(GDPi) + ( 1  -  p)GDPu] + zb>3[rbd(pvb +  ( 1  - p ) « ”)]
+*6,4 ^2 frdiPVi + ( 1 - p ) uii)] (4 -12)
b^beB
where,
d f =  amount of money that agent 0 chooses to deposit with bank b G B.
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4 .2 .3 .3  H ou seh old s’ Loan R epaym ent R ates
We assume that each household’s repayment rate on his loan obligation to his nature-selected bank 
in state s 6  S  is a positive function of the corresponding GDP level as well as the aggregate credit 
supply in the economy. The latter variable captures the effect of ‘credit crunch’ in the economy 
whereby a fall in the overall credit supply in the economy aggravates the default probability of every 
household. 10 Specifically, the functional form of the repayment rate of household hb, \/hb 6  H b, to 
his nature-selected bank b E B, in state s € S  is as follows:
ln(wJfc) =  9h>,s,i + 9 hb,s,2 In{GDPs) +  0 fc*t*>3 [ln(m7) +  ln(m*) +  ln(mT)] (4.13)
4.2.4 G D P
As can be seen from equations (4.11) to (4.13), we have assumed that households’ actions depend on 
their expected GDP in the second period. So, in this section we endogenise GDP in both states of 
the second period. We assume that GDP in each state is a positive function of the aggregate credit 
supply available in the previous period. Since the Modigliani-Miller proposition does not hold in 
our model11, higher credit extension as a result of loosening monetary policy, or any other shocks, 
increases private agents’ liquidity which in turn raises consumption demand and ultimately GDP. In 
particular, the following functional form for GDP in state s 6  S' of the second period (GDPa) holds:
In (GDPS) =  uS)i +  uSi2 [ln(m7) +  \n(ms) +  ln(mT)] (4.14)
4.2.5 Market Clearing Conditions
There are seven active markets in the model (three consumer loan, three deposit and one interbank 
markets). Each of these markets determines an interest rate that equilibrates demand and supply
10Higher interest rates, given that households are liquidity constrained, u ltim ately increase their debt obligations 
in the future. Hence, defaults rise.
11 See Goodhart et al. (2003) for an extensive discussion.
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in equilibrium.12
1 + r 6 =  !=r, hb <EHb, \ /b e B
m
1 + rbd =
dt
1 + p - M  + d6
(i.e. bank 6 ’s loan market clears) (4.15) 
(i.e. bank 6 ’s deposit market clears) (4.16) 
(i.e. interbank market clears) (4.17)
We note that these interest rates, i.e. r b, rd, and p,b G B, are the ex ante nominal interest rates 
that incorporate default premium since default is permitted in equilibrium. Their effective (ex post) 
interest rates have to be suitably adjusted to account for default in their corresponding markets. 13
4.2.6 Equilibrium
Let ab =  {rrP, p b, p bd,v b,7rb,eb,k b} G R + x R  x R+ x R%_ x R 2 x R 2 x R 2 for b G { 7 ,r} ; a5 = 
{m?,d6,fj,5d,v%,Trs3,es,kg} G R+ x R  x R + x R \  x R 2 x R 2 x  R 2\ a hb =  (p.hb,v3£) G R+ x R for 
hb G H b and ; a^ = (d$) G R+ for b G B\ and GDPS G R 2. Also, let 77 G {r^ ,rT,r s ,r d,r d,r d, p}, 
B b(ri) =  { crb : (4.1) — (4.2) hold }, and B 5(rj) =  { as : (4.6) — (4.7) hold }. We say that 
(MbefT.r}* ^ > V, 6, v*, (GDPS) ses) is a monetary equilibrium with commercial banks
and default for the economy
E {(eb0, Othersb, A b)beB\M; ( k \  Xb, \ bks,u , uj,Z)beB,seS-, rA',p}
iff:
(z) (a )  ab G Argmax ^ ( z r 6) , b G { 7 ,  r }
crbE B b(i7)
(b )  c /  G A r ^ m a x I I ‘5(7r(5)
<7s e B s (r])
( i .e .  a l l  b a n k s  o p t im is e .)
(zz) All markets (4.15)-(4.17) clear.
E «.V
(in) R ,  =  — 5- ,  s e S
be{-y ,T>
13The interest rate formation mechanism is identical to the offer-for-sale mechanism in D ubey and Shubik (1978).
The denominator of each of the expressions (4.15-4.17) represents the supply side whereas the numerator divided
by (1 +  r ) ,  r  €  { r b,r ^ ,p } ,  b G B  corresponds to the demand. N ote that this interest rate formation mechanism is
well-defined both in, and out of, equilibrium.
13For more on the m ethod of calculating the ex post interest rates, see Shubik and Tsom ocos (1992).
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(i.e. bank 6 is correct in its expectation about the repayment rates that it gets from its interbank 
investment.)
We emphasise here that the equilibrium conditions (i ) — (Hi) are consistent with the defining 
properties of a competitive equilibrium with rational expectations.
(iv) crhb, and GDPS, for h e  H  and s e  S  satisfy the reduced-form equations (4.11)-(4.14).
(i.e. loan demand, deposit supply, repayment rates, and GDP in both states satisfy the reduced- 
form equations (4.11)-(4.14).)
4.3 C alibration
Excluding the Lagrange multipliers, conditions (i) — (iv) in the previous section imply that we have 
a system of 56 equations in 135 unknown variables, 79 of which are exogenous variables/parameters 
in the model. This implies that there are 79 variables whose values have to  be chosen in order 
to obtain a numerical solution to the model. Thus, they represent the degrees of freedom in the 
system and can either be set appropriately or calibrated against the real data. It is important to 
note that these variables, which are exogenous when solving the system of simultaneous equations, 
do not necessarily have to be those which are exogenous in the model.14 We report the values of 
exogenous parameters/variables in the model and the resulting initial equilibrium in Table 4.1. The 
table also summarises whether the value of each variable reported is (1 ) calibrated against real data,
(2) arbitrarily selected, or (3) endogenously solved. We note, however, that, owing to the data 
confidentiality reason, we suppress those numbers which are based on the calibrated balance sheet 
data of UK banks and replace them by ‘xxx’ in Table 4.1. Unless stated otherwise, the values of all 
the nominal variables reported therein, e.g. all bank balance sheet items, are normalised by 1 0 10.
The values of all banks’ balance sheet items in the initial period, i.e. {m b, n bd, O thersb, A b}beB, 
{ /^b}be {7)T}, and {d5}, are calibrated using the 2 0 0 2  annual account data for seven largest U K  banks. 
Based on this source of data, we also calibrate the values of private agents’ loan repayment rates 
to their nature-selected banks in the good/normal state, i.e. (v!£){hbeHb}i using the data of each 
bank 6 ’s ratio of provision at the end of the year to total customer loans. However, since there are 
no data available for crisis/extreme events, the default rates of all private agents in the bad state
(state ii) are arbitrarily set to 0 .1 .
14 For exam ple, the Central Bank in our m odel fixes its base m oney and lets the interbank interest rate adjust 
endogenously, i.e. base money is exogenous in the model. However, in solving for a numerical solution , we can first 
choose the value of the interbank rate and let the system  of sim ultaneous equations determ ine endogenously the value 
of base m oney that supports the preset value of the interbank rate.
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Initial Equilibrium Exogenous variables in the model
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Table 4.1: Exogenous variables and the initial equilibrium
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The probability that state ii will occur, 1 —p, is chosen to be 0.05, given that it reflects an extreme 
event. Since banks rarely default on their debt obligations in the good state, the corresponding 
repayment rates in the deposit and interbank markets for all banks, i.e. v \ , b E B , are set to 0.999. 
In state ii, the bad state, we arbitrarily set the analogous repayment rates to 0.95 for banks 7  and 
t  and 0.955 for bank S. These values are selected to be relatively higher compared with households’ 
repayment rates in state ii (0.9) since in reality the probability that banks would default on their 
financial obligations is smaller than that of households. Note also that the chosen value for bank 
S’s repayment rate is slightly greater than those of the other two banks because its deposit rate, 
whose values are determined endogenously, is slightly smaller in equilibrium. This may suggest at 
first glance that we are assuming what we need to estimate, i.e. a bank’s willingness to run a risky 
position, which could lead to enforced shut down. Not quite so, since each chosen value for a bank’s 
chosen default rate relates to an equivalent subjective default penalty. If you give us, the model 
builders, some guidance on banks’ aversion to default penalties, i.e. the size of the \ b3,b  E B ,s  E S, 
we can adjust the default probabilities accordingly.
We choose the value of the interbank interest rate, p, to be 4 percent to match with the actual 
value of UK RP rate in December 2002. The value of risk weight for loans is set to 1 whereas 
the corresponding values for market book and interbank lending are 0.2. The value of capital to 
asset requirement set by the regulator for each bank (fc6, b E B) is chosen to be slightly higher, 
but almost equal to, its corresponding value in state i so that all banks always violate their capital 
requirement. 15
The values of default and capital violation penalties (A5 and A\ a,b E B ,s  E S) reflect both the 
tightness of the regulator’s regulatory policy and the (subjective) aversion of banks’ managements to 
putting themselves at risk of default and/or regulatory violations, and can, in principle, be treated 
as inputs given by the practitioner users of this model. Their values are, however, unobservable and 
therefore have to be chosen somehow. We have chosen them in this example to be consistent with 
the following outcomes. First, the resulting endogenously-solved banks’ lending rates are such that 
all banks earn positive profit in state i, whereas they suffer a loss in state ii. This in turn implies 
that banks’ capital at t = 2 deteriorates if the bad state (ii) occurs. Second, all banks’ coefficients of 
risk aversion (c3,b E B, s E S) are positive, implying that banks’ utility functions are well-behaved, 
i.e. concave. Lastly, the rate of return on market book is arbitrarily chosen to be 4.5 percent.
15 As mentioned in section 4.2.1, this is a simplifying assum ption. Recall that capital requirements’ violation penalty  
enters banks’ objective functions as ‘max[0, kb — A;*]’. However, given our assum ption that banks always violate their 
capital requirement, we can restrict the optim isation problem to kb — k3 > 0 , thus avoiding ‘corner’ equilibria.
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We calibrate the value of GDP in the good state (GDP*) to match with the actual UK (annual) 
GDP in 2002. We set the value of GDP in the bad state (GDPjj) to represent a 4% fall from its 
corresponding value in the good state. The values of coefficients ahb2 and aftb 3, Vhb € H b, in the 
reduced-form equation (4.11) are calibrated, respectively, using the values of the long-run income 
and interest rate elasticities of UK household sector estimated by Chrystal and Mizen (2001).
To our knowledge, we do not know any empirical study which estimates deposit supply and 
default probability functions for UK household/private sectors. Although this can, in principle, be 
done, such an exercise is beyond the scope of this chapter. So, we arbitrarily choose the appropriate 
values of ^6 ,3 , 2 5 ,4 , V6  6  B, in equation (4.12), and the values of ghb,s ,2 and 9hb,s,3 > Vh6 e  H b, 
s 6  S', in equation (4.13). As can be seen from Table 4.1, the values of ^ 6  ^ 3  is chosen to be greater 
than the corresponding values of ghb,ut3 , V7ib E H b, implying that the effect of a ‘credit crunch’ is 
assumed to be stronger in the bad state.
The remaining parameters for which their values have to be chosen are the coefficients uS|2 , 
Vs 6  S, in the reduced-form equation (4.14). We set them to be equal to 0.1. Because the value of 
these coefficients capture the inter-relationship between real and nominal variables in the economy, 
they are therefore important in determining the strength of the ‘amplification’ effect when a shock 
hits the economic system. For this reason, as will be seen in section 4.5, we conduct a robustness 
check by considering alternative initial values of these two parameters in our simulation exercise. At 
this point we note that the above specifications rely on the monetary and regulatory non-neutrality 
properties of our model. We formally prove these propositions in Goodhart et al. (2003).
Given the chosen values of the variables mentioned above, we are left with the system of 56 
simultaneous equations in 56 unknown variables. By solving such system, the values of all the 
remaining variables are specified and a numerical solution to the model is obtained.
4.4  C om parative Static Analysis: Stress T esting U K  Banks
In this section we show how the model can be used as a risk assessment tool for UK banks. Given that 
the initial equilibrium has been found, we conduct a series of comparative statics by perturbing each 
of the variables which are exogenous in the model and studying how the initial equilibrium changes. 16 
Table 4.A.1 in the Appendix reports the directional responses of all endogenous variables in the 
model given that we increase the values of the variables listed in the first column one at a time. 
Recall that these comparative statics are based on the base-line specification, which assumes that
16 The calculation is carried out using a version of N ew ton’s m ethod in Mathematica .
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Table 4.2: Responses of key variables (percentage changes from the initial equilibrium) to  a positive 
shock in base money
the Central Bank’s monetary policy instrument is its base money. In what follows, we also conduct 
an alternative set of comparative statics whereby the Central Bank is assumed to set the interbank 
rate as its instrument and let its base money adjust endogenously. 17 Table 4.A.2 in the Appendix 
reports the results of this alternative set of comparative statics in an analogous format to Table 
4.A.I.
4.4.1 A n expansionary m onetary policy
We first analyse the case when the Bank of England engages in an expansionary monetary policy. 
As expected, we found that the result is exactly the same regardless of whether the Bank uses its 
base money or the interbank rate as its monetary policy instrument (i.e. the Bank increases its base 
money and allows the interbank rate to be determined endogenously, produces the same result as the 
case when the Bank decreases the interbank rate and lets its base money adjust endogenously). We 
summarise the percentage changes in the values of certain key variables in response to an increase 
in the Bank’s base money from 69.28 to 71.28 trillion pounds (approximately 2.9%) in Table 4.2. 
As can be seen from the table, the interbank rate decreases by 0.8%. Given a lower rate of return 
on interbank market investment, other things constant, bank 8 invests less in this market (recall 
that bank 8 is the net lender in this market). It demands less funds from the deposit market and it 
increases its loan supply to its nature-selected customer, Mr. /3. This portfolio adjustment of bank 
5 produces a negative pressure on both its deposit and lending rates. Unlike bank 8, banks 7  and 
r  are the net borrowers in the interbank market. Thus they respond to a lower cost of interbank 
borrowing by reducing their demand for deposits, borrowing more from the interbank market, and 
lending more to their nature-selected customers, Mr. a  and 6, respectively. This, in turn, causes a 
negative pressure on these two banks’ deposit and lending rates.
All banks rationally anticipate that their greater credit extension would increase the overall 
supply of credit in the economy, thus causing the probability of household default to  decline. This
17M ore specifically, the interbank rate becom es an exogenous parameter in the model under this alternative speci­
fication.
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is because greater aggregate credit supply not only directly increases households’ liquidity but also 
increases their income in both states of the subsequent period. As can be seen from Table 4.2, GDP 
increases by 0.05% in both states. Thus, the expected rate of return from extending loans increases 
for all banks, implying that their willingness to supply more credit rises even further.
Given higher expected GDP in both states, every household borrower (i.e. Mr. ct,/3, and 9) 
demands more loans, imposing a positive pressure on the lending rates offered by their respective 
nature-selected banks. However, this ‘crowding-out’ effect is dominated by the corresponding neg­
ative pressure from greater credit supply by all banks. Thus, we observe that their lending rates 
decline (0.9% for bank <5, and 1% for banks 7  and r). We also find that the deposit rates offered 
by all banks decrease (i.e. 0.9% for bank S and 0.8% for banks 7  and r). This is not only because 
all banks demand less funds from the deposit markets but also because Mr. (j> responds to higher 
expected GDP by supplying more deposits to every bank.
Banks in our model choose their optimal expected level of profitability by equating the derived 
marginal benefit with the corresponding marginal cost. On the one hand, higher profitability not 
only directly increases their utility but also raises their capital to asset ratios, allowing them to 
suffer less capital violation penalties. This latter source of marginal benefit is lower the higher the 
value of banks’ risk-weighted assets. 18 On the other hand, in order to achieve higher profitability, 
other things constant, they take more risk and therefore suffer higher cost in the form of higher 
expected default penalties . 19 In this comparative static exercise, since the default probability of all 
household borrowers decreases in both states, the corresponding values of every bank’s risk-weighted 
assets increase. This leads all banks to revise the trade off between the relative marginal benefit 
and cost in such a way that they are willing to achieve a marginally lower level of profitability in 
both states, compared with the corresponding initial equilibrium value, in pursuit of suffering less 
default penalties . 20 Consequently, their capital declines slightly in both states compared with the 
initial equilibrium. This, together with the fact that the values of their risk-weighted assets increase, 
causes all banks to suffer greater capital violation penalties.
18For exam ple, if the profit of a bank increases by 1 dollar, given that its risk-weighted asset is 1 0 0  dollar, its 
capital to asset ratio would increase by However, if the value of the risk-weighted assets is 1000 dollar, the bank’s 
capital to asset ratio would increase by much less, i.e. by y ^ q .
19Recall that we interpret a bank’s continuous default rate as isomorphic to the probability that the bank will shut 
down, and therefore, at least in the very short run, com pletely default on its obligations. Thus, when banks choose 
higher default rates, this implies that it adopts a riskier position.
20 More precisely, higher risk-weighted assets in both states for all banks cause their marginal benefit of achieving  
higher profitability in terms of suffering less capital violation penalties to  decrease. Given that the marginal benefit 
of achieving higher profitability is now lower than the corresponding marginal cost, they reduce their optim al desired 
level of profits.
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Table 4.3: Responses of key variables (percentage changes from the initial equilibrium) to a positive 
deposit supply shock on bank <5; Central Bank sets base money
Given that banks operate under a perfectly competitive environment, they treat all interest rates 
and the households’ default probability as given when making their optimal decisions. However, in 
response to shocks, these variables have to adjust endogenously to satisfy market clearing conditions, 
where the direction and extent of the adjustment depend on how banks and households adjust their 
portfolios. This ‘portfolio reallocation’ effect produces pressures on banks’ profitability and their 
willingness to take risk. 21 As for bank 8 in both states and banks 7  and r  in the bad state, this 
portfolio reallocation effect is relatively weak, causing them to simply adopt a more conservative 
position in response to their lower targeted level of profitability. However, for banks 7  and r  in the 
good state, the portfolio reallocation effect produces a relatively strong negative pressure on their 
profitability so that they end up adopting a slightly riskier position in order to achieve their targeted 
level of profits.
4.4.2 A  positive deposit supply shock to  bank 5 in th e initial period
We next turn to the scenario where there is a positive deposit supply shock to bank S in the initial 
period. In particular, we increase the (log) autonomous deposit supply of Mr. <j> with bank 8 (2 ,5,1 ) 
by approximately 0.8%. We first assume that the Bank fixes base money as its monetary policy 
instrument, allowing the interbank rate to be determined endogenously. We report the percentage 
changes of certain key variables in response to the shock in Table 4.3. Not surprisingly, the results 
are almost qualitatively identical to that of a change in the Bank’s injection of funds, since both 
represent a change in the overall broad money supply. The difference is that here we assume that 
the shock is concentrated in bank 8.
Major differences arise, however, when we analyse the effects of the shock in the context whereby 
the Bank fixes the interbank rate as its monetary policy instrument. Key results are summarised 
in Table 4.4. In the previous case, even though the effect of the shock is initially concentrated in
21 For exam ple, a bank may respond to a positive shock by supplying more loans, thereby imposing a negative  
pressure on the lending rate. Similarly, the shock may cause household borrowers to demand more loans from such 
a bank, causing a positive crowding-out pressure on the lending rate. T he relative strength of the pressures caused 
by the bank’s and the borrower’s portfolio adjustm ent depends in general on the relative elasticities of demand and 
supply in such a market.
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Table 4.4: Responses of key variables (percentage changes from the initial equilibrium) to a positive 
deposit supply shock on bank 6; Central Bank sets the interbank rate
bank 6, we observe that the other two banks also benefit from increased overall liquidity through 
their interactions in the interbank market. In particular, a positive deposit supply shock in bank 
5 causes the bank to supply more liquidity in the interbank market. Such higher liquidity is then 
passed on to banks 7  and r  in the form of a lower cost of interbank borrowing. However, in this 
case, the Bank’s intervention to maintain the interbank rate at its original level precisely shuts down 
this interbank rate channel, causing the dominant channel of contagion to become the one which 
operates via changes in the household sector’s default probability in the loan market instead. The 
chain of contagion of this ‘consumer loan default’ channel begins with bank <5’s decision to supply 
more credit. This in turn causes the overall credit supply in the economy to increase. This implies 
that every household benefits directly from greater liquidity as well as from higher income (GDP) 
in both states i and ii of the subsequent period. Thus, the default probability of every household in 
the consumer loan market decreases, causing the expected rate of return from extending more loans 
to increase not only for bank <5 but also for banks 7  and r . Consequently, their respective lending 
rates fall. Since the cost of interbank borrowing is fixed regardless of the amount demanded, the 
two banks finance their greater credit extension by borrowing more from the interbank market.
As can be seen clearly by comparing the results presented in Tables 4.3 and 4.4, the contagion 
effects when the Bank’s monetary instrument is the interbank rate are much weaker than those 
observed when the Bank fixes its base money. This is because fixing the interbank rate not only 
directly shuts down the interbank rate contagion channel but also weakens the extent of contagion 
effects which operate through the consumer loan default channel. As mentioned, the contagion effects 
which operate via the latter channel arise from bank S's decision to extend more credit. However, the 
Bank’s intervention to fix the interbank rate implicitly increases the attractiveness of the interbank 
investment for bank S since its rate of return does not diminish as it invests more. Thus, even 
though we observe that bank 5 increases its credit extension when the Bank fixes the interbank rate, 
the extent of such increase is not as strong compared to the case when the rate is allowed to  adjust 
endogenously. Put differently, the money supply multiplier is larger when the Bank does not target 
interest rates since besides their direct effect due to increased deposits, a second-order effect from
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Table 4.5: Responses of key variables (percentage changes from the initial equilibrium) to a positive 
shock on bank 6 ’s capital at t  = 1; Central Bank sets base money
allowing the interbank rate to change enhances credit supply of the entire banking sector.
4.4.3 A  positive bank capital shock to  bank 5 in th e  initial period
In this comparative static exercise, we increase the capital endowment of bank 5 in the initial period 
by approximately 5.6%. As before, we first consider the case when the Bank sets its base money 
as its instrument. The percentage changes in the values of certain key variables in response to such 
shock is summarised in Table 4.5. We observe that the directional responses of most of the variables 
are the same as the case when we assume that there is a positive deposit supply shock to bank S. 
This is because these two shocks both result in more available funds for bank 6 to invest. However, 
the exception is the response of bank <J’s capital, and capital to asset ratios, in the second period. 
Unlike the case of the positive deposit supply shock, here we observe that bank S’s capital position 
and its capital to adequacy ratios improve in both states of the world. The reason for this lies in 
the fact that a positive endowment shock imposes a direct positive effect on the capital of bank 5 in 
the second period, thus reducing its capital requirements’ violation penalty.
We now turn to analyse the effects of the same shock but this time under the assumption that 
the Bank fixes the interbank rate. Key results are reported in Table 4.6. As in the case when there 
is a positive deposit supply shock to bank S in state ii, we found in this case that the main contagion 
effects operate via the consumer loan default channel. However, the major difference is that here the 
effects of liquidity injection in bank S produces negative contagion effects onto the rest of the banks 
in the banking sector. Recall that the Bank’s sterilisation policy in the interbank market increases 
the relative attractiveness of interbank investment, implying that bank 5 responds to higher capital 
by increasing its investment in the interbank market. Unlike the results found in section 4.4.2, 
however, the extent of such increase is so large that bank S has to switch part of its investment 
away from the loan market. This in turn puts a downward pressure on the overall credit supply in 
the economy, aggravating the probability of default in the consumer loan markets. This negative 
contagion effect depresses the other two banks’ expected return on their credit extension. Thus,
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Table 4.6: Responses of key variables (percentage changes from the initial equilibrium) to a positive 
shock on bank <5’s capital at t  = 1; Central Bank sets the interbank rate
they extend less credit, causing the aggregate output to fall in both states. This in turn worsens the 
severity of credit crunch in the economic system even further. Moreover, unlike before, we observe 
that banks 7  and r  now violate ‘less’ capital adequacy requirements and therefore suffer less capital 
violation penalties. This is because a higher default probability of every household causes the values 
of banks 7 ’s and t ’s  risk-weighted assets to decrease. In sum, we see that emergency liquidity 
assistance in the form of bank capital injection, when implemented under interest rate targeting 
regime, may engender adverse effects to financial stability. Banks may radically restructure their 
portfolios in a way that depresses credit extension in the loan markets.
One of the key implications from our results presented thus far is that, as far as financial stability 
is concerned, there is no clear-cut answer as to whether a Central Bank should set the interbank 
rate or base money as its monetary policy instrument. Although all the contagion effects which 
operate through the interbank rate channel are completely sterilised away when the Central Bank’s 
instrument is the interbank rate, such a sterilisation policy may mitigate the extent of contagion 
effects which operate via other channels of contagion. As the results in this section show, the 
direction of contagion effects can even be reversed, thereby producing negative rather than positive 
contagion effects to the rest of the economic system. Disentangling the issue is beyond the scope of 
this chapter. Since our main objective here is to study financial contagion and banks’ inter-linkages, 
we have chosen to focus our analysis in the remainder of this chapter on our base-line specification 
(i.e. the Bank’s monetary policy instrument is base money). This allows all contagion channels to 
operate actively in equilibrium.
4.4.4 A n increase in default penalties im posed on all banks in th e  bad  
state
We now turn to analyse the case where the regulator engages in a restrictive regulatory policy by 
increasing the default penalties imposed on all banks in the bad state from 1 .1  to 1 . 1 2  (approximately 
1.8%). This implies that adopting a riskier position in the bad state is more costly for all banks 
since by doing so they have to suffer greater default penalties in this particular state. Thus, as
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Table 4.7: Responses of key variables (percentage changes from the initial equilibrium) to a rise in 
default penalty for all bank in state ii\ Central Bank sets base money
reported in Table 4.7, all banks optimally choose a significantly lower desired level of profitability in 
the bad state, allowing them to adopt a much more conservative position and therefore to mitigate 
the extent of default penalties that they have to face in this particular state. Moreover, bank 5 
increases its investment in the interbank market which is relatively ‘safer’ in the bad state.22 In 
doing so, it borrows more from the deposit market, and invests less in the loan market. This portfolio 
adjustment of bank S imposes a negative pressure on the interbank rate and produces a positive 
pressure on its lending and deposit rates. In response, Mr. 0 supplies more deposits with bank S 
and less with the other two banks.
Unlike bank S, banks 7 ’s and r ’s initial positions in the interbank market are net borrowers. 
Thus, even though interbank investment is now relatively safer, switching its ‘net’ position in such 
market would result in a relatively more severe negative portfolio reallocation effect on these banks’ 
overall payoff. Anticipating this, they ‘gamble to resurrect’ by extending more loans, expecting that 
such an action would increase their profitability in the good state, which is not subject to higher 
default penalties, and therefore to reduce the extent of the decline in their overall payoff which is 
due mainly to the significant fall in their profitability in the bad state. This causes their lending 
rates to decrease both by 0.08%. Given a lower interbank rate, they also adjust their portfolios by 
switching away from the deposit market and borrowing more from the interbank market, causing 
their deposit rates to decrease by 0.4%.
We observe that the extent of decrease in bank <5’s credit extension is larger than the extent of 
increase in banks 7 ’s and r ’s credit supply combined, causing the overall supply of credit in the 
economy to fall. This directly decreases households’ liquidity, which in turn imposes a downward 
pressure on the probability that households will repay their loan obligations in full. This pressure is 
further exacerbated since lower aggregate credit supply depresses GDP in both states of the second 
period (i.e. by 0.003% in both states), causing the corresponding income of every household to fall.
As mentioned, because of the direct first-order effect of the initial shock (i.e. higher default 
penalty in state i i), all banks are willing to obtain lower profitability in the bad state, compared
22  M o r e  s p e c i f ic a l ly ,  t h e  p r o b a b i l i t y  w i t h  w h ic h  b a n k s  ( 7 , r )  c h o o s e  t o  d e f a u l t  c o m p l e t e l y  o n  t h e i r  in t e r b a n k  o b l ig ­
a t io n s  is  l e s s  t h a n  t h e  c o r r e s p o n d in g  p r o b a b i l i t y  o f  M r . /3 o n  h is  l o a n s .
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Table 4.8: Responses of key variables (percentage changes from the initial equilibrium) to a rise in 
CAR penalty for all bank in state ii; Central Bank sets base money
with the corresponding initial equilibrium level, and therefore to adopt a more conservative position 
in the bad state, causing their corresponding profitability and capital to decrease so much that they 
suffer more capital violation penalties in this particular state. In state i , because households’ default 
probability is higher, the values of their risk-weighted assets in this particular state decrease. This 
changing condition alters the trade off between the benefit derived from higher profitability and 
the corresponding cost in terms of suffering more default penalties in such a way that it favours 
the former. Thus, all banks optimally choose to target a slightly higher level of profitability in the 
good state, causing the corresponding value of their capital to increase marginally. Even though the 
targeted level of profits is higher, owing to the relatively strong and positive portfolio reallocation 
effect, all banks can adopt a slightly more conservative position in the good state. Finally, since the 
values of risk-weighted assets decrease for all banks in the good state and that the corresponding 
values of their capital increase, they suffer slightly less capital violation penalties in this particular 
state.
4.4.5 A n increase in capital violation penalties for all banks in  th e  bad  
state
We next turn to another restrictive regulatory policy. Let the regulator increase the capital violation 
penalties for all banks in the bad state from 0.1 to 0.12 (approximately 20%). We summarise the 
percentage changes of some of the key variables in response to such shock in Table 4.8 . 23
Since violating capital requirement in state ii is now more costly for all banks, in response, they 
engage in the following actions in an attempt to increase the values of their capital to asset ratios 
in the bad state. First, they choose to increase their optimal profitability level in this particular
23 A s  c a n  b e  s e e n  f r o m  t h e  r e s u l t s  r e p o r t e d  in  T a b le s  4 . 7  a n d  4 .8 ,  t h e  e f f e c t s  o f  a n  i n c r e a s e  i n  d e f a u l t  p e n a l t y  a r e  
m u c h  s t r o n g e r  t h a n  t h e  c a s e  w h e n  w e  in c r e a s e  t h e  c a p i t a l  r e q u ir e m e n t s  v i o l a t i o n  p e n a l t y  b y  a  c o m p a r a b le  m a g n i t u d e .  
T h is  is  o w i n g  t o  o u r  c h o i c e  o f  p a r a m e t e r i s a t io n  w h ic h  a s s u m e s  t h a t  b a n k s  c a r e  r e l a t i v e l y  m o r e  a b o u t  t h e m  b e i n g  
p e n a l i s e d  f r o m  d e f a u l t i n g  o n  t h e i r  f in a n c i a l  o b l ig a t io n s ,  r a t h e r  t h a n  v i o l a t i n g  m o r e  t h e ir  c a p i t a l  r e q u i r e m e n t s .  T h i s  is  
a  r e a s o n a b le  a s s u m p t i o n  s in c e  b a n k s  in  o u r  m o d e l  c o m p a r e  t h e ir  a c t u a l  l e v e l  o f  c a p i t a l  w i t h  t h e i r  s e l f - i m p o s e d  id e a l  
c a p i t a l  h o l d in g ,  n o t  t h e  ( P i l l a r  1 )  m i n i m u m  c a p i t a l  r e q u ir e m e n t s .  T h u s ,  a s  m e n t i o n e d  e a r l i e r ,  t h e  c o s t  o f  v i o l a t i n g  
c a p i t a l  r e q u i r e m e n t s  in  o u r  m o d e l  l a r g e l y  r e p r e s e n t s  a  n o n - p e c u n i a r y  l o s s  o f  c o m f o r t  a n d  r e p u t a t i o n .  S u c h  c o s t  s h o u l d  
b e  o f  l e s s  c o n c e r n  t o  t h e  b a n k s  a s  c o n t r a s t e d  w i t h  t h e  c o s t  t h a t  t h e y  b e a r  f r o m  b r e a c h in g  t h e ir  f in a n c i a l  o b l i g a t i o n s .
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state by adopting a riskier position. The higher profitability, other things constant, improves their 
capital position in the bad state, allowing them ultimately to suffer fewer capital violation penalties. 
Second, banks 7  and 8 adjust their portfolios such that the size of their risk-weighted assets in 
the bad state decreases, thereby alleviating the extent of their capital requirements’ violation even 
further. For bank 7 , it reduces its overall investment by demanding less funds, both from the deposit 
and interbank markets, and invests less in the loan market. This causes both the interbank rate 
and its deposit rate to decrease and its lending rate to increase. Consequently, Mr. (j) supplies less 
deposits with bank 7  and Mr. a  demands less funds from bank 7 . Bank 8 also demands less funds 
from the deposit market, causing its deposit rate to fall and Mr. <f> to supply less deposits with 
bank 8. Moreover, it reduces its investment both in the loan and interbank markets. The extent 
of decline in bank 8’s interbank investment is further aggravated since the interbank rate is now 
lower. Because bank 5’s action produces an upward pressure on its lending rate, Mr. /3 demands 
less consumer loans.
Even though a higher capital violation penalty in state ii produces an upward pressure on the 
cost of extending more credit for bank r , such a pressure is marginally outweighed by the negative 
pressure arising from a cheaper cost of interbank borrowing. Thus, bank r  borrows less from the 
deposit market, switches to borrow more from the interbank market, and extends slightly more loans 
to Mr. 6. Thus, both its deposit and lending rates decrease by 0.006% and 0.001%, respectively.
Because the extent of decrease in credit extension by banks 7  and 8 over-compensates the extent 
of increase in the credit supply of bank r , the aggregate supply of credit in the economy decreases. 
This causes GDP to decline in both states (i.e. by 0.0008% in both states), which in turn  results in 
a higher default probability of every household.
4.4.6 A  positive shock in  G D P in th e  bad state
Our final comparative static exercise studies the effect of a positive shock in the autonomous com­
ponent of GDP in the bad state. In particular, we increase the value of u\ by 0.6% .24 Table 4.9 
summarises certain key results.
The shock directly increases the expected aggregate output in the second period. This simulta­
neously raises all individual borrowers’ demand for loans, and the probability that they will repay 
their loans in full, as well as increases Mr. $ ’s supply of deposits with every bank. Given a higher 
loan demand by Mr. a  and 9, the lending rates offered by their respective nature-selected banks ( 7
and r)  increase by 1.1%. Moreover, a decrease in the default probability of Mr. a  and 6 further
24This is tantam ount to an increase in the autonom ous GDP in the bad state by 2.02%.
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Table 4.9: Responses of key variables (percentage changes from the initial equilibrium) to a rise in 
GDP in state ii; Central Bank sets base money
raises the expected rates of return on credit extension for banks 7  and r. Thus, these banks supply 
more credit, and demand more funds from both the deposit and interbank markets. Even though 
Mr. 0 ’s decision to deposit more with these banks imposes a negative pressure on banks 7 ’s and 
r ’s deposit rates, such a pressure is relatively weak when compared to  the positive effect from these 
banks’ greater demand for deposits. Thus, we observe that the interbank rate and the deposit rates 
offered by the two banks increase.
For the same reason as banks 7  and r ,  bank S supplies more loans to Mr. /3. Unlike the other 
two banks, however, bank S is the net lender in the interbank market. So, it responds to  a higher 
interbank rate by investing more in the interbank market. To finance its greater investment, bank 
5 demands more funds from the deposit market, pushing up its deposit rate by 2.4%.
As mentioned, the initial shock directly increases the probability that an individual household 
will repay his loans in full. The extent of such increase is further magnified since the overall credit 
supply in the economy and the aggregate output in both states increase.25 Consequently, the values 
of all banks’ risk-weighted assets rise. This in turn implies that the marginal benefit of higher 
profitability in terms of suffering less capital violation penalties for all banks is lower. Thus, banks 
revise their optimal level of profits downward in order to suffer lower default penalties. This directly 
worsens their capital position. Given lower profitability, bank 7  is able to adopt a more conservative 
position in both states. The same is true for banks S and r  in the bad state. However, the negative 
portfolio reallocation effect on banks 6 ’s and r ’s profitability in the good state is so strong that they 
have to adopt a riskier position to be able to achieve the targeted profitability level.
25A s can be seen from Table 4.9, GDP in the bad state rise by 2.03%, 2.02% of which is from the direct effect and 
0 .0 1 % of which is from the indirect effect via higher aggregate supply of credit in the economy.
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4.5 R obustness Check: T he effect o f an expansionary m one­
tary policy  under alternative in itial conditions
In section 4.4, we analysed the effect of an expansionary monetary policy on the economic system 
based on a given value of the parameters ua,2 , Vs 6  S', in the reduced-form equation (4.14). We have 
already noted that these parameters are important because they capture the degree of responsiveness 
of aggregate economic activities, as measured by GDP, to changes in financial variables of the 
model. Put differently, they represent the multiplier effect of changes in the overall credit supply in 
the economy with respect to aggregate output in the subsequent period. Thus, in this section, we 
provide a robustness check for the result of one of the comparative statics that we obtained in the 
previous section, i.e. a positive monetary policy shock, by studying the sensitivity of the impact of 
the shock on the economy as we simultaneously vary the value of the parameters uSt2 , Vs € S'. In 
doing so, we re-do another two independent comparative static exercises analogous to that shown 
in section 4.4.1, assuming instead that the value of the two parameters is 0 in the first and 0.05 in 
the second. Moreover, in order to maintain the same ‘initial’ equilibrium values of all endogenous 
variables across the these comparative statics, the values of autonomous part of (log) GDP (i.e. ua> 1 , 
Vs (E S') are adjusted accordingly. In this way, the initial equilibrium values of GDP in both states 
are the same across all comparative static exercises. Figure 4.2 reports the percentage changes in 
key variables in response to an expansionary monetary policy (i.e. an increase in base money from 
69.28 to 71.28 trillion pounds) under different values of ua>2 , Vs E S, i.e. 0, 0.05, and 0.1.
Assuming the same positive monetary policy shock, the remainder of this section analyses how 
the response of key endogenous variables changes as we simultaneously increase the value of uS)2 , 
Vs € S'. Given a higher value of these parameters, other things constant, an increase in same amount 
of aggregate credit supply results in a larger increase in GDP in both states of the subsequent period, 
causing, in turn, households’ default probability in the loan market to decrease more precipitously. 
This implies that, a higher value of these two parameters, other things constant, results in a higher 
expected rate of return from extending consumer loans for all banks. Thus, all banks increase their 
credit supply even more, causing the extent of increase in the aggregate credit supply in the economy 
to rise. This implies that extent of increase in GDP and the probability that households will repay 
in full in both states increase.
Since all banks supply more credit, they need more funds to finance their higher investment. 
Thus, although, as explained in section 4.4.1, all banks respond to a positive monetary policy shock 
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Figure 4.2: Percentage changes in key variables in response to an expansionary monetary policy 
under different values of uSt2 , Vs € S' (i.e. 0 , 0.05, 0 .1 ).
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the extent of decline in every bank’s deposit rates has to  be smaller as well. Moreover, banks 7  and 
r ,  which are net borrowers in the interbank market, demand an even greater amount of interbank 
borrowing. This causes a smaller decline in the interbank rate.
Because of the bigger multiplier effect of GDP with respect to aggregate credit extension in 
both states, the increase in all household borrowers’ loan demand is greater. This effect is strong 
enough to reduce the rate of decrease in every banks’ lending rates. Moreover, Mr. <f) increases his 
deposit supply to banks, thus increasing their available investment funds. This causes not only the 
percentage increase in bank S’s investment in the loan market to be higher but also the percentage 
decrease in its interbank investment to be lower.
Because the extent of decrease in households’ default probability in both states is bigger, the 
values of every bank’s risk-weighted assets grow by an even larger amount. This reduces the incentive 
for banks to achieve higher profitability even further. Consequently, all banks choose to achieve 
an even lower optimal level of profits, exacerbating the extent of decline in the capital violation 
penalties (recall that profits enter the numerator of the capital adequacy requirements). Given 
that the targeted level of profits decreases more substantially, banks 7  and r  choose a relatively 
more conservative portfolio, though such position is still riskier compared to their initial equilibrium 
positions. We observe, however, that the percentage increase in bank <5’s probability of default 
declines. This is because the negative pressure from the portfolio reallocation effect is relatively 
stronger for bank S.
In sum, we observe that the effect of an expansionary monetary policy on the economic system is, 
in general, directionally the same under alternative values of us>2 , Vs € 5. However, the magnitude of 
its effect on the banking sector and the real economy is found to be stronger as we increase the value 
of the parameters. This is because, in such a case, the ‘multiplier’ effect from changing aggregate 
credit condition to default and ultimately to aggregate output is stronger.
4.6 C onclusion
This is the first attem pt at calibration, to bring the model to real (UK) data, that we have made; 
the programme of work that we are following is just beginning to span the chasm between pure 
theory and practical empirical modelling. Nevertheless there is a long way yet to go. For example, 
this remains a two-period model only, in which banks take decisions in period one, e.g. determining 
their holdings of loans and deposits, on the basis of expectations of the potential states in period 
two; they then are stuck with their decisions in period two. In a longer period model, the outcome
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in period two would cause banks to revise their expectations of states in period three (e.g. as in a 
Markov switching model), thereby causing them dynamically to revise their loans/deposits in period 
two, and so on. Also, for a variety of reasons, mostly connected with data availability, we took the 
value of each bank’s trading books (its investments) as a constant throughout.
Although we have based this exercise on real UK data, it remains a simulation. It does not 
provide an independent check whether our model can capture the main time series properties of the 
major UK banks. Trying to do this latter, and also to work out some way to lengthen the number 
of time periods in the model, without making the model far too unwieldy to solve are priorities for 
future research. In particular, this analysis reveals how complex, and complicated, default is as an 
institution, which is one reason why it rarely figures in other models.
Given these constraints, the focus of this exercise was on adjustments in the interbank market, 
and in the relative interest rates on deposits and loans; hence, in part via changes in bank margins, 
this fed back into changes in bank profits, capital and CARs. Like most other empirical research 
in this field, we do not find much serious contagion occurring via the interbank market with our 
arbitrarily chosen set of banks. Note that we could re-do this exercise for any other pair of UK 
banks (with a third residual banking sector). One result that practitioners will have expected, but 
not perhaps academics, is that contagion is much diminished if the Central Bank targets interest 
rates rather than a fixed time path for base money. We intend to write this latter up as a separate 
academic article.
Perhaps the most striking result is the sensitivity of banking profitability (in a bad state) to 
changes in the ‘default penalty’ on banks, see Table 4.7. We think of this as measuring the general 
risk aversion of banks, which is a function of the banks’ own conservatism, and concern for regulation, 
interacting with externally-imposed discipline from markets and from the regulatory/supervisory 
regime. The greater the risks that bank managers are prepared to run, in pursuit of profit, the 
greater the probability of default in a bad state.
No doubt a glimpse of the obvious, but the problem is that such risk aversion is not objectively 
measurable. Indeed, but it is crucial, at least in our models. What this means is that to run models 
where default matters, the model builders will have to depend on the regulators/ supervisors to 
give them some input, e.g. in the form of rankings, on the relative appetite for risk of the various 
banks involved. It is not, however, clear whether this is a ‘good’ result, since it would require all 
concerned to focus on the really important issues, or a ‘bad’ result since it reveals just how difficult 
quantification and modelling continues to be in this field.
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Table 4.A.1: Simulation results (Directional effects of an increase in exogenous parameters on endogenous variables); 
Central Bank sets base money
IP n 7 n r < A i A
'VA i A A i Ct eh■X% A 6 -^it e*T. A Ai k6 A k7Kii kr< A A kT k
M + + r>u
zsi + + rss r^j rsj
Z'y 1 + + r-ss
PSe0 + — — + rsj r*~r + + rs«» r*j + + +
Aii - + + + t - t - + - + - + - + - + - - + - - + - - -
\ bAkii + + + + + + t + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +
uj
Ul — + + r<*> r>j
Note: kb =  pk ? +  ( 1  -p)A&, b E {7 ,5 ,r} ; k = (k° + W  + kT)/3] = (IP +  n 7 +  n T)/3
Table 4.A.1 (CONTINUE)
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Table 4.A.2: Simulation results (Directional effects of an increase in exogenous parameters on endogenous variables); 
Central Bank sets the interbank rate
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